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1. Kapitel
Einleitung und Zusammenfassung
1.1. Einleitung
Das Zusammenspiel von Wahlsystem und Wählerverhalten bestimmter sozialer Gruppen
wird in neueren Ansätzen der Political Economy als zentrale Erklärung einer ineffizienten
Wirtschaftspolitik angesehen (Baron, 1994; Grossman und Helpman, 1996; Persson und
Tabellini, 2000). Während die Betrachtung des Wahlsystems für die Analyse des Einflus-
ses formaler politischer Institutionen auf das politische Ergebnis unvermeidlich ist, ist die
Berücksichtigung informeller gesellschaftlicher Sozialstrukturen (Organisation der Wähler
in sozialen Netzwerken, Wählerbeliefs und Informationsstand) für eine Untersuchung des
Wählerverhaltens ausschlaggebend. Allerdings gibt es bislang keine fundierten empirischen
Untersuchungen, die explizit die theoretisch unterstellten Zusammenhänge zwischen Wäh-
lerverhalten und Implementierung (in-)effizienter Wirtschaftspolitiken, d.h. Government
Performance, quantitativ untersuchen.
Damit eine ökonomisch und sozial fundierte Wählerforschung zu einer Erhöhung der ge-
sellschaftlichen Wohlfahrt beitragen kann, muss vor allem gezeigt werden, welche Faktoren
Government Performance determinieren und die politischen Entscheidungen beeinflussen.
Die Ergebnisse des politischen Handelns sind im großen Teil von den gesellschaftlichen
Sozialstrukturen abhängig. Theoretisch hängt die Leistungsfähigkeit einer Regierung von
ihren politischen Anreizstrukturen ab. Diese spiegeln sich zumindest in demokratischen
Systemen insbesondere in ihren Wiederwahlchancen wider. Damit wird das Wählerverhal-
ten zu einem zentralen Bestimmungsfaktor der Government Performance. Konkret werden
in relevanten Studien (Bardhan und Mookherjee, 2002, 2006; Persson und Tabellini, 2000)
zwei der Leistungskontrolle zugrunde liegende Mechanismen, Government Capture und
Government Accountability, als Phänomene einer geringen Government Performance und
als Folge von nicht-politikorientierten Wahlmotiven, wie Parteiloyalität, diskutiert. Die
Faktoren, die eine Fähigkeit widerspiegeln, die lokalen Regierungen zur Verantwortung zu
ziehen, bilden Government Accountability. Unter dem Begriff Government Capture wird
ein formales Konzept des Staatsversagens verstanden, wonach an ihrer Wiederwahl interes-
sierte Politiker einen Anreiz haben, ineffiziente Politiken auszuwählen, die eine Minderheit
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gut informierter (reicher) Wähler auf Kosten der Mehrheit von armen, nicht informierten
Wählern besser stellen. Die aktuellen theoretischen Ansätze (Baron, 1994; Grossman und
Helpman, 1996; Bardhan und Mookherjee, 2002), die versuchen, die Implementierung in-
effizienter Wirtschaftspolitiken, d. h. eine geringe Regierungsperformanz, als Folge einer
Anreizproblematik demokratisch gewählter Politiker zu verstehen, stellen die theoretische
Grundlage für die empirischen Analysen zu nicht-politikorientierten Wahlmotiven in dieser
Arbeit dar.
Methodisch-theoretisch gehen alle Ansätze im Kern auf das Baron-Grossmann-Helpman-
(BGH)-Modell (Baron, 1994; Grossman und Helpman, 1996) zurück. Das BGH-Modell
geht von einem probabilistischen Wählermodell aus, welches zwischen informierten und
nicht informierten Wählern unterscheidet. Informierte Wähler wählen auf der Grundla-
ge der Politikplattformen der Parteien bzw. der Kandidaten. Dabei nimmt die Wahr-
scheinlichkeit, eine bestimmte Partei zu wählen, monoton mit der Relation zwischen der
gewichteten euklidischen Distanz der eigenen Politikposition eines Wählers und der poli-
tischen Position einer Partei ab. Dieser Ansatz entspricht der räumlichen Wählertheorie
von Downs (1957) bzw. der Formalisierung durch Enelow und Hinich (1984). Da uninfor-
mierte Wähler keine hinreichenden Informationen bzgl. der Auswirkungen von Politiken
auf ihre Wohlfahrt haben, können uninformierte Wähler im Gegensatz zu informierten
Wählern unterschiedliche Parteien auch nicht aufgrund ihrer Parteipositionen bewerten.
Stattdessen verwenden uninformierte Wähler unterschiedliche Nicht-Politik-Faktoren als
Proxies für ihren individuellen Nutzen, den sie mit der Wahl einer Partei verbinden. Re-
levante Nicht-Politik-Faktoren sind z. B. wahrgenommene Persönlichkeitsmerkmale der
Kandidaten als Proxies für politische Kompetenz, die grundlegende Affinität einer Par-
tei zu einer speziellen sozialen Klasse (z. B. Arbeiter- oder Bauernparteien) oder einer
ethnischen Gruppe oder uninformierte Wähler wählen anhand einer langfristig gebildeten
Parteiloyalität (Stammwähler). Entsprechend sind uninformierte Wähler im Gegensatz zu
informierten Wählern in ihrer Einschätzung der Parteien durch Wahlkampfaktivitäten be-
einflussbar.
Während die auf einem Rational-Choice-Ansatz basierenden probabilistischen Wählermo-
delle davon ausgehen, dass ein Wähler sich als rationaler Nutzenmaximierer verhält und
aufgrund dessen diejenige Alternative wählt, die ihm den größten Nutzen bringt, gibt es
einen zweiten interessanten Bereich von Forschungsansätzen. Laut diesen können Wähler
als wirtschaftspolitische Laien die komplexen Zusammenhänge zwischen wirtschaftspoli-
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tischen Maßnahmen und dadurch implizierten Wohlfahrtseffekten nicht erfassen (Caplan,
2007). Wähler bilden naive mentale Modelle, mit denen sie den Zusammenhang zwischen
Politik und implizierten Wohlfahrtseffekten vereinfacht abbilden. Diese einfachen menta-
len Modelle bezeichnet Caplan als Policy Beliefs. Wähler beurteilen somit Politiken bzw.
politische Positionen von Parteien auf der Grundlage ihrer Policy Beliefs. Insofern ist die
Beurteilung von Politiken wie auch die politikorientierte Bewertung von Parteien verzerrt,
solange diese Wählerbeliefs verzerrt sind. Caplan belegt mit einer Reihe von empirischen
Studien überzeugend, dass die Wählerbeliefs hinsichtlich der Wirkung von wirtschaftspo-
litischen Maßnahmen im Vergleich zu entsprechenden Wirtschaftsexpertenmeinungen sehr
stark und systematisch verzerrt sind. Auf der Grundlage seiner empirischen Ergebnisse
zieht Caplan (2007) die pessimistische Schlussfolgerung, dass „democratic mechanisms of
preference aggregation naturally lead to the choice of inefficient policies“. Die Arbeiten
von Caplan wurden unter anderem von Beilhartz und Gersbach (2004) sowie Bischoff und
Siemers (2011) aufgegriffen und vertieft. Interessanterweise führen verzerrte Wählerbeliefs
nicht nur zu pareto-ineffizienten Politiken, sondern diese bedingen zudem, dass Govern-
ment Capture wie auch eine geringe Government Accountability weder eine notwendige
noch eine hinreichende Bedingung für Politikversagen darstellen.
Die neueren Studien der empirischen Wahlforschung in Industrieländern fokussieren sich
neben der Erklärung des Wahlverhaltens und der Wahlbeteiligung (Geys, 2006; Bhatti
et al., 2012) auf die Untersuchung der Wahlstrategien der Kandidaten z. B. in politi-
schen Wahlen in den USA (Ansolabehere et al., 2001; Graefe, 2013; Simas, 2013; Scotto
et al., 2010). Weiterhin wird in europäischen Wahlstudien die grundsätzliche Bedeutung
unterschiedlicher Wählermotive untersucht (Lewis-Beck und Nadeau, 2000; Kousser, 2004;
Wagner und Kritzinger, 2012; Fraile und Lewis-Beck, 2013; Costa Lobo, 2013) bzw. die
spezielle für Deutschland (Konzelmann et al., 2012; Clarke und Whitten, 2013; Schmitt-
Beck und Mackenrodt,2010). In Entwicklungsländern gibt es ebenfalls eine Vielzahl von
empirischen Wahlstudien, die sich im Gegensatz zu Industrieländern allerdings primär auf
die deskriptive Analyse des Wählerverhaltens konzentrieren. Hingegen steht die Ablei-
tung von Wahlkampfstrategien wie auch die Analyse grundlegender theoretischer Model-
lierungsfragen weniger im Vordergrund der Analysen. Beispielsweise ist die Mehrzahl der
empirischen Wahlstudien in afrikanischen Ländern auf die deskriptive Analyse des afrika-
nischen Wählers fokussiert (siehe Literaturüberblick Bates 1973, 1974; Hoffman und Long
2013; Ferree und Horowitz 2007, 2010; Bratton et al. 2011). Obwohl in neueren Studien
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u. a. von Hoffman und Long (2013) die Bedeutung von konkreten Politikfragen (policy
position issues) für afrikanische Wähler erwähnt wird, steht die Analyse unterschiedli-
cher nicht-politikorientierter Faktoren im Vordergrund. Insbesondere wird die Bedeutung
ethnischer und regionaler Zugehörigkeit als Determinante der Wahlentscheidung hervor-
gehoben (Ferree und Horowitz, 2010; Bratton et al., 2011; Hoffman und Long, 2013). Die
meisten Studien, die einer Analyse des politischen Verhaltens der Wähler in Transformati-
onsländern gewidmet sind, beschäftigen sich überwiegend mit den ökonomischen Motiven
der Wähler (Tucker et al., 2002; Boerner und Hainz, 2009; Hayo, 2004; Fidrmuc, 2000a,b;
Kim und Pirttilae, 2006), während die individuellen ideologischen und politikorientierten
Motive vernachlässigt werden.
Angesichts der Existenz der oben erwähnten Studien mit unterschiedlichen Ansichten auf
das Wählerverhalten sowie der Problematik der Länder im Transformationsprozess zielt
diese Arbeit darauf ab, die entsprechenden theoretischen und empirischen Effekte zwischen
Wählerverhalten, Government Performance und Capture am Beispiel dreier Transformati-
onsländer, Slowakei, Polen und Russland, herauszuarbeiten. Weiter sind die auf Mikro- und
Makroebene entstehenden Determinanten des Wählerverhaltens und deren Implikationen
auf die Government Performance unter unterschiedlichen politischen, sozialen und ökono-
mischen Rahmenbedingungen zu identifizieren. Während die ersten beiden EU-Länder die
wesentlichen Transformationsschritte in die Richtung Demokratie geleistet haben, herrscht
in Russland unter der Maske der „gelenkten Demokratie“ das autoritäre Regime, das häufig
zu sozialen, politischen und ökonomischen Spannungen im Inland sowie in internationa-
len Beziehungen führt. Obwohl die politischen Wahlen in Russland heutzutage nicht als
ein vernünftig funktionierendes Instrument für eine Kontrolle über die Regierung angese-
hen werden können, spielen die Wahlen in Russland die Rolle eines Indikators der Ver-
teilung politischer und ideologischer Präferenzen unter verschiedenen sozioökonomischen
Gruppen. Darüber hinaus spiegeln sie eine ungleiche politische Konkurrenz zugunsten der
Machtpartei wider. Gerade in dieser Situation, wo die Informationsressourcen für Parteien
ungleichmäßig verteilt sind, ist es wichtig zu verstehen, wie die Wähler auf die laufen-
den politischen Prozesse reagieren. Werden die Wahlmotive der Wähler im Laufe der Zeit
ideologischer oder lassen sie sich dagegen durch einseitige Information nicht permanent
beeinflussen?
Konkret wird in dieser Arbeit auf der Grundlage von eigenen und vorhandenen Wählersur-
veys für die drei Länder die quantitative Bedeutung von ’politikorientiertem’ und ’nicht-
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politikorientiertem’ sowie ’retrospektivem’ Wählen mit Hilfe von innovativer Anwendung
der Latent-Class-Schätzungen für probabilistische Wählermodelle analysiert. Konkret wer-
den dabei die auf logistischen Schätzungen basierten Discrete-Choice-Modelle für Latent-
Class-Analysen in der empirischen Wahlforschung eingesetzt. Die Latent-Class-Analysen
liefern ein tieferes Verständnis der Determinanten von ideologischem und politikorientier-
tem Wählen, weil die Wähler nach der Heterogenität in ihren sozioökonomischen Charak-
teristika und politischen Präferenzen differenziert werden. Dadurch wird besser erklärt, wie
sich die zu einer sozioökonomischen Gruppe gehörenden Wähler verhalten und ihre poli-
tische Wahlentscheidung treffen. Durch die ermittelte probabilistische Zugehörigkeit der
Wähler zu dieser oder jener latenten Klasse und aufgrund der postlogistischen Evaluierung
des Latent-Class-Modells wird analysiert, wie sich die endogen bedingten Wählerklassen
bilden und welche Wählerklassen ideologischer, d. h. weniger politikorientiert, wählen. Im
Gegensatz zu multinomialen logistischen Modellen (MNL), die seit vielen Jahren eine fun-
damentale Basis für die Discrete-Choice-Modelle darstellen und eine große Einschränkung
hinsichtlich der IIA-Annahme aufweisen (Interdependence of Irrelevant Alternatives)1, las-
sen sich Mixed-Logit-(MLM)- und Latent-Class-Modelle (LCM) in der empirischen For-
schung auch dann verwenden, wenn eine Verletzung dieser Annahme vorliegt und/oder eine
unbeobachtete Heterogenität zwischen den Entscheidungsträgern existiert (Temme, 2007).
Beim Vergleich der beiden Arten von Modellen miteinander ist vor allem zu erwähnen, dass
die LCMs etwas weniger flexibler als MLMs sind, weil durch die Klassengenerierung die
mit MLMs assoziierten kontinuierlichen Kovariaten eine diskrete Form in LCMs annehmen.
Die großen Vorteile der Latent-Class-Modelle sind eine höhere Handhabbarkeit, Plausibi-
lität und statistische Prüfbarkeit, weil die Annahme über die Verteilung der Parameter,
die eine Heterogenität determinieren, nicht spezifiziert werden muss.
Neben der empirischen Ermittlung der relativen Bedeutung ’politikorientierter’ und ’nicht-
politikorientierter’ sowie ’retrospektiver’ Wahlmotive für das Wahlverhalten unterschied-
licher Wählergruppen liegt ein weiterer Schwerpunkt der Analysen auf der Identifikation
relevanter Determinanten des individuellen Wählerverhaltens. Hier werden neben den klas-
sischen sozioökonomischen Variablen (Einkommen, Bildung, Alter) insbesondere die Rolle
von sozialen Netzwerkstrukturen sowie von der Zugehörigkeit der Wähler zur Gruppe der
Landwirte herausgearbeitet und empirisch analysiert. Insgesamt trägt die Arbeit somit
1Gemäß IIA-Annahme ist der relative Nutzen einer Alternative im Vergleich zu einer anderen unabhängig
gegenüber der Existenz einer dritten Alternative
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nicht nur zu einer besseren Erklärung der Government Accountability und Government
Capture auf Makroebene, sondern auch zu einem besseren mikropolitisch fundierten Ver-
ständnis der Wählermotive bei.
Diese Arbeit besteht aus insgesamt fünf Beiträgen, die inhaltlich in drei Gruppen ein-
zuordnen sind. Die Gruppen spiegeln die drei untersuchten Determinanten des (nicht-
)politikorientierten Wählerverhaltens wider: (I) Zugehörigkeit zu Interessengruppen; (II)
Soziale Netzwerke und Massenmedien; (III) Wählerzufriedenheit mit Government Perfor-
mance. Neben der inhaltlichen Ausrichtung werden in den Beiträgen auch unterschiedliche
theoretische und empirische Schwerpunkte gesetzt. In Tabelle 1.1 ist die Zuordnung der
Beiträge zu den entsprechenden inhaltlichen Schwerpunkten veranschaulicht. Im Folgenden
wird eine Zusammenfassung der einzelnen Beiträge gegeben.
Table 1.1.: Einordnung der Artikel
Netzwerke und EMPIRISCHE
Beitrag Interessengruppen Massenmedien Zufriedenheit THEORIE METHODE
1 X X X
2 X X X X
3 X X X X
4 X
5 X X X
1.2. Zusammenfassung
1.2.1. Testing micropolitical foundation of agricultural protection: Latent Class
approach to Slovakia
Die Interessenvermittlung findet in repräsentativen Demokratien über zwei unterschied-
liche Kanäle statt: politische Wahlen und Lobbying. Während bei Lobbying die Interes-
sengruppen die relevanten Träger der Interessenvermittlung sind, stellen bei politischen
Wahlen die politischen Parteien die dominanten Strukturen dar. Im Gegensatz zur Be-
einflussung des politischen Prozesses durch Interessengruppen, die eine indirekte Auswir-
kung auf politische Entscheidungen hat, haben die Wähler die Möglichkeit, die Gestaltung
des politischen Raums, d. h. letztendlich das politische Outcome, direkt zu beeinflussen.
Während die Entstehung der politischen Entscheidungen durch das Agieren der Interes-
sengruppen sowohl erleichtert als auch erschwert werden kann, weil die unterschiedlichen
Interessen zu einer Einigung oder zu einem Konflikt führen können, geht es bei direkter
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Beeinflussung des politischen Systems durch die Wahlen vor allem darum, inwieweit die
Wähler informiert sind und wie stark politikorientiert sie wählen. Die Menschen, die so-
wohl formal als auch informell aufgrund ihrer sozioökonomischen Charakteristika zu einer
Interessengruppe gehören, haben ein größeres Interesse an bestimmten politischen Issues.
Sie beobachten genauer die relevanten politischen Felder und wählen daher mehr politi-
korientiert. Wählen dagegen die Menschen nicht aufgrund ihrer politischen Präferenzen,
sondern aufgrund ideologischer Komponenten, z. B. Loyalität zu einer Partei, Charisma
oder Überzeugungskraft eines Kandidaten, dann kommt es zu Ideologischen Wahlen (d. h.
’nicht-politikorientierte’ Wahlen).
Die Analyse der ideologischen versus politikorientierten Wahlen setzt aber voraus, dass
vor allem ein handhabungsfähiges Instrumentarium fundiert und erarbeitet wird, das die
Schätzungen ermöglicht. Ausgehend von den theoretischen Arbeiten (Keefer und Khema-
ni, 2005; Grossman und Helpman, 1996; Bardhan und Mookherjee, 2002) und der Dis-
kussion der Komponenten der ideologischen versus politikorientierten Wahlmotive leitet
der Beitrag, zum einen, eine theoretische Erklärung für „development paradox“ ab, und
zum anderen, einen individuellen Ideologischen Indikator aufgrund der postlogistischen
Evaluierung der Modelle aus der Latent-Class-Analyse. Von besonderem Interesse für die
Implementierung der Agrarpolitik ist die Betrachtung des politischen Verhaltens der Wäh-
ler, die im Interessenvermittlungsprozess als Landwirte auftreten. Vor diesem Hintergrund
wird in diesem Beitrag das politische Verhalten zweier Interessengruppen (Landwirte ge-
gen Nicht-Landwirte) am Beispiel der slowakischen Daten für 391 Wähler aus ländlichen
Regionen mithilfe des berechneten Ideologischen Indikators auf Mikroebene analysiert.
Vor dem Hintergrund, dass die Betrachtung des politischen Verhaltens der Wähler, die
im Interessenvermittlungsprozess als Landwirte auftreten, ist für die Implementierung der
Agrarpolitik von besonderem Interesse, wird in diesem Beitrag das politische Verhalten
zweier Interessengruppe (Landwirte gegen Nicht-Landwirte) am Beispiel der slowakischen
Daten für 391 Wähler aus ländlichen Regionen mithilfe des berechneten Ideologischen Indi-
kators auf Mikroebene analysiert. Des Weiteren stellen die theoretischen Arbeiten (Gross-
man und Helpman, 1996; Bardhan und Mookherjee, 2002; Persson und Tabellini, 2000;
Hinich und Munger, 1997; Becker, 1983; Lohmann, 1998) eine Grundlage für die theore-
tische und empirische Analyse eines Zusammenhanges zwischen nicht-politikorientierten
Wahlen und Capture sowie für die Ermittlung der Bedeutsamkeit der Agrarlobby in poli-
tischen Wahlen mithilfe der berechneten Gewichte dar.
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1.2.2. Networks as determinants of voter behavior for the farm and non-farm
population: An estimation of spatial voting models using Latent Class Analysis
Die Theorie der sozialen Netzwerke und deren Einfluss auf das ökonomische und poli-
tische Verhalten der Individuen auf Mikroebene sowie auf das korrespondierende wirt-
schaftspolitische Ergebnis auf Makroebene wurde durch Studien in unterschiedlichen For-
schungsbereichen belegt, z. B. in Ökonomie (Jackson, 2008; Goyal, 2005; Alesina und La
Ferrara, 2000; Knack und Keefer, 1997; Dasgupta, 1999), Soziologie (Burt, 1982, 1990;
Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1985; Fukuyama, 1995) und Politikwissenschaften (Putnam
et al., 1993; Hardin, 1999). In Bezug auf die Auswirkung sozialer Netzwerke, in denen
Aufnahme, Verarbeitung und weitere Verbreitung der politischen Information stattfindet,
auf die Einstellung und das Verhalten der Wähler zeigen die überraschenden Ergebnisse
der Columbia-Schule (Lazarsfeld, 1950; Lazarsfeld und Henry, 1968; Berelson et al., 1954;
Katz und Lazarsfeld, 1955), dass die Informationen aus den Massenmedien die Wähler
meistens nicht direkt erreichen und ihre Meinung nicht umdrehen, sondern nur verstärken
können. Stattdessen erfolgt die Kommunikation im Zwei-Stufen-Fluss, in dem die Infor-
mationen zunächst vom Meinungsführer aufgenommen, bearbeitet und an weitere Wähler
in Netzwerken vermittelt werden (Pappi und Shikano, 2007). Dass die Wähler die Infor-
mationen indirekt aus Netzwerken erhalten, deren strukturelle Eigenschaften basierend
auf den theoretischen Arbeiten in großem Maße mit zwei Netzwerkparametern (Netz-
werkdichte und Netzwerkgröße) abgebildet werden können, erweist sich als problematisch.
Angesichts dessen stellt dieser Beitrag eine empirische Überprüfung dar, ob ein Zusam-
menhang zwischen individual- sowie gruppenspezifischen nicht-politikorientierten Motiven
und Netzwerkparametern nachweisbar ist.
Ausgehend von den theoretischen Erarbeitungen des ersten Beitrages werden im zwei-
ten Beitrag zwei Interessengruppen mithilfe der Netzwerkparameter (Netzwerkdichte und
Netzwerkgröße) verstärkt untersucht. Die theoretischen Arbeiten gehen davon aus, dass
die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Verbreitung der objektiven und unabhängigen Informationen
in den größeren und undichten Netzwerken höher als in den kleineren und dichteren Netz-
werken ist. Angesichts der Arbeiten zum Einfluss sozialer Netzwerke auf soziale Strukturen
(Granovetter, 2005; Lake und Huckfeldt, 1998) werden in diesem Beitrag die Hypothesen
über den Einfluss der größeren und dichteren Netzwerke auf die ideologischen Präferenzen
der Wähler aufgestellt. Vor dem Hintergrund der Unterscheidung zweier Interessengruppen
in ihrer Motivation und ihren verschiedenen Strukturen wird die Analyse der slowakischen
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Daten unter Berücksichtigung sozialer Netzwerke vertieft. Damit wird der Einfluss sozia-
ler Netzwerke auf das ideologische Wählen von Landwirten und Nicht-Landwirten explizit
ermittelt. Um die Bedeutung der politischen Issues für Wähler sowie deren Auswirkung
auf die marginale Wahrscheinlichkeit zu ermitteln, werden die politischen Gewichte der
Wähler anhand der marginalen Effekte berechnet und auf deren Zusammenhang mit den
sozioökonomischen Charakteristika auf der Mikroebene untersucht. Im Sinne der theore-
tischen Arbeiten (Bardhan und Mookherjee, 2002) wird der Capture-Index als relativer
Grad, zu dem die Anteile der Bevölkerungsgruppen von den normierten politischen Ge-
wichten dieser Gruppen divergieren, definiert und auf der Makroebene analysiert.
1.2.3. Social organization of voting and government performance: Theory and
empirical application in Poland and Slovakia
Eingeführt von Lazarsfeld et al. (1968) und später formuliert von Berelson et al. (1954)
und Campbell et al. (1960) stellt das Konzept von „cross-pressure“ eine wichtige Erklärung
des politischen Verhaltens von Wählern im Rahmen der Netzwerktheorie dar. Eine Cross-
Pressure-Situation liegt in den modernen Gesellschaften ganz häufig vor, da die sozialen
Kreise, zu denen ein Individuum gehört, nicht homogen sind. So kann es dazu kommen,
dass es einem Individuum mit widersprüchlichen Wahlpräferenzen aus unterschiedlichen
sozialen Kräftefeldern schwerer fällt, eine politische Entscheidung zu treffen. Während das
interne „cross-pressure“ aufgrund der unterschiedlichen Einstellungen des Individuums
hervorgerufen wird, wird das externe „cross-pressure“ unmittelbar in sozialen Netzwerken
determiniert, wenn z. B. große politische Differenzen im Freundeskreis eines Individuums
vorliegen. In diesem Fall kann das Individuum nicht entscheiden, welche konkrete Meinung
es zu den anderen konfrontierenden Meinungen präferiert.
Angesichts dieser Problematik, dass es schon bei einem Individuum zu einem inneren In-
teressenkonflikt kommen kann, der das ganze Interesse an Politik negativ beeinflusst, so
dass das Individuum eher nicht-politikorientiert wählt oder im äußersten Fall die politi-
schen Wahlen ganz ignoriert, zielt dieser Beitrag darauf ab, einen Zusammenhang zwi-
schen nicht-politikorientierten Wahlmotiven und sozialer Organisation der Wähler zu un-
tersuchen. Aus diesem Grund werden im Sinne der theoretischen (Baron, 1994; Grossman
und Helpman, 1996; Bardhan und Mookherjee, 2002; Lohmann, 1998) und empirischen
Arbeiten (Huckfeldt et al., 2005, 2004; Nir, 2005) nicht nur die individuellen sozioöko-
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nomischen Charakteristika der Wähler, sondern auch die Parameter ihrer formalen und
informellen sozialen Organisation einbezogen. Eine formale Organisation der Wähler in
einer Interessengruppe wird mithilfe ihrer Zugehörigkeit zu der Gruppe der Landwirte kon-
trolliert. Ihre informelle Organisation wird mithilfe der quantitativen (Netzwerkgröße und
Netzwerkdichte) und qualitativen (Netzwerkambivalenz) Netzwerkparameter berücksich-
tigt, wobei Netzwerkambivalenz nach Nir (2005) als Maß für die externe „cross-pressure“
benutzt wird. Insbesondere liegt der Schwerpunkt dieser Arbeit auf der Untersuchung ei-
nes Zusammenhangs zwischen ideologischen Wahlmotiven und der qualitativen Netzwerk-
charakteristik (Netzwerkambivalenz) in zwei formalen Wählergruppen (Landwirte versus
Nicht-Landwirte), wobei die Analysen durch die Aufnahme nicht nur slowakischer, sondern
auch polnischer Daten erweitert werden.
1.2.4. Capture in Russian Parliamentary Elections 2003–2011: Panel Analysis of
Voting Motives using Latent Class Approach
Während in Polen und der Slowakei erhebliche Schritte der postsozialistischen Transfor-
mation unternommen werden, die auf die konsolidierte Demokratie und funktionierende
Marktwirtschaft zielen, lassen sich die Ursachen der Wiederkehr eines autoritären Regi-
mes in Russland nicht genau erklären. Zum einen kann die Entstehung des autoritären
Regimes in Russland durch die historischen Besonderheiten des Landes (z. B. starke Aus-
prägung der Mentalität durch das sozialistische System) und durch die starke Zuneigung
der Menschen zu eingebildeter wirtschaftlicher Stabilität nach der Systemkrise der 90er
Jahre erklärt werden. Zum anderen begünstigt die negative Entwicklung der Informati-
onsfreiheit in den letzten Jahren die Beibehaltung eines autoritären Regimes. Angesichts
dieser Problematik ist es auch nicht zu unterschätzen, dass die zahlreichen Demonstra-
tionen in Russland 2011–2012 als Zeichen der latent verlaufenden Änderungsprozesse, die
sich trotz des aktuellen Informationsniveaus in das Verständnis der Menschen über das
richtige Funktionieren eines demokratischen Systems einschleichen und dadurch ihr poli-
tisches Verhalten beeinflussen, interpretiert werden können.
Ausgehend von diesem Hintergrund hat der Beitrag das Ziel, die politik versus nicht-
politikorientierten Motive der russischen Wähler aufgrund der Paneldaten des European
Social Survey aus den Jahren 2006–2012 bezogen auf die parlamentarischen Wahlen 2003–
2011 zu untersuchen. Im Kern der Analyse stehen die Latent-Class-Modelle, die eine De-
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terminierung der latenten heterogenen Klassen der Wähler anhand ihrer sozioökonomi-
schen Charakteristika ermöglichen. Von besonderem Interesse ist die Frage, ob das po-
litische Verhalten der russischen Wähler über die Zeit stabil bleibt, d. h. ob die nicht-
politikorientierten Motive durch die über die Zeit gleichen sozioökonomischen Charakte-
ristika der Wähler erklärt werden können. Des Weiteren werden die politischen Gewichte
berechnet, wobei diejenigen Menschen hohe politische Gewichte aufweisen, die stark po-
litikorientiert wählen und eine starke Indifferenz zu der Machtpartei aufzeigen. Aufgrund
der politischen Gewichte wird untersucht, ob die russischen Wähler in ihren politischen
Präferenzen heterogen sind und ob die Heterogenität sich über die Zeit verändert. Außer-
dem liefert der Beitrag empirische Ergebnisse dafür, ob sich Capture über unterschiedliche
sozioökonomische Bevölkerungsgruppen identifizieren lässt.
1.2.5. Satisfaction and Media as Determinants of Voting Behavior in Russian
Elections 2003–2011
Wird unterstellt, dass Wähler retrospektiv wählen, d. h. die Wähler messen die Regierungs-
leistung direkt an der beobachteten eigenen oder regionalen wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung,
so hat eine Regierung selbst in autoritären Regimen einen Anreiz effiziente Politiken aus-
zuwählen. Retrospektives Wählen ist also eine spezielle Form des nicht-politikorientierten
Wählens (Fiorina, 1981), wobei Daten über die Bürgerzufriedenheit mit öffentlichen Gü-
tern sowie mit ihrer ökonomischen Situation die Government Performance reflektieren und
daher eine Grundlage für die Schätzung des retrospektiven Wählens darstellen. Offensicht-
lich hängt das retrospektive Wählen mit dem politikorientierten Wählen zusammen, denn
die dem retrospektiven Wählen zugrunde liegende Zufriedenheit wird in großem Maße von
den (in-)korrekten individuellen Policy Beliefs über die effizienten Politiken beeinflusst.
Diese können wiederum durch unterschiedliche Medienkanäle generiert werden.
Die komplexen Zusammenhänge zwischen Wählerverhalten, d. h. die relative Bedeutung
von politikorientiertem versus nicht-politikorientiertem sowie retrospektivemWählen, bzw.
den Wählerbeliefs und den Anreizen von gewählten politischen Agenten, effiziente Politi-
ken zu implementieren, wurden bislang kaum systematisch empirisch analysiert. Daher
hat dieser Beitrag das Ziel, die bisherigen Analysen aufgrund der Paneldaten für die rus-
sischen Wahlen durch die Aufnahme der zusätzlichen Daten über die Medienkanäle und
die individuelle Zufriedenheit mit öffentlichen Gütern zu vertiefen. Angesichts der Proble-
matik, dass Zufriedenheit sowohl das ideologische als auch das politikorientierte Wählen
11
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beeinflussen kann, wird in diesem Beitrag ermittelt, welche Tendenzen im Zusammenhang
mit der Zufriedenheit und dem politischen Verhalten zu beobachten sind. Des Weiteren
wird untersucht, wie Medienkanäle das Verhalten der Wähler beeinflussen sowie inwie-
weit Differenzen im Verhalten zwischen den Machtparteiwählern und anderen Wählern
vorliegen.
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Abstract
This paper analyzes, empirically and theoretically, a discrepancy of the policy and non-
policy voting motives between farm and non-farm population groups as well as the in-
fluence of lobbying on a specific policy outcome, agricultural protection. In this paper,
we propose a micropolitically-founded theoretical model to link the well-known theoreti-
cal studies on voter behavior and special interest groups (Baron, 1994a; Grossman and
Helpman, 1996; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2002) with empirical methodology. Considering
rural and urban populations, we focus on rural groups’ use of campaign contributions as
a vehicle for influencing agricultural protection. Based on this theory, we are able to ex-
plain the development paradox, i.e., with economic development, some countries switch
from agricultural taxation to protection (Anderson, 2008); we can also empirically and
theoretically identify the determinants of agricultural protection. Further, we derived a
practical measure, ideological indicator, based on the post-logit-estimation evaluation of
discrete choice models. Ideological indicator illustrates how to appropriate the relative im-
portance of policy preferences compared to ideological preferences. To confirm our theory,
we estimated a latent class model based on the probability of making a specific choice
among a set of political parties as a function of choice attributes (individual distances in
political space) and other individual characteristics. According to discrete choice models,
a voter supports the candidate or the party who maximizes his combination of measured
policy-related utilities and his unmeasured utilities. Based on logit estimation, we calcu-
lated the political weights of voters as well as relative political weights of groups, which
depend on the relative importance of policy versus non-policy voter motives, and show
that Slovakian farmers’ votes are really more policy-oriented than Slovakian non-farmers.
Moreover, the non-farm urban population is less captured by farmers than the non-farm
rural population. Therefore, the existence of the agricultural lobby is evident; however,
the considerably biased voter beliefs of non-farmers induce only small relative weight of
lobbying vis-a-vis the voters.
2.1. Introduction
The political theory interprets electoral competition as a fundamental democratic me-
chanism for guaranteeing that governmental policies reflect society’s interests. However,
electoral competition takes place at two levels: first, providing different policies, the politi-
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cal parties fight for the votes of informed voters; second, the parties want to be supported
by lobby contributions to gain more of the votes of uninformed voters. Reviewing the li-
terature about the impact of voters’ and lobbies’ behavior on the policy outcome, we can
identify two strands of studies contributing to the understanding of agricultural protection.
The first strand of literature is devoted to classical political economy models, which
understand final policy outcomes as the result of political bargaining among various social
groups for income distribution. Inefficient (biased) agricultural policies can be explained
by the fact that political decision makers often favor special interest groups at the ex-
pense of the general public to increase their re-election prospects, because the special
interest groups monitor the political decision maker better. The basic explanation of why
the policy bias is toward special interests is information asymmetry, which arises endoge-
nously because of the free-rider problem (Lohmann, 1998). The well-known recent works
of Beghin and Kherallah (1994), Beghin et al. (1996), Swinnen et al. (2000), Thies and
Porche (2007), Olper and Raimondi (2009) provide a comprehensive econometric analysis
of the political determinants of agricultural protection, including socio-economic factors
as control variables. While many models explain observed differences in agricultural pro-
tection, comparing industrialized and developing countries (Zusman, 1976; Becker, 1983;
Gardner, 1987; Tyers and Anderson, 1992; Swinnen, 1994), and understand agricultural
policies as the results of political bargaining competition between the organized voter
groups, these approaches ignore the role of ordinary voters. A theoretical justification for
neglecting electoral competition and the role of the voter can be found for example in
Becker (1983), which focuses on interest group competition based on the assumption that
voters’ electoral choices are completely controlled by interest groups, e.g., via campaign
spending. According to Becker (1983), even in democratic countries, the electoral out-
put is not influenced by policy-oriented voting and is completely generated by non-policy
oriented voting. This fact goes against to the fundamental democratic mechanism of elec-
toral competition; moreover, this is contrary to the theoretical and empirical works which
postulate a relationship between Democracy, Good Governance, and positive economic
development (Judson and Owen, 1999; Sen, 1987; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005, 2007;
Knack and Keefer, 1997; Mauro, 1995), and confirms an impact of democratic political
institutions on political decisions and economic development (Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2002;
Rogowski and Kayser, 2002; Persson and Tabellini, 2003; Grossman and Helpman, 2005).
Another micro-political foundation for the neglect of voters can be derived from socio-
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structural theories of voting, i.e., following Lazarsfeld et al. (1968) or Lipset and Rokkan
(1967): voters’ electoral choices are completely determined by their social classes so that
electoral competition does not imply much incentive for elected politicians to perform.
A second strand of studies corresponds to theoretical and empirical probabilistic models
analyzing not only the impact of special interest groups on policy outcome, but also the
influence of non-organized voters on policy outcome (Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Baron,
1994a; Grossman and Helpman, 1996; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2002). A central theore-
tical work using a probabilistic approach is Bardhan and Mookherjee (2002), developed in
the framework of an extended version of the Baron-Grossman-Helpman model of electoral
competition (Baron, 1994a; Grossman and Helpman, 1996). All these models show that
biased policy outcome, in terms of low government performance and government capture,
results if voters are modeled to apply different mechanisms to make a choice between
political parties or candidates based on their level of information on politics. Thus, the
share of informed and uninformed voters across social groups has a dominant impact on a
biased policy in favor of informed voters. Policy positions of candidates or parties depend,
first of all, on the proportion of uninformed voters: if there are relatively few uninformed
voters, then the productivity of campaign expenditures is low. The higher the proporti-
on of uninformed voters, the more the candidates cater to interest groups and the more
biased the policies. Although a key result of these works is that a necessary condition for
government capture is that voters base their judgment of different parties at least partly
on the non-policy factors, these non-policy factors are not analyzed. Further, these studies
focus only on informed and uninformed voters; however, an identification of such voters
in reality is very restricted, since a policy space is multidimensional: the same voter can
be informed in one policy issue and uninformed in another policy issue. Therefore, in the
framework of empirical works, it makes more sense to use another terminology, policy and
non-policy voting (Adams et al., 2005), whereby the latter are often linked to ideological
preferences (Persson and Tabellini, 2000). We note that absolute and relative levels of
policy and non-policy oriented voting components are relevant for policy outcomes.
While many studies (Beghin and Kherallah, 1994; Beghin et al., 1996; Swinnen et al.,
2000; Thies and Porche, 2007; Hee Park and Jensen, 2007; Olper and Raimondi, 2013,
2011; Henning, 2008; Henning et al., 2012, 2013) show an indirect impact of the political
system, first of all the election system, on the policy outcome (agricultural protection), a
direct relative importance of policy and non-policy voting motives of farmers versus non-
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farmers for agricultural protection at the micro level was not yet provided. In this context,
the paper tries to make the following contributions:
First, to link theoretical studies (Baron, 1994a; Grossman and Helpman, 1996; Bardhan
and Mookherjee, 2002) with empirical methodology, this paper develops a micropolitically-
founded theory of voter behavior. Considering rural and urban populations, we focused
on rural groups’ use of campaign contributions as a vehicle for influencing agricultural
protection. Assuming that voters expect a pro-agrarian policy, rural districts are pivotal
in determining policy-oriented voting. Introducing one lobby for agricultural groups, we
developed a model of campaign finance in which political parties wanted to maximize
the votes of both policy and non-policy oriented voters’ motives. In the framework of
this theory, based on maximization of social welfare function, formulation of the relative
importance of policy versus non-policy motives, as well as their discrepancy among the
heterogeneous population groups, we were able to identify the determinants of agricultural
subventions in industrial countries.
Second, we developed a measure to verify the theoretical models empirically. Hence,
using the frame of probabilistic discrete choice models, we derived the ideological indi-
cator, based on the post-logit-estimation evaluation. Ideological indicator illustrates how
to practically appropriate the weight of the policy vs. ideological preferences. This hypo-
thetical measure provides the extent to which the non-policy (ideological) term is higher
than the policy-term, i.e., to which extent the policy voting term must be increased to
compensate for non-policy voting advantages.
Third, the theoretical hypotheses were tested empirically. We estimated latent class
models based on individual distances between voter and parties in political space, since,
according to discrete choice models, a voter supports the candidate or the party who ma-
ximizes his combination of measured policy-related utilities and his unmeasured utilities.
In the case of latent class choice models, we obtained different population segments (latent
classes), endogenously determined by non-policy variables. By calculating the ideological
indicator, we were able to confirm our theory, i.e., the suggested greater importance of the
relative policy component for farmers than for non-farmers. Therefore, using propensity
score matching, we could identify potential urban voters to have a representative sample.
We then calculated the relative political weights for voters; these political weights reflect
to what extent the voters vote indifferently in the policy space, i.e., to what extent they
are important for politicians. Moreover, to uncover agricultural lobby and capture, we
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approached a theoretical policy outcome in PNE, maximizing the votes over all conside-
red population groups, and computed the relative political weights for these groups. Our
results reveal a capture towards the farmers and strongly biased voter beliefs in favor of
EU agricultural protection.
2.2. The Model
2.2.1. The population and economy
The population and economy
We consider a society comprising of two groups, the agrarian and the non-agrarian popu-
lation. Each group has a fixed share in total population which is denoted by αJ , J = R,M .
Society’s economy is subdivided into two sectors, agriculture and manufacture. Agricultu-
ral policy is considered as a redistribution between the agricultural and non-agricultural
sector. For simplicity we assume that income redistribution occurs via subsidization and
taxation, where two different policy regimes are considered. In particular, let sR and sM
denote the per capita subsidy paid to agrarian and non-agrarian population, respectively,
while tR and tM denote corresponding per capita tax. Accordingly, sR − tR is the net-
subsidization of rural population, where a positive net subsidy, i.e. sR− tR > 0 indicates a
subsidy regime and vice-versa a negative net-subsidy, sR − tR < 0 indicates a tax regime.
Any feasible agricultural policy, (sR, tR) must satisfy the following budget constraint:
ΓT (tM ) =
αR
αM
ΓS(sR)⇔ tM = ΓS (sR) (2.1)
ΓS(sM ) =
αR
αM
ΓT (tR)⇔ sM = ΓT (tR) (2.2)
The functions ΓS and ΓT include deadweight costs (Becker, 1983). In particular, it
holds: ΓS(sR) > sR, sR > 0 and ΓT (tR) < tR, tR > 0. Moreover, we assume increasing
deadweight costs, i.e. ΓS is strictly convex and increasing in the level of subsidization,
while ΓT is strictly concave and increasing in the level of taxation. Deadweight costs
significantly vary across various agricultural policy instruments. However, we do not focus
on the choice of economically efficient redistribution instruments, although discussion on
agricultural policy is to a large extent concerned about this issue (de Gorter and Swinnen,
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2002; Becker, 1983; Lohmann, 1998).
Assuming identical individuals for both groups implies the following welfare function of
each member given agricultural policy (sR, tR):
WR(sR, tR) = Y 0R + sR − tR; WM (sR, tR) = Y 0M + ΓT (tR)− ΓS(sR)
Y 0J , J = R,M denotes the income of rural and urban population, respectively, without any
agricultural policy intervention.
Not further, that due to deadweight costs efficient agricultural policy implies: tR∗sR = 0.
That is efficient net-subsidization of agriculture implies that agricultural taxation is zero
and vice versa efficient net-taxation of agriculture implies that agricultural subsidy is zero.
2.2.2. Political system
Following Grossman and Helpman (1996) and Bardhan and Mookherjee (2002), we as-
sumed that agricultural policy is set by a legislative majority. Seats in legislature are
determined by election outcomes, where parties compete for votes in a democratic elec-
tion. The parties vary their agricultural policy positions to attract votes and campaign
contributions from organized interest groups. In particular, we examined a jurisdiction
with two political parties, one interest group that represented the special interests of a
specific group, and a finite number of voters.
Voters
The total number of voters is divided into the agrarian and non-agrarian group J = R,M ,
where we assume that the share of agrarian voters in total voters just equals the agrarian
population share αR. The total number of voters in each group is sufficiently large that
we can apply the law of large numbers.
There are two parties, denoted A and B. In the Downsian tradition, parties announce
their agricultural policies prior to the election, and are assumed to credibly commit to
these once elected. Voters engage in probabilistic voting, i.e. a voter j ∈ J of group J will
vote for party A as long as:
W J(XA)−W J(XB) +KJ(µjJ + δ + h(CA − CB)) > 0 (2.3)
W J(Xk) denote voter j’s welfare derived from the agricultural policy platform Xk,
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announced by party k = A,B. Beyond utility directly derived from policies, voters have
non-policy preferences. Non-policy party preferences of voters may arise from personal
characteristics of candidates nominated by different parties, e.g. their affiliation with a
social, regional or ethnic group, or incumbency, i.e. voters may be unwilling to experiment
and hence have a tendency to vote for the party currently in power, or random events that
cause voters to evaluate past policy positions differently. These events occur between the
time that parties formulate their electoral platforms, and the time elections take place.
Hence the outcome of elections are uncertain for parties when they have to formulate
their electoral strategies. Moreover, a second component of non-policy voting corresponds
to campaign spending, i.e. voters evaluation of parties might be influenced by election
advertisement, or election rallies or door-door visits by campaign workers. At this stage we
do not further analyze non-policy preferences of voters; we only assume that these include
a stochastic component that cannot credibly be modified by parties and a deterministic
component that can be influenced by campaign spending.
The first stochastic non-policy component is captured by the parameters µjJ , and δ,
which can take negative and positive values and measure the preference bias of voters
from group J . Thus, a positive value implies that voter has a bias in favor of party A.
These non-policy preferences are uncertain at the time political agents have to make their
policy decision. In detail, we assume that µjJ has a uniform distributions on
[µ¯J − 12χ, µ¯J +
1
2χ ]
We assume the same density, χ, for both groups, while the relative ideological bias in
favor of a specific party, which is captured by the group specific mean µ¯J , can vary across
groups.1.
Furthermore, the parameter δ captures a common national popularity shock, where we
assume that G is the distribution function of δ. In contrast, to µjJ G is a more general dis-
tribution function different to an uniform distribution. Following Grossman and Helpman
(1996) as well as Bardhan and Mookherjee (2002) we assume further that the popularity of
a party can also be influenced by campaign spending, where h > 0 is a parameter reflecting
the marginal effectiveness of campaign spending in increasing a party popularity.
1Please note that Persson and Tabellini (2002) introduced the term ideological preferences for the sto-
chastic component of the non-policy preference. Please note further, that Persson and Tabellini (2002)
use the term ideology differently to how ideology is generally used in political science see for example
Enelow and Hinich (1984)
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Non-policy party preferences of voters may arise from the personal characteristics of
candidates nominated by different parties, e.g., their affiliation with social, regional, or
ethnic groups, incumbency, i.e., voters may be unwilling to experiment and hence have a
tendency to vote for the party currently in power, or random events that cause voters to
evaluate past policy positions differently. These events occur between the time that parties
formulate their electoral platforms and when elections take place; thus the outcome of
elections is uncertain for parties when they have to formulate their electoral strategies.
Moreover, a second component of non-policy voting corresponds to campaign spending,
i.e., voters’ evaluation of parties might be influenced by election advertisements, election
rallies, or door-to-door visits by campaign workers. At this stage, we did not further analyze
the non-policy preferences of voters; we only assumed that these included a stochastic
component that cannot credibly be modified by parties and a deterministic component
that can be influenced by campaign spending.
Following Grossman and Helpman (1996) and Bardhan and Mookherjee (2002), we fur-
ther assumed that the popularity of a party can also be influenced by campaign spending,
where h > 0 is a parameter reflecting the marginal effectiveness of campaign spending in
increasing party popularity.
Finally, we assumed that the relative importance of voters’ non-policy preferences, when
compared to policy preferences, differs across groups, which is captured in the group spe-
cific parameter,KJ . Baron (1994b) as well as Grossman and Helpman (1996) provide an
informational rationality of the relative importance of voters’ non-policy preferences com-
pared to their policy preferences; in particular, Bardhan and Mookherjee (2002) refer to
the empirical studies of Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996), which point out that political
awareness, i.e., the importance of policy voting versus non-policy voting, crucially depends
on voters’ political knowledge. Furthermore, in another paper, we provided a theoretical
model from which we derived that the relative importance of policy preferences vis-a-vis
non-policy issues increases with the level of political knowledge (Henning and Petri, 2013).
Conditional on the national shock, the vote share which party A receives from group J
results as:
piJA = φJ [W J(XA)−W J(XB)] + χ(δ + µ¯J + h(CA − CB)) +
1
2 (2.4)
where its holds: φJ = χ
KJ
.
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Accordingly, the total vote share of party A results as:
ΠA = ∑
J
αJpiJA = 12 + χ(δ + µ¯) + wA(XA, CA)− wB(XB, CB)
, where wk = ∑
J
αJ
(
φJW J(Xk) + χhCk
)
and µ¯ = ∑
J
αJ µ¯J
(2.5)
Given the electoral strategy (Xk∗ , Ck∗) of the two parties, the ex ante probability that
party A wins a majority results:
PA = Prob[ΠA > 12 ] = Prob
[
χ(µ¯+ δ) + wA(XA, CA)− wB(XB, CB) ≥ 0
]
= GA
(
µ¯+ 1χ
[
wA(XA, CA)− wB(XB, CB)
]) (2.6)
, where GA is the distribution function of the national popularity shock δ and is a strictly
increasing function of the difference in the effectiveness of the respective electoral strategies
of the two parties and of voters’ average ideological preference in favor of party A.
Electoral competition and lobbying in election
For simplicity, we focused our analysis of electoral competition by assuming electoral rules
corresponded to proportional representation, i.e., elections take place in a single national
voting district.
Each party is assumed to maximize the probability of winning the national election. Par-
ties are thus presumed to be purely opportunistic, and the rents from office are exogenously
given. Equation 2.6 implies that each party has a dominant strategy: party k will select
an electoral strategy (Xk, Ck) to maximize its own electoral effectiveness wk(Xk, Ck), no
matter what the other party does. Accordingly, party k’s behavior can be represented
simply by maximizing the weighted welfare of agricultural and non-agricultural groups,
respectively, and campaign spending:
W (Xk) + hχθ Ck
with
W (Xk) = ∑
J
gJW J(Xk)
(2.7)
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where relative weight of group J , gJ , just correspond to the following term:
gJ = α
JφJ∑
K
αKφK
(2.8)
and
θ =
∑
K
αKφK (2.9)
In the absence of any lobbying, the political equilibrium results as a unique pure Nash
equilibrium (PNE),X∗ = XA∗ = XB∗, of a Downsian Party competition set-up: each party
will choose the policy platform that maximizes a Bentham’s welfare function of voters.
Please note that as long as non-policy voting plays a different role for the agrarian and
the non-agrarian group, i.e., KA 6= KM , the unique PNE corresponds to the maximization
of a weighted additive welfare functions, where the average weight of an agrarian voter
differs from the corresponding weight of a non-agrarian voter. In contrast to our model,
non-policy-voting is neglected in the original Downsian set-up, i.e., all voters cast their
vote based on the parties’ policy platforms only, which implies the same weight for all
voters. Which party wins the election depends entirely on the unpredictable swing factor
δ. If it holds G = Prob (δ + µ¯ > 0) > 0.5, party A is favored to win elections. Here we
assume that the national popularity shock is unbiased, i.e., G(0) = Prob(δ ≥ 0) = 0.5,
while average voters might be ideologically biased in favor of a party. Hence, if we assume
µ¯ > 0, the average ideological bias is in favor of party A, i.e., µ¯ > 0 and hence G =
Prob(δ + µ¯ > 0) > 0.5. In the following, we used G¯A and G¯B = 1 − G¯A to denote the
probability of party A and party B, respectively, to win the elections without any lobbying.
Lobbying
The final assumption of our model is that there exists one organized interest group repre-
senting the economic interests of the agrarian sector and one representing the non-agrarian
sector, respectively. The set of lobby groups is exogenous in the Grossman-Helpman frame-
work; in their model, more than one lobby can be incorporated. As has been nicely shown
by Grossman and Helpman (1996) as well as Bardhan and Mookherjee (2002), however,
the relevant policy impact of lobbying depends on the relative strength of the lobbying
group. Therefore, we focused our analysis on an exogenous lobbying group to capture the
essential effects in the asymmetry of lobbying strength of agrarian versus non-agrarian
interest groups.
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In particular, let DJ denote a dummy variable that indicates if the economic interests
of a group J are represented by the lobby, where DJ = 1 indicates representation, while
DJ = 0 indicates no representation. Further, we assume that only an exogenous fraction
l of the total represented population is an active member of the interest group and hence
financially contributes to the lobby.
Following the path-breaking work of Grossman and Helpman (1996), we assume that the
lobby contributes to the campaign finances of two parties, where these contributions are
conditioned on the policy platforms of the parties: C˜A(XA), C˜B(XB), or unconditioned
cˆA, cˆB, i.e., total contribution result as: Ck = C˜k(Xk) + cˆk.
Following Grossman and Helpman (1996), we first focused on conditional lobbying. The
corresponding lobbying game is as follows: at the first stage, the lobby offers non-negative
contribution schedules, CA(XA), CB(XB). At the second stage, each party selects its policy
platform, maximizing its vote share Πk, i.e., party k = A,B maximizes W (Xk) + hχθ Ck.
Hence, at the first stage, if the lobby wants to influence a party’s policy choice, it must
make sure that the party prefers to adopt the policy position Xk and get the contribution
CA from the lobby, compared to getting no contributions and realizing its equilibrium
support without lobby G¯k. Thus, formally, the minimum contribution the lobby has to
pay to a party, k, for taking policy position Xk results in the following participation
constraints:
C˜k(Xk) = θ
hχ
[
W (X∗)−W (Xk)
]
(2.10)
The lobby maximizes the sum of the welfare of its members. Thus, letWL = ∑
J
DJα
JW J(Xk)
denote the welfare of the total population represented by the lobby. Then the problem of
the lobby corresponds to the following maximization problem:
argmax
Xk
∑
k
Gk(Xk, Ck)lWL(Xk)− C˜k(Xk),
If the lobby only wants to influence parties’ policy choices, but not the relative proba-
bilities of either party winning, that implies that the lobby gives the parties exactly the
minimum contribution. Hence, party A continues to win the election with probability G¯A,
independent of the actual policy chosen, while party B wins the election with the constant
probability G¯B. Accordingly, assuming the lobby has only an influence motive, the lobby
problem becomes choosing one of the two party platforms to maximize the expected utility.
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Overall, the following proposition describes the equilibrium policy choices:
Proposition 1 : If the contributions from a sole lobby satisfy both participation cons-
traints in eq. 2.10, it follows that, in equilibrium, the policy choice Xk of party k = A,B
maximizes the following additive welfare function:
W (Xk) +
(
G¯khlχ
θ
)
WL(Xk)
=
(
gR +DRαR G¯
khlχ
θ
)
WR(Xk) +
(
gM +DMαM G¯
khlχ
θ
)
WM (Xk)
(2.11)
Next, we analyze the electoral motive of the lobby, i.e., the lobby contributes to a party
without expecting that the party adopts its policy platform in exchange. The rationality of
unconditional campaign spending follows from the fact that campaign spending induces a
change in the reelection probabilities of the parties. Hence, taking party platforms as given,
the lobby might want to donate to a party to increase the reelection probability of this
party. Let cˆk denote the level of unconditional campaign spending to the party k. It then
follows that the lobby selects the level of unconditional campaign spending to maximize
the expected welfare of its members, i.e., the following first-order condition results:
∂GA
∂cˆA
l
[
WL(XA)−WL(XB)
]
− 1 ≤ 0 ⊥ cˆA ≥ 0
∂GA
∂cˆB
l
[
WL(XB)−WL(XA)
]
− 1 ≤ 0 ⊥ cˆB ≥ 0
(2.12)
Obviously, it follows directly from the equilibrium conditions in eq. 2.12 that the lobby
never wants to support both parties simultaneously, since both conditions cannot hold
simultaneously. Moreover, unconditional lobbying makes only sense for the lobby if the
parties have different policy platforms, where the agrarian lobby never contributes to the
party with the lower protection level. Furthermore, we note that sole unconditional lobby-
ing does not induce parties to select a different optimal policy platform, since the reelection
probability of a party is additively separable in unconditional campaign contributions and
party platforms. Thus, excluding a conditional lobby for the moment, it follows that, for
any level of unconditional lobby, the best response of both parties is to choose the PNE
position X∗.
Proposition 2 : Including both conditional (cˆk) and unconditional (C˜k) campaign spen-
ding, the equilibrium policy, campaign spending choices, and the probabilities of the parties
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to win (P k) are characterized by the following conditions:
Xk∗ = argmax
Xk
W (Xk) +
(
Pkhlχ
θ
)
WL(Xk)
PA = G(Ck∗, Xk∗), PB = 1− PA
∂Gk(Ck∗,Xk∗)
∂cˆk
l
[
WL(XA∗)−WL(XB∗)
]
− 1 ≤ 0 ⊥ c∗k ≥ 0
C˜k(Xk∗) = θhχ
[
W (X∗)−W (Xk∗)
]
Ck∗ = C˜k∗(Xk∗) + cˆ∗k
(2.13)
Given our exhibitions above, the proof of proposition 2 is straightforward and therefore
is omitted here 2.
Furthermore, denote βkJ =
(
gJ +DJαJ G¯
khlχ
θ
)
. Then, the optimal agricultural policy
platform Xk∗ = (sk∗R , tk∗R ) chosen by party k = A,B to maximize reelection chances can be
derived from the following first-order conditions:
∂Πk
∂sR
= βRk − βMk ∂Γ
S
∂sk
≤ 0 ⊥ sk∗R ≥ 0
∂Πk
∂tR
= −βRk + βMk ∂Γ
T
∂tk
≤ 0 ⊥ tk∗R ≥ 0
(2.14)
Based on the conditions characterizing the political equilibrium, we can derive a set of
hypotheses regarding the impact of voter behavior on agricultural protection levels. We
summarize these results in proposition 3.
Proposition 3 : The impact of voter behavior on agricultural policy resulting from elec-
toral competition is characterized by the following properties:
(i) In political equilibrium, optimal party platforms correspond either to taxation or
subsidization of agriculture, but never to both simultaneously, i.e., it holds tk∗R sk∗R = 0
∀k = A,B.
(ii) A necessary condition that a party k prefers a subsidy regime (sk∗R − tk∗R > 0) is :
βkRα
M
βkMα
R > 1, while
βkRα
M
βkMα
R < 1 is a necessary condition that a party k prefers a tax
regime (sk∗R − tk∗R < 0).
(iii) The PNE X∗ corresponds to a subsidy (tax) regime if non-policy preferences have a
lower (higher) importance vis-a-vis the policy preferences for the agrarian, compared
to the non-agrarian, voters, i.e., it holds KR < KM (KR > KM ). Moreover, in a
subsidy regime, the subsidy level decreases with the ratio κ = KR
KM
and vice versa
in a tax regime, where the tax level increases with κ, where κ measures the relative
2The proof is available from the authors upon request.
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importance of non-policy voting for the agrarian voters in comparison to the relative
importance of non-policy voting for the non-agrarian voters.
(iv) The impact of lobbying on agricultural policy is crucially dependent on the average
relative importance of policy versus non-policy voting; in particular, the agricultural
policy position held by a party k in equilibrium can be derived from an additive
welfare function that includes the welfare of agrarian and non-agrarian voters, re-
spectively, and the welfare of the members of the lobby group. gL = Gkhlχθ is the
relative political weight of the lobby vis-a-vis the common weight of the voters, gR +
gM = 1. Hence, the relative political weight of the lobby, gL, is monotonically decre-
asing in θ and monotonically increasing in l and h. θ measures the average relative
importance of policy versus non-policy voting of agrarian and non-agrarian voters,
while l measures the interest group cohesiveness and h the effectiveness of campaign
spending. In particular, if non-policy voting becomes irrelevant, i.e., KJ = 0, with
J = R,M , lobbying has no impact on agricultural policy.
(v) In equilibrium, lobbying shifts agricultural policy away from the corresponding PNE
in favor of the represented group. Hence, if the PNE corresponds to a subsidy regime
and the lobby represents agrarian interest, the agricultural subsidy level is higher in
the political equilibrium when compared to the PNE, while it is lower or agriculture
might even be taxed in equilibrium if the lobby represents non-agrarian interests.
Analogously, if the PNE corresponds to a tax regime and the lobby represents non-
agrarian interests, the agricultural tax level is higher in political equilibrium when
compared to the PNE, while the agricultural tax is lower or agriculture might even
be subsidized in equilibrium if the lobby represents agrarian interests.
(vi) A subsidization of agriculture can only be observed in equilibrium, if one of the
following conditions holds:
θR > θM or h > 0 and ∑
J
KJ > 0 Moreover, assuming that the generic district is
perfectly representative for the total society, i.e., αJn = αJ , it follows that the relative
ideological bias of rural and urban population determines candidates’ preferred po-
licy regime. In particular, in a perfect representative district, candidates only prefer
subsidization (taxation) of agriculture if rural population is less (more) ideologically
biased than the urban population. However, assuming heterogeneous districts, subsi-
dization (taxation) of agriculture might be preferred, although the rural population
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is more (less) biased than the urban population, as long as the share of agricultural
population is sufficiently higher (lower) in the generic district when compared to the
average national share. The latter replicates the well-known result of Weingast et al.
(1981), indicating that the geographical distribution of costs and gains from political
redistribution determines the politically-preferred level of redistribution. The higher
(lower) the share of rural population in a generic district in comparison to the cor-
responding national share, the higher (the lower) is the share in political gains and
the lower (higher) is c.p., the share of political costs resulting from agricultural sub-
sidization and thus, more (less) politicians being re-elected that prefer agricultural
subsidization.
(vii) Assuming a subsidy regime, i.e., s∗R > 0, then subsidization of agriculture increases
the higher the ideological bias of urban and rural population, i.e., the higher θR
θM
, the
higher the rural population’s share in the generic district in comparison to the total
society, i.e., the higher α
R
n
αR
, while subsidization of agriculture decreases the higher
the relative national share of rural and urban population, i.e. the higher αR
αM
. Note
that the latter replicates the result of Becker (1983), who nicely demonstrated that
assuming increasing deadweight costs of taxation implies that subsidization is higher
when the subsidized group is smaller than the taxed group.
(viii) Defining a family r = 1, ..., y of redistribution schemes characterized by different
deadweight costs, where the difference in deadweight costs can be expressed with a
factor λr, such that:
λrΓSr (sR) = ΓS1 (sR), λr ≥ 1 ∀r = 1, ..., y
λrΓTr (tR) = ΓT1 (tR), λr ≤ 1 ∀r = 1, ..., y
It then follows that, in equilibrium, subsidization of agriculture decreases with dead-
weight costs.
The proof of proposition 3 is straightforward given from the first-order condition 2.14.
Overall, proposition 3 implies the well-known development paradox, i.e., the higher costs
of collective action by the large group of farmers opposed to the relatively smaller and
politically better-organized urban manufacturing sector result in taxation of agriculture
in developing countries. In contrast, in highly-developed economies, a declining farm po-
pulation is better organized and, thus, votes less ideologically, but more in response to
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politically-distributed welfare, while higher wages and smaller expenditure shares on food
decrease urban resistance to higher agricultural prices.
Therefore, the political costs of subsidizing agriculture are significantly lower in indus-
trialized countries when compared to developing countries and, vice-versa, the political
costs of taxing agriculture are significantly lower in developing countries than in indus-
trialized ones. However, it also follows directly from proposition 3 that, beyond relative
political responses of urban and rural populations, the preferred direction and level of
redistribution are also determined by deadweight costs.
Altogether, our theoretical model identifies a number of determinants of agricultural
protection:
(i) High relative importance of policy versus non-policy voting: The expected agricultural
protection level increases c.p. with the relative importance of non-policy voting versus
policy voting.
(ii) Lack of effective electoral competition: Expected agricultural subsidization increases
with higher loyalty bias in favor of one party.
(iii) Average level of political awareness: Expected agricultural protection decreases with
the greater average relative importance of policy versus non-policy voting.
(iv) Disparity in the level of political awareness across agrarian and non-agrarian popu-
lation: The greater disparity in the level of political awareness across the groups in
favor of farmers, the higher the expected agricultural protection.
(v) : Organizational strength of farm interests: The higher organizational strength of
farm interests, the higher agricultural protection.
Although the electoral competition of our theoretical model implies a policy choice in
PNE based on a linear form of social welfare function, we can test our theory by estima-
ting the conditional logit model, since the empirical estimation of the logit model does
not substitute a problem of maximization of social welfare function but mainly changes
the generated political weights. The theoretical conclusions from linear maximization will
also apply for the conditional logit models and multi-party system, since the relative po-
litical weights that dominate policy choice in PNE can be empirically specified from the
conditional logit models and thus our theoretical hypotheses can be tested. As a whole,
we dealt with two different kinds of relative weights. First, the ordinary voters had special
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weights vis-a-vis a lobby group. Second, the farmers, as a voter group, had special political
weights vis-a-vis the non-farmers (see Appendix). These political weights are different for
both groups and depend on the relative importance of non-policy voting versus policy vo-
ting. To find a relative importance of non-policy voting versus policy voting, we derived a
practical measure from a post logit evaluation, ideological indicator. Therefore, we provide
a short insight into formulation of spatial models and then approach this indicator.
2.3. Ideology Indicator
Spatial models
The spatial modelers posit that voters prefer parties whose positions are close to their
own positions along a salient policy dimension. In other words, the voters support the
candidates who reflect their policy beliefs in the best way. Therefore, the modelers used
a utility function based on the metric (Euclidean) distances in one- or multi-dimensional
space. A utility function Vi(j) of voter i for candidate j is specified as the negative of the
squared distance between the voter i at location xi and a candidate j at location sj in
one-dimensional space in the following way:
Vi(j) = −(xi − sj)2. (2.15)
In multi-dimensional space, voters have preferences on different issues. Suppose that
there are N issues, then xin is the voter’s position on the nth issue, and sjn is the candida-
te’s position on the nth issue. A multi-dimensional utility function is obtained by summing
the one-dimensional utilities over the various issue dimensions. With the policy-salience
parameter for the nth issue, βn, the voter’s utility for the candidate’s policies is given by
Vi(j) = −
∑
n
βn(xin − sjn)2. (2.16)
It is not possible to describe the voters’ behavior only through their political beliefs, be-
cause voters can support a preferred candidate even if some rival candidate better reflects
the voter’s political beliefs (Alvarez, 1997). Since there are many unobservable factors
which cannot be measured from voter’s evaluations of the candidates in voter’s surveys,
these factors were modeled by a stochastic component. The probabilistic policy-only model
(Adams et al., 2005) can be extended with measured non-policy variables (such as age,
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education, and income) so that we obtain two kinds of variables. In this case, the most
suitable model for this estimation is the extended conditional logit model, which com-
bines the multinomial logit model with the pure conditional logit model. The extended
conditional logit model in the framework of a discrete choice model was established and
developed by McFadden (1974, 1982). This kind of model allows one to examine how the
characteristics of an individual i (case-specific data) and the characteristics of some choice
j (alternative-specific data) affect the probabilities. In this case, the independent variables
of choice- or alternative-specific variables (in our analysis, policy variables) don’t provide
information about the decision maker, but rather information relative to each alternative:
the effect of these variables on the utility doesn’t differ across alternatives. In contrast, the
socio-demographic variables (here non-policy variables) do not vary over the alternatives:
the effect of these variables on the utility of alternatives differs across alternatives.
Thus the extended conditional logit model becomes the form:
Vi(j) = αj +
∑
l
γljtli −
∑
n
βn(xin − sjn)2, (2.17)
or in the condensed form
Vi(j) = αj +
∑
l
γljtli −
∑
n
βnd
n
ij , (2.18)
, where dnij are corresponding Euclidean distances.
∑
l γljtli is the sum of non-policy
measured factors: the vector tli is a vector of non-policy variables specifying a individual
characteristic of voter i for the lth non-policy variable and the vector γlj is a vector of a
salience parameter of party j for the lth non-policy variable. αj is an alternative-specific
constant, which captures the average effect on utility of all factors that are not included in
the model. When alternative-specific constants are included in the model, the stochastic
component ij has zero mean by construction.
The logit probability that voter i chooses party j has the following form:
Pij =
eVi(j)∑
J e
Vi(j′)
= e
αj+
∑
l
γljtli−
∑
n
βndnij∑
J e
αj′+
∑
l
γlj′ tli−
∑
n
βndnij′
. (2.19)
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Ideology indicator
We derived an ideology indicator based on the post-logit-estimation evaluation. Since only
differences in utility matter in logit estimation, we set the differences pairwise across all
utilities equal to zero to find the point in which all pairs of parties’ probabilities to become
elected were identical to each other; this means that we found the hypothetical point in
which a voter is indifferent between two parties, since the utilities of these parties are
identical. However, this doesn’t mean that a weight of a non-voting utility’s component
was equal to a weight of voting utility’s component; these components can be definitely
diverse. Assume J is a set of parties with 1, 2, ...j ∈ J . Thus, the ideology indicator is
derived in the following way:
Vi(j)− Vi(j′) = (αj − αj′) +
∑
l
(γlj − γlj′)tli −
∑
n
βn(dnij − dnij′) = 0. (2.20)
This equation needs to be rewritten:
∑
n
βn(dnij − dnij′) = (αj − αj′) +
∑
l
(γlj − γlj′)tli. (2.21)
Further we divide by the sum of betas on both sides:
∑
n
βn(dnij − dnij′)∑
n βn
= (αj − αj′) +
∑
l (γlj − γlj′)tli∑
n βn
. (2.22)
Assume, that β˜n = βn∑
n
βn
is the relative weight of distances’ difference for a policy issue
n. Thus we obtain:
∑
n
β˜n(dnij − dnij′) =
(αj − αj′) +
∑
l (γlj − γlj′)tli∑
n βn
. (2.23)
∑
n β˜n(dnij − dnij′) is the weighted sum of distances’ differences over all issues n for a voter
i. We denote it Dijj′ and name it the weighted policy voting component. We wanted to
answer the following question: how great must a weighted policy voting component be to
compensate for non-policy voting advantages?
Cijj′ =
(αj − αj′) +
∑
l (γlj − γlj′)tli∑
n βn
. (2.24)
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Finally, it is interesting to know the weighted policy voting component not only for one-
party constellation but the mean of all party pairs for a voter.
To derive a non-policy indicator, we shaped the mean over all party constellations in
the following way:
Table 2.1.: Evaluation of Non-policy Indicator
Parties 1 . . . j . . . J
1 0 . . . Ci1j . . . Ci1J 1J−1
∑J
h=1C
i
1h
. . . . . . 0 . . . . . . . . . . . .
j Cij1 . . . 0 . . . CijJ 1J−1
∑J
h=1C
i
jh
. . . . . . . . . . . . 0 . . . . . .
J CiJ1 . . . CiJj . . . 0 1J−1
∑J
h=1C
i
Jh
Therefore, a non-policy indicator for individual i for party j results in:
∣∣∣Idij∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
∑J
h=1C
i
jh
J − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ (2.25)
By the last step, we find the only one weighed sum of all party means, so that we get only
one non-policy indicator for a voter i of the following form:
Idi =
J∑
j=1
Sj ∗
∣∣∣Idij∣∣∣ (2.26)
where Sj is the share of party j.
An ideological indicator derived from a non-policy voting term is a hypothetical measure.
If the ideological indicator of voter i is quite high, the policy voting term of the voter
must be increased very much to compensate for non-policy voting advantages. ideological
indicator corresponds to the relative marginal effects, presented in the Appendix, so that
a correlation between both is 0.64***.
Voter behavior, lobby and government accountability
To analyze voter behavior after logit estimation of latent class analysis (LCA) , we used in-
dices describing the implications of voter behavior for government performance, presented
by Henning et al. (2014). Given our theory above, the more c.p. voters rely on non-policy
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voting, i.e., the more relative importance of non-policy versus policy voting, the less a
political support-maximizing government considers voters’ preferred policy position. For-
mally, the larger the α-parameter in relation to the β-parameter, the more voters base
their vote choice on non-policy factors; thus, more electoral competition implies that the
government orients its policy towards organized interest groups (lobby) and ignores voters.
Accordingly, we defined an index of governmental accountability (GA) vis-a-vis the voters
as the following relation (see Appendix):
GA = βG
αG + βG
with
βG =
∑
i∈V
PMEiG
αG =
∑
i∈V
NMEiG
While GA measures the relative accountability of the government vis-a-vis the voters,
a low value for GA does not necessarily imply that the government is not accountable
to society, because a high α-value only implies that the electoral outcome is significantly
driven by campaign spending. Thus, as long as campaign funds are generated primarily by
national interest groups, elected politicians might still have strong incentives to represent
society’s interests, as organized interest groups are constituted by members of society. Only
if campaign spending is derived primarily from other organizations (e.g., international
donors) does a high α-value imply low GA; this effect occurs because international donor
organizations do not represent society members. In many cases, donor organizations act
in the interest of a specific society, but from a society perspective, donor-driven policies
are, at best, derived from imposed welfare functions.
While ideological indicator and relative marginal effects correspond to the rate of substi-
tution (i.e., by what percentage the probability of non-policy changes when 1% increasing
probability of policy voting), the further index assesses the relative importance of different
voting motives to the sum of all marginal effects:
RIi
NP = NMEiNMEi+PMEi
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RIi
P = PMEiNMEi+PMEi
2.4. Empirical Model
2.4.1. Discrete Choice Models
Discrete choice models derived in a random utility model (RUM) framework are used
in a variety of areas of applied econometrics. This kind of model assumes that decision
makers choose between two or more discrete alternatives and behave as expected utility
maximizers; in the case of spatial models, the voter supports the candidate or the party
who maximizes his combination of measured policy-related utilities and his unmeasured
utilities (Adams et al., 2005). Assume there are J alternatives for a decision maker. Thus
the decision maker i chooses the party j if and only if
Ui(j) > Ui(j′), ∀j 6= j′. (2.27)
In random utility models, one presumes that the utility Ui(j) provided to individual i
by party j is composed of a deterministic component Vi(j), which can be calculated based
on observed characteristics, and a stochastic error component ij , which is unobserved, so
that the formula for a random utility model determining only policy factors is given by
Ui(j) = Vi(j) + ij = −
∑
n
βn(xni − snj)2 + ij , (2.28)
where ij is a voter-specific random utility term which represents the unmeasured com-
ponents of the voter i’s utility for a party j. The assumption used in the (conditional)
logit is that the unobserved portion of utility ij follows, independently and identically, an
extreme value distribution.
Note that in all discrete choice models, the absolute level of utility is irrelevant. The choice
probability is Pij = Prob(Ui(j) > Ui(j′)) = Prob(Ui(j)− Ui(j′) > 0), which depends only
on the difference in utility and not its absolute level. This fact has implications for the
identification of discrete choice models. Thus the conditional logit model is used as the
regression model in Latent Class Models (see below) and specifies that the probability that
voter i chooses a party j is proportional to the exponential of the deterministic component
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of utility and the sum of these probabilities over candidates is one
Pij =
eVi(j)∑
J e
Vi(j′)
, (2.29)
where Vi(j) is the systematic component in the utility of alternative j. Further, it is possible
to interpret the estimation results as the ratios of logit probabilities (Odds):
Oddsijm =
Pij
Pim
=
eVi(j)∑
J
eVi(j
′)
eVi(m)∑
J
eVi(j
′)
= e
Vi(j)
eVi(m)
= eVi(j)−Vi(m). (2.30)
An odds ratio greater than 1 indicates that an individual i is more likely to vote the party
j; conversely, if an odds ratio is less than 1, an individual i is more likely to vote the party
m. If an odds ratio is equal to 1, then both parties have the same probability of winning
the election.
The conditional logit model developed by McFadden (1974) is the regression model used
for estimation of latent class models in Latent GOLD Choice 4.0 software (Vermunt and
Magidson, 2005). In the following, we specify our estimated model of latent classes and
describe the used database.
2.4.2. Latent Class Analysis
LCA uncovers unobserved heterogeneity in a population and aims to find meaningful
groups of people that are similar in their responses to measured variables. LC analysis was
introduced in 1950 by Lazarsfeld (1950), who coined the term latent structure analysis
and included factor analysis as the latent structure method for characterizing continuous
latent variables (factors) based on continuous observed variables (McCutcheon, 1987). The
traditional LC model was introduced by Lazarsfeld and Henry (1968) for dichotomous
variables (Magidson and Vermunt, 2001). The further formalization and extension of LCA
are based on, amongst other works, Goodman (1972, 1974), Clogg (1988), McCutcheon
(1987), Vermunt (1997), Hagenaars (1990).
Latent Class Estimation of this paper was realized in Latent GOLD Choice 4.0, develo-
ped by Vermunt and Magidson (2005). From the three possible methods in Latent GOLD
Choice 4.0, based on different response formats (first choice, ranking task, rating task),
first choice format was selected as most suitable method concerning the assumption that
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each choice set has the same number of alternatives.
In this specific case, the conditional logit model doesn’t include predictor effects (only-
policy model), so the term Vi(j) is a linear function of an alternative-specific constant
αj and attribute effects βn, where i is used for a particular individual, j for a particular
alternative, and n for a particular attribute. Let yit denote the value of the dependent
variable for a case i at replication t, which can take on values 1 ≤ j ≤ J . Note that each
individual was observed only once; therefore, we have one-to-one correspondence between
replications and choice sets. So that we can denote it in simplified terms yi.
That is,
Vi(j) = αj +
∑
n
βnd
n
ij , (2.31)
where ∑Jj=1 αj = 0 is presumed. The detailed form of the estimated model is given,
then, by
Vi(j) = αj + βEUdEUij + βEcodEcoij + βSocdSocij , (2.32)
where βEU , βEco, βSoc are attribute effects accordingly for attributes dEUij , dEcoij , and
dSocij , calculated Euclidean distances in three dimensions (see below database), which cha-
racterize the policy choices of voters.
In a latent class variant of the conditional model, it is assumed that individuals belong
to different latent classes that differ with respect to βn. To indicate that the choice proba-
bilities depend on class membership x, the logistic model is of the form (cf. Vermunt and
Magidson, 2005, p.12):
P (yit = j|x) =
exp(Vi|x(j))∑
J exp(Vi|x(j′))
, (2.33)
Here, Vi|x(j) is the systematic component in the utility of alternative j, given that
individual i belongs to the latent class x. As can be seen, the logit regression coefficients
are class-specific and the linear model for Vi|x(j) in this specific case is:
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Vi|x(j) = αxj +
∑
n
βxnd
n
ij . (2.34)
In addition to the attributes, we included in our latent class analysis another type of
explanatory variable - covariates - in the LC model. While attributes enter in the regression
model for choices, covariates are used to predict class membership. When covariates are
included in the model, the probability density occupies the following form (cf. Vermunt
and Magidson, 2005):
P (yi) =
X∑
x=1
P (x|zcovi )
Ti∏
t=1
P (yit|x), (2.35)
where zcovi is a set of covariates of individual i and yi is a vector of all responses.
2.4.3. Data Base
(I) Own Sample3
The data used for the empirical analysis were derived from a household questionnaire
of non-farm and farm households, which included 391 households in four different rural
communities in Slovakia: Trnava, Galanta, Michalovce, and Trebisov. The communities
were selected following a two-dimensional design, covering economically high- and low-
performing rural regions and communities located close or distant to a major city. Personal
interviews were undertaken by locally-trained professional interviewers in 2007.
Table 2.2.: Communities
Community Economic Performance/Closeness to City Farm Non-farm
Trnava High/close 27 53
Galanta High/distant 14 55
Michalovce Low/close 49 90
Trebisov Low/distant 32 71
Total 122 269
For our analysis, we used the further socioeconomic characteristics as explanatory and
3EU-Project ADVANCED-EVAL FP6: Development and application of advanced quantitative methods to
ex-ante and ex-post evaluations of rural development programmes in the EU,http://cordis.europa.
eu/result/rcn/47026_en.html
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class-membership determining variables:
• Subjective Characteristics:
– Age (Age)
– Education (Education): 1=basic, 2=vocational, 3=secondary, 4=high school, 5=university
– Total monthly income in Euro (Income)
– Farmer Affiliation (Farmer): 1=farmer, 0 otherwise
• Regional Differences:
– Economic Performance of community (High-Performance): 1=high, 0=low
– Distance to city (Distance-to-city): 1=close, 0=distant
In addition to standard socioeconomic, network, and migration issues, interviewees were
asked about the perceived positions of the parties and their self-placement concerning the
three issues, using the following questionnaires:
• EU −Subsidies (EU): Some people say that the Slovak government should lobby in
Bruxelles to obtain more subventions for agricultural sector in Slovakia. Others say
that the government should lobby for other issues
• Socio− economic trade− off (Eco): Some people say that tax should be increased
in favor of better public services and social security. Others say that public services
and social security should be cut down to reduce tax
• Social− cultural dimension (Soc): Some people agree with liberal policies like lega-
lizing abortion, homosexual marriage etc. Others disagree with such liberal policies
The questions were referred to the latest national parliamentary election that took place
on the 17th of June 2006. The relevant parties and their results at the latest election are
summarized in Table 2.3. Note that the latent class analysis included only voters of the
parties for whom the seats in the National Council (Narodna rada Slovenskej republiky)
were allocated; in other words, the parties with at least 5 % of the nationwide votes.
Although Slovakia was governed by a coalition of three parties (SMER, SNS, and HZDS)
spanning the whole political spectrum, the coalition was dominated by the left-leaning
SMER. The shares of parties in our sample can be seen in Figure 2.1.
Using a one-to-seven scale, respondents placed the parties and themselves concerning the
issues above. Based on these voters’ policy preferences and their beliefs about all parties’
positions in three dimensions, the squared (Euclidean) distances were calculated for each
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Table 2.3.: Party System in Slovakia after Election 2006
Party Abbr. Ideology Votes,% Seats
Direction - Social Democracy (Smer) SMER Center left 29.14 50
Slovak Democratic and Christian Union SDKU Christian Democrat 18.35 31
Slovak National Party SNS Nationalist 11.73 20
Party of the Hungarian Coalition SMK Minority 11.68 20
People’s Party - Movement for a Democratic Slovakia HZDS Center right 8.79 15
Christian Democratic Movement KDH Conservative 8.31 14
Communist Party of Slovakia KSS 3.88
Free Forum SF 3.47
Alliance of the New Citizen ANO 1.42
other Parties under 1 % 3.23
of three dimensions and for each of six parties, so that these eighteen distances were taken
as attributes (policy variables) in LCA. The perceived voters’ positions for EU agricultural
protection, based on which an outcome policy (wP ) was calculated, are presented in Figure
2.1.
Figure 2.1.: Votes of parties and perceived parties’ position
(II) Eurobarometer Sample4
Since our own sample is predominantly based on data from rural areas (farmers share in
our sample 31% versus 8% nation-wide), we take also the Eurobarometer data for 250
Slovakian voters5 to identify with the help of propensity score matching potential urban
4ZA4235: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.3 (New Europeans, Science and Technology, and the
Agriculture), https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/sdesc2.asp?no=4235&db=e&doi=10.4232/1.4235
5A share of urban voters in the sample, based on Eurobarometer data, is 58%
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voters among the non-farmers in our sample and hence to ensure a ideal position of urban
voters in EU-Dimension for the further calculation of lobby influence.
In addition to age, education, income, farmer status (1=farmer, 0=non-farmer), urban
variable (1=village, 2=small town and 3=city), and political party choice, the following
questions regarding agricultural protection in the EU, used in further factor analysis, were
available:
• (QA1) In your opinion, should the European Union use its agricultural policy to:
• (QA1_a) Ensure stable and adequate incomes for farmers? yes=1, no=0
• (QA1_b) Make European agriculture more competitive on world markets? yes=1, no=0
• (QA1_c) Protect the taste and the specificity of European agricultural products? yes=1, no=0
• (QA1_d) Protect medium or small sized farms? yes=1, no=0
Based on these questions, the following factor loadings were determined, so that a factor
EU agricultural protection was generated for our further propensity score matching, making
it possible to identify a potential urban group in our sample, to deal with the representative
sample, and to calculate the political weights for all population groups.
Table 2.4.: Factor analysis for Eurobarometer data
Variable Factor loadings
QA1_a 0.66
QA1_b 0.65
QA1_c 0.71
QA1_d 0.73
Variance 0.47%
2.4.4. Results
First, we present the results of LCA, based on which the individual ideological indicator
was calculated. Second, based on our theory, we demonstrated, by ideological indicator, the
relative greater importance of policy-oriented voting for the agricultural population versus
the non-agricultural population. Third, we computed the political weights reflecting the
relative importance of one group’s policy voting versus another group’s policy voting for
politicians to test our theory. Moreover, we calculated the capture indices (see Appendix),
as well as the indices GA and RIs, to see whether the agricultural group is really more
important for politicians than the non-agricultural group, i.e., whether the farmers capture
the non-farmers and that the agricultural lobby exists.
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Ideological indicator
We estimated the latent class models to find out to what extent the voters have policy and
non-policy motives. Table 2.6 shows the results of the latent class analysis with the estima-
ted parameters, i.e., the relationship between the dependent (choosing a political party)
and independent variables (distances in three political dimensions) and the significance
levels for each class, which are determined by the socioeconomic variables. A two-class
model was the best fit for the data set, based on the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)
proposed by Nylund et al. (2007), where it was concluded that BIC is superior to AIC
(2.5).
Table 2.5.: Fit for different number of latent classes
BIC AIC CAIC
2 classes model 1191.692 1100.411 1214.692
3 classes model 1235.387 1084.577 1273.387
4 classes model 1289.144 1078.803 1342.144
From Table 2.6, the class membership probabilities show 53.13% of the interviewees
being a member of class 1 and 46.8% of class 2. The results indicate heterogeneity of party
preferences across the two latent classes. The estimation results also imply that policy-
oriented choice is different in both latent classes. For instance, while class 1 strongly votes
according to the economic dimension (Eco), the policy voting of class 2 is dominantly
generated by preferences in the two other dimensions (EU and Soc). The negative sign for
attribute means indicates less Euclidean distance between a voter and party in this or that
dimension, and thus greater likelihood for the party to be elected. Two classes are marked
by different constants; class 1 has the greater significant constants for two parties (SMER
and SNS) compared to the significant constants for these parties in class 2. Also from
Table 2.6, class membership is determined by the socioeconomic variables age, education,
income, and farmer status as well as community indices (High-Performance and Distance-
to-city). Only two variables have a significant influence in the class determination: farmer-
belonging and community performance. The first group is likely to be overrepresented by
non-farmers, mainly from low-performing communities.
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Table 2.6.: Results of the Latent Class Analysis with the Estimated Parameters by z-values
Class1 z-value Class2 z-value
Class Size 53.13% 46.87%
Constants HZDS -0.689 -1.608 0.261 0.703
SDKU -0.003 -0.013 0.200 0.624
SMER 1.447*** 8.033 0.684* 1.803
SMK 0.367* 1.660 0.437 1.313
KDH -0.446 -1.479 0.085 0.220
SNS -0.676* -1.796 -1.666* -1.960
Attributes
EU -0.009 -0.439 -0.736*** -3.415
Eco -0.065*** -2.649 -0.087 -1.167
Soc 0.004 0.245 -0.704*** -3.591
Class-Membership
Intercept 1.020* 1.653 -1.020* -1.653
Covariates Age -0.010 -1.319 0.010 1.319
Education -0.052 -0.648 0.052 0.648
Income -0.004 -0.223 0.004 0.223
Farmer -0.454* -1.710 0.454* 1.710
High-Performance -0.488*** -2.387 0.488*** 2.387
Distance-to-city 0.184 0.934 -0.184 -0.934
Log likelihood function: -527.206;
***p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10
Further, we calculated an ideology indicator, developed in formula 2.23. First, using the
estimated coefficients of latent classes, we evaluated ideology indicator for each voter and
class. Since we didn’t have the predictors in our model, the ideology indicator for class x
was the same for each voter within a latent class x and took the form:
IdeoInix =
∑
k′∈J
(sk′
1
J − 1
∑
k∈J
Dixk′k) (2.36)
with
Dixk′k =
(αxk′ − αxk)∑
n βxn
. (2.37)
Second, we calculated an individual ideology indicator for voter i based on the posterior
class membership probabilities Pˆ (x|yi) of voter i:
IdeoIni =
∑
x∈X
IdeoInixPˆ (x|yi) (2.38)
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Third, we computed kernel density plots of individual ideological indicator, separated
for three cases: farmers and non-farmers, for inhabitants of low- and high-performance
communities, and for class 1 and class 2. To obtain a better explanation, we also provide
the fourth plot with more detailed distributions: for farmers with high and low performance
as well as for non-farmers with the same characteristics.
Figure 2.2.: Estimated kernel density of ideological Indicator
The plots of Figure 2.2 provide evidence of heterogeneous election within the classes
and socioeconomic groups, whereas the main heterogeneity occurs between the classes.
Moreover, we performed a t − test for Equality of Means and Levene′s test for Equality
of Variances for all cases. For distribution of kernel density by farmer affiliation, the tests
resulted in an insignificant inequality of variances and highly significant difference of means
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(with means 5.71 and 8.41, respectively). For distribution by performance characteristics,
these tests also confirmed an insignificant inequality of variances and highly significant
difference of means: 5.72 and 8.70 for high- and low-performance communities, respectively.
The tests for distribution by latent classes indicate that variances are significantly different
in both classes with significantly unequal means (11.21 for class 1 and 3.63 for class 2).
Finally, the last plot shows that the farmer group with a high performance votes less
ideologically than one with a low performance. The same is true for the non-farmers. It is
also interesting that the distribution of farmers with low performance is very close to one
of non-farmers with a high performance.
Thus, LCA indicates significant heterogeneity in voter behavior between farmers and
non-farmers. While endogenously determined that class 2, which overrepresented farmers
from high-performing communities, votes in a more policy-oriented fashion than class 1;
a separation of groups by exogenous factor (farmer status) demonstrates the significant
differences in means for ideological indicator. Therefore, the results confirmed a central
idea of this paper: special interest groups vote in a more policy-oriented fashion.
Political weights
To calculate the political weights for all society groups, we first identified urban voters
with the aid of propensity score matching (PSM). Linear transformed factor values from
the factor analysis, i.e., individual voter positions to EU agricultural protection, were used,
among other variables, as independent variables in logit estimation (Table 2.10), based on
which the propensity scores were calculated and a matching was realized. Using the results
of previous studies (Plesivcak, 2012), confirming a great attachment of Slovakian urban
voters for the right-wing SDKU, we used a dummy for SDKU as a treatment indicator
to match potential urban voters in our sample. Based on the logit estimation, a function
Match of software R identified 57 urban voters, so that we are now able to deal with three
population groups: farmer, non-farmer rural, and non-farmer urban.
Individual voter positions to EU agricultural protection from the Eurobarometer sample
and our data are presented as a kernel density estimation in Figure 2.3. A small difference
between urban and non-urban opinion about agricultural protection exists, whereby the
correlation between urban variable and agricultural protection for the Eurobarometer sam-
ple is only -0.19***, while the correlation for our data is -0.34***. Obviously, we consider
a great bias in the ideal position of voters toward EU agricultural protection: the most
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urban voters have nothing against the EU supporting the farmers.
Figure 2.3.: Individual position to EU agricultural protection between urban and non-urban voters for both
samples
Figure 2.4.: Political weights and Lorenz curve
Knowing the ideal positions of urban voters from our own data sample, we calculated
the political weights and other indices (see Appendix) with the following results. From
the Lorenz curve below (2.4), we first saw a great discrepancy in political weights (with
Gini coefficient 0.425), while the large gap between the political weights of farmer and non-
farmer groups is evident from the next kernel density plot by the urban variable. Thus, the
great importance of the farmer group for politicians is obvious. The correlation between
the ideological indicator and political weights was -0.42***, so that the political weights of
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groups really depend on the relative importance of policy voting, i.e., the more ideologically
one group votes, the less it will be taken into account when choosing the equilibrium
policy.Moreover, by computing the relative political weights between two different groups,
we found that the capture index of the farmers versus non-farm rural group was 1.40,
while the capture of the farmers versus urban group is 1.21, i.e., the urban group was less
captured by the farmers than the rural non-farmers, since the urban group votes are more
policy-oriented than the rural non-farmers (see plot 2.6 in Appendix).
Next, we computed the density plots for indices RIiNP and RIiP by society groups.
Naturally, the sum of all relative marginal effects is one. From Figure 2.5, we see that also
relative importance of policy voting is greater for the farmer group; the non-farmer groups
place greater importance on non-policy motives. Moreover, the government accountability
index, GA, is 0.428.
Figure 2.5.: Political weights and Lorenz curve
Thus, we considered a relatively large GA towards the voters, first of all towards the
farmers. On the other side, the GA towards organized interest groups (0.572) points to
the existence of the lobby canal, which we tried to determine. According to the estimated
ideal party position in equilibrium (see Appendix), wjn∗, which maximizes all votes and
is calculated over three considered groups 6, farmer, rural, and urban, we assumed the
6Our calculation of ideal party position wjn∗ is based on the assumption of the following exogenous
Slovakian weights: 7% for farmers and 93% for non-farmers (with 57% urban and 43% rural population
of non-farmers).
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following equation:
GWwj
n∗ +GLwL = wP (2.39)
where wL is a preferred position of the lobby, calculated as a mean over the ideal positions
of all farmers, wP is the outcome position (average perceived position of parties), and
relative voters’ weight is GW = 1. We found a small relative weight of lobby, GL, equal to
0.0082, referring to the existence of only a minimal agricultural lobby canal.
In this line of thought, we can conclude the following. We showed a strong indirect
influence of the agricultural lobby on policy choice because of the relatively high political
weights of the farm group. On the one side, we found out the relative greater importance
of policy voting for the farm group (the calculated ideological indicator for the farmers is
significantly smaller) and the capture towards the farmers, whereby the relative weight of
the farmers versus the non-farm rural population was appreciably larger than the relative
weight of the farmers versus the urban group (1.40 versus 1.21), i.e., the urban group is less
captured by the farmers. These results explain an attachment for agricultural protection
in the EU. On the other side, despite the significantly greater relative importance of policy
voting for the farmer group, meaning a potential existence of a lobby canal, we found only
a very small relative weight of agricultural lobby when observing the empirically-perceived
voters’ positions in EU agricultural protection. This fact is explained, first of all, by the
great affection of the urban voters for EU agricultural protection, confirmed by the two
different samples. Obviously, urban and non-farm rural populations have special voter
beliefs which influence their opinion about EU agricultural protection that, for example,
the protection of farmers positively affects their own welfare. It means, in addition to the
two known factors, i.e., the importance of policy-oriented voting on the part of voters as
well as the strong organization and concernment on the part of agricultural lobby, there
also exists a third factor determining the policy choices in democratic countries: biased
voter beliefs. Although there is no consensus among scholars of rational choice theory
(Downs, 1957; Coleman, 1990) and the theory of Policy Beliefs (Caplan, 2007), we could
confirm both tendencies: first, the better-organized farm group votes more rationally than
the non-farm group; second, in reality, the agricultural lobby must not be necessarily
strong to be able to push through their own interests because of biased voter beliefs. Note
that biased voter beliefs may also be a consequence of a successful lobby bargaining from
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discussing relevant issues in the public. For example, well-knowing organizations acting as
defenders of consumer rights (among others, foodwatch.org) have a large impact on voter
beliefs and thus on policy choices, but not via campaign spending.
2.5. Conclusions
We provide a systematic analysis of policy- and non-policy-oriented voting motives at both
the theoretical and empirical levels. This paper tries to integrate existing theoretical studies
on voter behavior and special interest groups (Baron, 1994a; Grossman and Helpman, 1996;
Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2002) and advanced empirical probabilistic studies focusing on
voter behavior to derive theoretical hypotheses that will be empirically tested by the latent
class approach. In particular, we provide a theory that relates the relative importance of
different voting motives for urban and rural populations to the induced electoral incentives
of politicians in agricultural protection.
We started with a theoretical model applied to the economic and ideological framework
conditions for a population with different heterogeneous groups. The voting model was
based on a probabilistic environment in which the rural districts of industrialized coun-
tries are less ideologically committed than urban districts. As a consequence, a level of
agricultural protection increases with the falling relative importance of non-policy voting
for the agrarian voters, in comparison to the relative importance of non-policy voting for
the non-agrarian voters. Moreover, the impact of lobbying on agricultural policy is cruci-
ally dependent on the average relative importance of policy versus non-policy voting, i.e.,
the more the average relative importance of policy versus non-policy voting of agrarian
and non-agrarian voters, the less lobby impact on agricultural protection. Moreover, the
theoretical propositions of our model imply the well-known development paradox (Ander-
son, 2008), : the higher costs of collective action by the large group of farmers opposed to
the relatively smaller and politically better-organized urban manufacturing sector imply a
taxation of agriculture in developing countries; in contrast, in highly developed economies,
a declining farm population is better organized and, thus, votes less ideologically, but more
in response to politically-distributed welfare, while higher wages and smaller expenditure
shares on food decrease urban resistance to higher agricultural prices. Therefore, the po-
litical costs of subsidizing agriculture are significantly lower in industrialized countries
than in developing countries and, vice-versa, the political costs of taxing agriculture are
significantly lower in developing, when compared to industrialized, countries.
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To verify the theoretical models empirically, show how the demographic and economic
framework conditions influence the election, and to show whether farmers vote less ideolo-
gically, we needed a practical measure. Hence, as the next step, using the frame of discrete
choice models, we derived an ideological indicator based on the post-logit-estimation eva-
luation. The ideological indicator illustrates how to practically appropriate the weight of
policy preferences compared to ideological preferences. This hypothetical measure provides
the extent to which the non-policy (ideological) term is higher than the policy term, i.e.,
to which extent the policy voting term must be increased to compensate for non-policy
voting advantages.
Further, we implemented a probabilistic voter model in the framework of LCA in Latent
GOLD Choice 4.0 software (Vermunt and Magidson, 2005). In the two-class model, only
two variables significantly influence the class determination, namely farmer-belonging and
community performance. To investigate which latent class is more pronounced in ideolo-
gical elections, we estimated the ideological indicator for each voter. We found that the
farmers, as well as the better-performing communities, vote in a more policy-oriented way,
confirming our theoretical hypothesis. Then, using propensity score matching, we identi-
fied the urban voters so that we are able to deal with three population groups: farmers,
rural non-farmers, and urban voters. For each voter and the groups, we calculated the
relative political weights, which are significantly dependent on the relative importance of
non-policy versus policy voter motives. Computing the relative weights for the groups, we
found that the capture index of the farmers versus urban voters (1.21) was smaller than
versus rural non-farmers (1.40) and both indices were greater than one. Our theoretical
hypothesis of proposition 3 was confirmed by these results, pointing to the strong policy
incentives of the organized farmers and implicating, indirectly, the existence of an agricul-
tural lobby, because of the great discrepancy in the relative political weights between the
farm and non-farm populations. However, our empirical results implicate only a minimal
lobby canal in the sense of our theoretical model, as well as in the sense of other works
(Baron, 1994a; Grossman and Helpman, 1996; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2002); we found
only a very small relative weight of the agricultural lobby vis-a-vis all voters, obviously
because of the strongly biased beliefs of the non-farm population, i.e., they have the great
attachment for EU agricultural protection. It seems that the non-farm voters have special
beliefs that, for example, agricultural protection positively impacts their own welfare. Such
beliefs can obviously arise from the lobby bargaining in public debate. Thus, we provide
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two important results: first, there exists the potential lobby canal and that the better-
organized farm group votes more rationally than the non-farm group; second, in reality,
the agricultural lobby has impacts policy outcomes not only by campaign contributions
but also by biased voter beliefs.
ANNEX
2.A. Proof
Beweis. (i) If sk∗R > 0, it follows from the equilibrium conditions eq.2.14:
∂ΓS
∂sk
= β
R
k
βMk
From the properties of ΓS we know: ∂ΓS∂sk ≥ α
R
αM
Accordingly, sk∗R > 0 implies:
βRk α
M
βM
k
αR
> 1.
Analogously, it follows from the equilibrium conditions eq. 2.14 that tk∗R > 0 implies:
βRk α
M
βM
k
αR
< 1.
Therefore, it follows directly that in the political equilibrium none of the parties
can choose a party platform corresponding simultaneously to a subsidization and a
taxation of agriculture.
(ii) If β
R
k α
M
βM
k
αR
< 1 it follows directly β
R
k
βM
k
< α
R
αM
. Hence, given the property of of ΓS :
∂ΓS
∂sk
≥ αR
αM
it directly follows: ∂ΓS∂sk >
βRk
βM
k
and hence sk∗R = 0. The proof for second
part of (ii) is analogously and therefore omitted here.
(iii) The equilibrium conditions in eq. 2.14 correspond to the PNE if gL = 0. Accordingly,
it follows : βJ = gJ , and therefore:
βRk α
M
βMk α
R
=
1
αR+καM
κ
αR+καM
= 1
κ
= K
M
KR
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2.B. Data
Table 2.7.: Description of own data
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
age 391 51.978 13.376 20 99
education 391 2.959 1.256 1 5
position to EU protection 391 4.967 1.866 1 7
farmer 391 0.312 0.464 0 1
Table 2.8.: Description of Eurobarometer data
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
age 250 45.544 17.057 16 82
education 250 2.596 1.209 1 5
income 250 3.864 2.133 1 10
position to agric. protection 250 4.000 0.510 1.000 4.190
farmer 250 0.008 0.089 0 1
Table 2.9.: Description of data putted into logit estimation
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
age 641 49.468 15.234 16.000 99.000
education 641 2.817 1.250 1 5
income 641 3.836 2.095 1 10
position to agric. protection 641 4.590 1.564 1.000 7.000
farmer 641 0.193 0.395 0 1
Table 2.10.: Logit Results
Dependent variable: Dummy SDKU
coeff. (Std. Error)
age -0.013* (0.007)
education 0.211** (0.083)
income 0.064 (0.048)
position to agric. protection -0.218*** (0.070)
farmer status -0.394 (0.323)
Constant -0.651 (0.544)
Observations 641
Log Likelihood -299.672
Akaike Inf. Crit. 611.345
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Figure 2.6.: Ideological Indicator for three population groups
2.C. Relative marginal effects
The marginal effects of an independent policy alternative-specific variable dnij in a policy
dimension n for individual i and party j on the choice probabilities is
∂Pij
∂dnij
= Pij(1− Pij)βn
For whole policy space with N variables, the total differential of the probability can be
gained accordingly:
dPij =
N∑
n=1
∂Pij
∂dnij
ddnij = Pij (1− Pij)
N∑
n=1
βn
so that the absolute marginal effect in policy dimension for individual i, party j and
class x is
PMEijx = Pijx(1− Pijx)|
N∑
n=1
βnx|
that means how sensitive a voter reacts on the changing distance between one party and
him. Further, we calculate the marginal effects for non-policy dimension (NME) reflec-
ted in constants. Concerning the constants being party specific we obtain for non-policy
preferences ti for individual i and party j the following NME:
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∂Pij
∂ti
= Pij (1− Pij) (αj − αk)
with
αk =
J∑
k 6=j
[
Pik∑J
k 6=j Pik
αk
]
so that the absolute marginal effect in non-policy dimension for individual i, party j
and class x is
NMEijx = Pijx (1− Pijx) |αjx − αkx|
.
Further we find individual relative marginal effects for each class and party:
RMEijx =
NMEijx
PMEijx
Weighting with average party share we obtain RME over all parties:
RMEix =
J∑
j=1
sjRMEijx
2.D. Political Weights and Capture
Probability that a voter i belonging to class x with posterior class membership probability
Pˆx votes for party j is Fij :
Fij =
X∑
x
Pˆx Fijx =
X∑
x
Pˆx
eUijx∑
J e
Uijx
If utility function of voter i for party j is:
Uij = αj −
N∑
n
βnDnij
with
Dnij = bni |ϕni − wnj |2
and
dnij =
∣∣∣ϕni − wnj ∣∣∣
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then derivation is
∂F ij
∂dnij
=
X∑
x
Pˆx
∂F ijx
∂Uijx
∂Uijx
∂Dijx
∂Dijx
∂dnij
= 2
X∑
x
Pˆx P
x
ij(1− P xij)|
N∑
n
βnx |bni |ϕni − wnj | =gi|ϕni −wnj | = 0
with political weight
gi =
X∑
x
Pˆx P
x
ij(1− P xij)|
N∑
n
βnx |bni
for individual i over two classes (X = 2). The weight is maximized, when electoral compe-
tition is strong, i.e. the more the political weight of one group, the more individuals of this
group are indifferent between the two parties, i.e. the more importance this group has for
politicians which are motivated to gain the votes of this group. bni is a relative importance
of individual preferences in dimension n.
For all voters it applies:
I∑
i
gi|ϕni − wnj | = 0
wnj =
I∑
i
gi∑
i gi
ϕni
For two difference groups R and M , the ideal position of party j in equilibrium, wjn∗,
to maximize all votes over the groups is7:
wj
n∗ =
∑
i∈R giϕni∑
i∈R gi
∑
i∈R gi∑
i gi
+
∑
i∈M giϕni∑
i∈M gi
∑
i∈M gi∑
i gi
wj
n∗ = (
∑
i∈R
giϕ
n
i )gKex + (
∑
i∈M
giϕ
n
i )gMex
where gKex =
∑
i∈K gi∑
i
gi
is exogenous weight of the group K and ∑i∈K gi = ∑i∈K gi∑
i∈K gi
is a sum of normalized political weights of the voters of a group K. An ideal position over
all parties is calculated as a mean weighted with party shares.
Straightforward definition of government capture corresponds to the degree to what
political weights of social groups diverge from their corresponding population shares. The
higher the weight of a social group, when compared to its population shares, SK , the more
7Analogously, one calculates an ideal position of party j for three or more different society groups
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this group is able to capture the government. Hence, we estimate the following capture
index for two voter groups R and M :
CAPR_M =
∑
i∈R gi
SR∑
i∈M gi
SM
CAPR_M > 1 means that group R captures the group M . Thus, capture results from
the lobbying activities of interest groups and particularly appears when not all members of
society are equally organized into interest groups (Grossman and Helpman, 1996) or when
the relative political weight of different interest groups deviated from the corresponding
population shares of the sociaty members organized in these interest groups (Bardhan and
Mookherjee, 2002). This capture coefficient corresponds to the β
k
Rα
M
βkMα
R from our theory but
we take the calculated normalized political weights from non-linear logit estimation, g,
instead of political weights from a linear model, βkJ .
Table 2.11.: Correlation table
Ideol pol. position
Indic. RINP RIP weights age education income farmer economic EU protec.
RINP 0.77***
RIP -0.77*** -1.00***
pol.weights -0.42*** -0.78*** 0.78***
age -0.18*** -0.09* 0.09* -0.02
education -0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.23***
income -0.14*** -0.22*** 0.22*** 0.20*** -0.16*** 0.07
farmer -0.29*** -0.25*** 0.25*** 0.20*** 0.06 -0.08 0.42***
economic -0.33*** -0.34*** 0.34*** 0.16*** 0.02 0.04 -0.03 -0.06
position EU prot. -0.10* -0.04 0.04 0.00 0.17*** -0.04 0.05 0.30*** -0.20***
urban 0.24*** 0.19*** -0.19*** -0.14*** -0.15*** 0.10** -0.34*** -0.86*** 0.05 -0.34***
***p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10
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Abstract
The micropolitical foundation of government capture is inherent in voter behavior, i.e.
the more the relative importance of non-policy- versus policy-oriented voting varies across
socio-economic groups, the more biased are governmental policies in favor of special interest
groups. This paper considers two socio-economic groups: farmers and non-farmers. First,
we derive a theoretical model, where the voter’s relative weight for non-policy voting
depends on his informational level. Moreover, the informational level depends on the voters’
ego-centric network structure, i.e. density and network size. Second, we derive a non-policy
indicator, i.e. individual-specific relative weights of the policy- and non-policy-oriented
voting motives, based on the post-logit evaluation of discrete choice models. Third, we test
our theory estimating a probabilistic voting model for Slovakia using own election survey
data. In particular, to be able to deal with potential heterogeneity, we estimate a latent
class model. Based on the estimation results, we are able to calculate a non-policy indicator.
In this way, we identify the relative importance of the policy and non-policy preferences
for observed voting behavior. Estimating kernel density on this indicator we show, first,
that the farmer class votes less ideologically than the non-farmer class. Further, the non-
policy indicator for non-farmers rises with increasing network density and decreases with
increasing network size. In contrast, the non-policy voting of farmers is nearly constant
with increasing network density and network size. At the end, we analyze the capture
between the different socio-economic groups and show that this capture relates to the peer
network structure.
3.1. Introduction
Although the idea that social network relations have a significant impact on the economic
and political behavior of individual agents at the micro level and corresponding social
outcomes at the macro level has been realized for a long time (Sweezy, 1946; Arrow, 1974;
Williamson, 1975), only recently has the importance of social networks as determinants of
behavior and performance been systematically examined on the theoretical and empirical
levels. Nowadays, however, social network theory has become a new and promising para-
digm in economics (Jackson, 2008; Goyal, 2005; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Knack and
Keefer, 1997; Dasgupta, 1999), sociology (Burt, 1982, 1990; Coleman, 1988; Granovetter,
1985; Fukuyama, 1995), and political science (Putnam et al., 1993; Hardin, 1999; Van Deth
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et al., 1999).
In particular, within the political science literature, the early political sociology stu-
dies of policy networks focused on social network structure among governmental and non-
governmental organizations to explain political decision-making ((Parsons, 1963) and (Co-
leman, 1963)). Further, Laumann and Knoke (1987) and Knoke et al. (1996) developed
social influence models to explain opinion formation within a political communication pro-
cess, where governmental actors partly adopt their policy positions to the positions com-
municated by other non-governmental organizations. Moreover, political science scholars
study the impact of social networks on voter behavior (e.g. Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995);
Fowler (2005)).
However, most political science scholars studying social networks focused on the expla-
nation of political phenomena, e.g. the impact of social network structure on a voter’s
party loyalty or policy preferences but have not yet studied how voting behavior affects
political performance at the macro level.
In contrast, political economists, e.g. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2002), study how vo-
ting behavior has an impact on governmental performance theoretically in the framework
of an extended version of the Baron-Grossman-Helpman model of electoral competition.
But they consider voting behavior to be exogenous and neither theoretically nor empi-
rically analyze the determinants of assumed voting behavior. A key result of their very
interesting work is that a necessary condition for government capture is that voters base
their judgment of different parties, at least partly, on the non-policy factors. Non-policy
voting results from voters being uninformed or politically unaware, i.e. they do not vo-
te for different parties based on the levels of welfare they expect to achieve under their
respective policies, but use other non-policy-related indicators to judge different parties.
Analogously, even Lohmann (1998) explains inefficient (biased) polices by stating that
special interest groups are more informed about the party platforms and, hence, vote in a
more policy-oriented manner.
However, neither Lohmann (1998) nor Bardhan and Mookherjee (2002) provide empiri-
cal testing of their theories. In particular, to make theoretical analyses traceable, Bardhan
and Mookherjee (2002) apply a restricted version of the probabilistic voter model, assu-
ming a uniform distribution of the stochastic utility component, while advanced empirical
voter studies apply a more general version of the probabilistic voter model, i.e. assuming a
Type I extreme value distribution. However, this more advanced probabilistic voter model
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comes at a high cost, as the analyses become more complex. For example, a main advantage
of the assumption of the uniformly distributed stochastic utility component corresponds to
the electoral competition always being pure strategy as the Nash equilibrium (PNE) exists
(also assuming higher policy dimensions). This can be easily computed from a separate
maximization of an additive social welfare function (SWF) for each party (Bardhan and
Mookherjee, 2002).
This paper integrates existing political science approaches explaining the impact of so-
cial networks on voter behavior and political economy approaches explaining government
performance. It then derives hypotheses that are empirically tested, estimating a probabi-
listic voter model including explicitly social network indicators as explanatory variables.
In particular, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
1. We show theoretically that the relative importance of a non-policy when compared
to policy-oriented voting ceteris paribus increases with higher uncertainty.
2. We derive a non-policy indicator, i.e. individual and group-specific relation of non-
policy and policy voting motives, respectively, based on the post-logit evaluation of
discrete choice models. In this way we identify the relative importance of non-policy
voting for observed voter behavior.
3. We test our theory estimating a probabilistic voting model for Slovakia using own
election survey data. In particular, to deal with potential heterogeneity, we estimate
a latent class model. Based on the estimation results of the latent class model, we are
able to identify the relative importance of ego-centric network parameters as well as
personal characteristics, e.g. age, education, income, for policy and non-policy voting
motives calculating individual-specific as well as group-specific non-policy indicators,
which have direct implications for government performance. We show, first, with
kernel density estimation, that the farmer class votes less ideologically than the
non-farmer class. Second, the importance of the non-policy factors increases with
network density and decreases with network size for the non-farmer class, while the
importance of non-policy voting is not significantly determined by network structure
for the farmer-class.
4. According to the network theory, we show empirically that the information level of
each individual voter depends on the ego-centric network structure, where ceteris
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paribus information on the politics is higher the larger the network size and the
lower the density (clustering) of the ego’s network.
5. We derive a capture coefficient on the macro level, implying political weights of social
groups diverging from their corresponding population shares, and show empirically
that government performance, measured as government accountability and capture,
decreases ceteris paribus with the relative importance of the non-policy voting. Mo-
reover, the capture is related to the social network structure, i.e. network size and
density have a significant impact on political weights.
3.2. Networks and voter behavior
3.2.1. Voter Behavior and Networks
Following existing literature, e.g. Huckfeldt and Sprague (1987, 1992); Zuckerman et al.
(1994); Pattie and Johnston (1998, 1999); Beck et al. (2002), the voters’ information le-
vel on politics goes beyond personal characteristics like education, age, and income, and is
significantly determined by the voters’ personal networks. For example, by undertaking la-
boratory experiments to identify the effect of information on voting behavior and electoral
outcomes, Lupia showed that social network interactions allow one to raise the informa-
tion level of voters (Lupia, 1994). Several other empirical studies highlight the impact of
network structure on the information level of voters and their political choice (Huckfeldt
and Sprague, 1987, 1992; Zuckerman et al., 1994; Pattie and Johnston, 1998, 1999; Beck et
al., 2002). Beck et al. (2002) states that the primary sources of information and party cues
are personal networks and groups, not the modern mass media, and that these partisan
cues have a direct influence on voting behavior.
In the empirical studies focusing on voters’ participation, researchers investigate how far
the socio-economic characteristics of individuals and their social environment as well as the
social structure of organizational membership have an impact on political engagement and,
hence, on voting behavior (Kenny, 1992; Leighley, 1990; Lake and Huckfeldt, 1998; Cox
et al., 1998; McClurg, 2003; Mutz, 2002; Ikeda and Richey, 2005; Verba et al., 1995; Jang,
2009). The influence of individuals on each other in social networks is articulated best in
terms of a social learning process. Since the control over information is incomplete, the
bias of information that the voters receive is a "complex product of their own preferences
intersecting with the content of the incoming stream of information to which they are expo-
74
3. Networks as determinants of voter behavior for the farm and non-farm population
sed"(Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995, P. 20). "When citizens encounter political information
that disagrees with their own viewpoints, they may rationally reassess their positions, and
herein lies the potential for influence."Political conversations generate a distinct context
within which people evaluate the parties and form their individual decision. Conversations
with the supporters of a particular party encourage respondents to vote for it too (Pattie
and Johnston, 1999). Hence, there are two processes running in both directions: determina-
tion of the information supply through political preferences and determination of political
preferences through information supply. Following Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995, P. 125),
"people choose information sources subject to their own preferences, but they also take
what is available. They consume what social structure and social situations supply, albeit
guided in acceptance by individual perceptual mechanisms."Further, social networks not
only transfer information from one voter to another, but also shape human relationships
in a society, generating a basis for trust or mistrust, cooperation or disconnection. Hence,
social networks form not only the informational content, which emerges from the networks
itself or from media, but also the people’s relationship to this informational content. Even if
the media translates only one-sided information, the effects of this information determined
by networks are dependent, first of all, on whether people trust it or not. Therefore, the
problem of latent homophily, i.e. the fact that voter behavior and social network relations
influence each other implies that it is generally problematic to identify causal relations
from observational data, since voting behavior and networks co-evolve over time (Zucker-
man et al., 1994). However, at this stage we are not explicitly interested in the detailed
causal mechanisms of how network and voting behavior influence each other, but focus in-
stead on testing theoretical hypotheses on a significant correlation of a specific ego-centric
network structure and the relative importance of policy versus non-policy voting.
3.2.2. Networks, Capture, and Government Performance
Social networks, as components of social capital, are able to contribute to the greater or
smaller economic and political performance. Networks may help explain coherence bet-
ween voter behavior and government performance, since networks reflect the state of the
information milieu. If, for example, voters are uninformed as well as distrustful and dis-
connected in their networks, then interest groups or local elites become disproportionately
represented and receive legal and illegal advantages in institutional rules, in public service
delivery or in the misdirection of public resources at the cost of the ordinary population.
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This phenomenon is named the capture (The World Bank, 2000). Especially in transition
countries, the processes of building new political and economic institutions and a massive
redistribution of state assets have created fertile ground for capture and low government
performance. Capture leads to considerable negative effects on the political accountability
of public officials. In particular, accountability refers to the obligation of bureaucrats and
politicians to justify and explain their actions, and to the possibility of citizens to sanc-
tion poor performance (Widlund, 2007). Therefore, in the absence of stronger political
competition and given non-transparency of political decisions, i.e. under the conditions
where information is strongly distorted voters lack necessary and sufficient information
to evaluate government performance. Capture and accountability are discussed first with
regard to poor countries and discriminated public service delivery. The problem of unfair
public service delivery is that voters cannot easily evaluate the quality and efficiency of
these services, partly because they lack accessible information about democratic rights, re-
medies, and responsibilities, which affects their political awareness (Keefer and Khemani,
2005). Information constraints reduce the ability of citizens to hold politicians accounta-
ble. Even if poor people actively participate in the political process, imperfect information
can distort politicians’ incentives; hence, politicians prefer to expend resources for narrow
interest groups in constructing targetable public goods within a short time horizon, since
narrow interest groups obtrain better signals of politicians’ ability, rather than improve-
ments in broad public services within the long time horizon (Keefer and Khemani, 2005).
Thus, political participation alone cannot explain government performance and illuminate
the reasons for low performance. However, the total information environment formed by
networks can explain why non-policy voting leads to low performance of political institu-
tions.
3.3. Theory
3.3.1. An informational rational for the importance of policy versus non-policy
voting: a theoretical framework
We relate the relative importance of policy when compared to policy preferences with voter
uncertainty regarding the impact of policy on voters’ welfare. Voters can be separated into
different social groups J = 1, .., ng. There are two parties, denoted as A and B. In the
Downsian tradition, parties announce policies prior to the election, and are assumed to
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credibly commit to these once elected. Voters engage in probabilistic voting, i.e. a voter
j ∈ J of group J will vote for party A as long as:
W J(XA)−W J(XB) + αJjA − αJjB > 0 (3.1)
W J(Xk) denote voter j′s welfare derived from the policy platform Xk, announced by
party k=A,B.
While political economists interpret the non-policy factors as ideological preferences
(Persson and Tabellini, 2000), political scientists interpret the non-policy factors as the
valence perceived by individual voters (Hinich and Munger, 1997; Schofield, 2003).
We relate the relative importance of non-policy when compared to policy preferences to
voter uncertainty regarding the impact of policy on voters’ welfare. To this end, we assume
for simplicity’s sake that voters’ policy preferences correspond to one-dimensional spatial
policy preferences:
W J(XA) = −|Y J − ZA|, ZA = T (XA)
ZA is the policy outcome, where Y J is the preferred policy outcome of voters from
group J . T (XA) denotes the political technology describing the technical transformation
of policy into outcomes.
Now, voters are uncertain regarding the true political technology. To describe this Uncer-
tainty, we assume the following simple stochastic relation between policy XA and outcome
ZA (Gilligan and Krehbielm, 1989):
ZA = XA + ω,
where ω is a stochastic variable. For simplicity, we assume that ω is uniformly distributed
between the interval [− 12σ , 12σ ], i.e. we assume that ω is uniformly distributed with a zero
mean and variance of 12σ 1.
With assumption d = Y J −XA, it follows that:
W J(XA) = −|d− ω|
Accordingly, the expected utility for voters from policy X, EU(X), is then:
1 We consider a one-dimensional policy space, but it is possible to extend this to more dimensions
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EU(X) = −σ
1/2σ∫
−1/2σ
|d− ω| dω = −σ(
d∫
−1/2σ
(d− ω) dω −
1/2σ∫
d
(d− ω) dω)
Thus, it follows from integration:
EU(X) = −σd

d∫
−1/2σ
dω −
1/2σ∫
d
dω
− σ

1/2σ∫
d
ωdω −
d∫
−1/2σ
ωdω

After rearrangement, we get:
EU(X) = −σd
(
d− (−1/2σ)− (1/2σ − d)
)
− σ2
( 1
4σ2 − d
2 − (d2 − 14σ2
)
= −(σd2 + 14σ )
Hence, the higher the uncertainty, i.e. the higher the variance of ω and the lower the
density σ the lower the weight of the policy preferences when compared to the non-policy
preferences, i.e. the less informed a voter, the more non-policy-oriented she or he votes
ceteris paribus.
3.3.2. Post-logit evaluation of non-policy Indicator
We showed theoretically that voters’ uncertainty influences their policy and non-policy
preferences. But how is it possible to estimate the weight of the policy preferences relative
to the non-policy preferences? To respond to this question, we start with the classic spa-
tial models extended by non-policy variables and come to a derived non-policy indicator
containing the weight of both voter preferences.
In theoretical and empirical models, it is assumed that informed voters prefer parties
whose positions are close to their own positions along the policy dimension. In other words,
(informed) voters support the candidates who best reflect their policy beliefs. Therefore,
the modelers use a utility function based on metric (Euclidean) distances in a one- or multi-
dimensional space. A utility function Vi(j) of the voter i for a candidate j is specified as
the negative of the squared distance between the voter i at location xi and the candidate
j at location sj in a one-dimensional space in the following way:
Vi(j) = −(xi − sj)2. (3.2)
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In a multidimensional space, voters have preferences for different issues. Suppose that there
are N issues, then xin is the voter position on the nth issue, and sjn is the candidate’s
position on the nth issue. The multidimensional utility function is obtained by summing
up the one-dimensional utilities over the various issue dimensions. With the policy-salience
parameter for the nth issue, βn, the voter utility for the candidate’s policies is given by:
Vi(j) = −
∑
n
βn(xin − sjn)2. (3.3)
The voters’ behavior cannot be described only through political beliefs, because voters
can be uninformed about policies and support a preferred candidate even if some rival
candidate better reflects the voters’ political beliefs (Alvarez, 1997). Since there are many
unobservable factors that cannot be measured from voters’ evaluations of the candidates
in voters’ surveys, these factors are modeled by a stochastic component. Therefore, the
probabilistic policy-only model (Adams et al., 2005) can be extended with measured non-
policy variables (such as age, education, income), so that we obtain two kinds of variables.
In this case, the most suitable model for this estimation is an extended conditional logit
model that combines the multinomial logit model with the pure conditional logit model.
An extended conditional logit model in the framework of the discrete choice model was
established and developed by McFadden (1974, 1982). This kind of model allows one to
examine how the characteristics of an individual i (case-specific data) and the characteri-
stics of some choice j (alternative-specific data) affect the probabilities. In this case, the
independent variables of choice- or alternative-specific variables (in our analysis, policy
variables) do not provide information about the decision maker, but rather information
relative to each alternative: The effect of these variables on the utility does not differ across
alternatives. In contrast, the socio-demographic variables (here non-policy variables) do
not vary over the alternatives: The effect of these variables on the utility of alternatives
differs across alternatives.
Thus, the extended conditional logit model takes the form:
Vi(j) = αj +
∑
l
γljtli −
∑
n
βn(xin − sjn)2, (3.4)
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or the condensed form:
Vi(j) = αj +
∑
l
γljtli −
∑
n
βnd
n
ij , (3.5)
where dnij are corresponding Euclidean distances.
∑
l γljtli is the sum of non-policy-
measured factors: The vector tli is a vector of non-policy variables specifying an individual
characteristic of voter i for the lth non-policy variable and the vector γlj is a vector of a
salience parameter of party j for the lth non-policy variable. αj is an alternative-specific
constant, which captures the average effect on utility of all factors that are not included in
the model. When alternative-specific constants are included in the model, the stochastic
component ij has a zero mean by construction.
We now derive a non-policy indicator that is based on the post-logit evaluation. Since
only differences in utility matter in the logit estimation, we set the differences pair-wise
across all utilities equal to zero to find the point in which all pairs of parties’ probabilities
to become elected are identical to each other. It means that we find the hypothetical point
in which a voter is indifferent to two parties, since the utilities of these parties are identical.
But it does not mean that a weight of a non-voting utility’s component is equal to a weight
of a voting utility’s component. These components can be diverse. Assume that J is a set
of parties with 1, 2, ...j ∈ J . Thus, the non-policy indicator is derived in the following way:
Vi(j)− Vi(j′) = (αj − αj′) +
∑
l
(γlj − γlj′)tli −
∑
n
βn(dnij − dnij′) = 0. (3.6)
This equation needs to be rewritten:
∑
n
βn(dnij − dnij′) = (αj − αj′) +
∑
l
(γlj − γlj′)tli. (3.7)
Further, we divide by the sum of betas on both sides:
∑
n
βn(dnij − dnij′)∑
n βn
= (αj − αj′) +
∑
l (γlj − γlj′)tli∑
n βn
. (3.8)
Assume that β˜n = βn∑
n
βn
is the relative weight of the distances’ difference for a policy
issue n. Thus, we obtain:
∑
n
β˜n(dnij − dnij′) =
(αj − αj′) +
∑
l (γlj − γlj′)tli∑
n βn
. (3.9)
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∑
n β˜n(dnij − dnij′) is the weighted sum of the differences in distances over all issues n for a
voter i. We denote it with Cijj′ and name it the weighted policy voting component. We want
to answer the following question: How great must a weighted policy voting component be
to compensate for non-policy voting advantages?
Cijj′ =
(αj − αj′) +
∑
l (γlj − γlj′)tli∑
n βn
. (3.10)
Finally, it is interesting to know the weighted policy voting component not only for one
party constellation but the mean of all party pairs for a voter.
To derive a non-policy indicator, we shape the mean over all party constellations in the
following way:
Table 3.1.: Evaluation of Non-policy Indicator
Parties 1 . . . j . . . J
1 0 . . . Ci1j . . . Ci1J 1J−1
∑J
h=1C
i
1h
. . . . . . 0 . . . . . . . . . . . .
j Cij1 . . . 0 . . . CijJ 1J−1
∑J
h=1C
i
jh
. . . . . . . . . . . . 0 . . . . . .
J CiJ1 . . . CiJj . . . 0 1J−1
∑J
h=1C
i
Jh
Therefore, a non-policy indicator for individual i for party j results in:
∣∣∣Idij∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
∑J
h=1C
i
jh
J − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ (3.11)
By the last step, we find the only weighed sum of all party means, so that we get only one
non-policy indicator for a voter i of the following form:
Idi =
J∑
j=1
Sj ∗
∣∣∣Idij∣∣∣ (3.12)
where Sj is the share of party j.
A non-policy indicator derived from a non-policy voting term is a hypothetical measure.
If the non-policy indicator of voter i is high, then the policy voting term of the voter must
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be increased considerably to compensate for non-policy voting advantages.
3.4. Empirical Model
3.4.1. Heterogeneous Preferences in Random Utility Models and Latent Class
Analysis
Like economic analysis estimating consumers’ heterogeneous preferences for goods, the
political economy is interested to find voters’ heterogeneous preferences characterized by
their individual characteristics. When unobserved heterogeneity in the population is fore-
cast, this leads to a class of response models based on random utility maximization (RUM)
(McFadden and Train, 2000). There are mainly two types of models based on the idea of
using a mixture of a simple underlying model, such as multinomial logit, over the distribu-
tion of preferences: mixed multinomial logit models (MMLM) and latent class logit models
(LCLM). While in MMLM this distribution is continuous, in the latent-class context, a
finite number of classes is used to express the heterogeneity (Hess et al., 2011). Both types
of models are RUM models generalizing standard logit by allowing the parameter associa-
ted with each observed variable to vary randomly across individuals. Although mixed logit
models explicitly account in a sense for heterogeneity, latent class analysis (LCA) is better
suited to explain the sources of heterogeneity that relate to the characteristics of individual
consumers (Boxall and Adamowicz, 2002). Hence, this paper concentrates on LCA, since it
uncovers unobserved heterogeneity in a population and aims to find meaningful groups of
voters that are similar in their responses to measured variables. In an LCA, the parameter
heterogeneity across individuals is modeled by a discrete distribution or set of classes. The
estimation results in a fixed number of classes; thereby, the parameters of the statistical
model differ across these latent classes formed by unobserved latent variables. Thus, the
preferences of voters are homogeneous within each latent class, but can vary between the
classes. The latent class estimation of this paper was realized in Latent GOLD Choice
4.0, developed by Vermunt and Magidson (2005). The regression model used in Latent
GOLD Choice 4.0 is the conditional logit model developed by McFadden (1974) (Vermunt
and Magidson, 2005). Latent GOLD Choice implements a non-parametric variant of the
random-coefficient or mixed conditional logit model (McFadden and Train, 2000; Vermunt
and Magidson, 2005). From three possible methods in Latent GOLD Choice 4.0 based on
different response formats (first choice, ranking task, rating task), the first choice format
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was selected as the most suitable method concerning the assumption that each choice
set has the same number of alternatives. Since random utility theory is first employed to
model choices among a set of substitutes or alternatives, we give its formalization first.
Next, we formulate conditional and latent class models. Discrete choice models derived in
a random utility model (RUM) framework assume that decision makers choose between
two or more discrete alternatives and behave like expected utility maximizers. In the case
of spatial models, the voter supports the candidate or the party that maximizes his com-
bination of measured policy-related utilities and his unmeasured utilities (Adams et al.,
2005). Assume there are J alternatives for a decision maker. Thus, the decision maker i
chooses the party j if and only if:
Ui(j) > Ui(j′),∀j 6= j′. (3.13)
In RUMs, one presumes that the utility Ui(j) provided to individual i by party j is com-
posed of a deterministic component Vi(j), which can be calculated based on observed
characteristics, and a stochastic error component ij , which is unobserved, so that the
formula for a random utility model determining only policy factors is given by:
Ui(j) = Vi(j) + ij , (3.14)
where ij is a voter-specific random utility term that represents unmeasured components of
the voter i’s utility for a party j. Note that in all discrete choice models, the absolute level
of utility is irrelevant. The choice probability is Pij = Prob(Ui(j) > Ui(j′)) = Prob(Ui(j)−
Ui(j′) > 0), which depends only on the difference in utility and not its absolute level.
The conditional logit model (McFadden, 1974) can be utilized to estimate these proba-
bilities if the random terms are assumed to be independently distributed Type I extreme
value variates. Let yit denote the value of the dependent variable for individual i at repli-
cation t, which can take on values 1 ≤ j ≤ J . We use vector notation yi, zcovi , dattit , kpreit to
refer to all responses, all covariate values for individual i, and the attribute and predictor
values corresponding to individual i at replication t. The conditional logit model for the
response probabilities has the form (Vermunt and Magidson, 2005):
P (yit = j|dattit ,kpreit ) =
exp(Vit(j))∑
J exp(Vit(j′))
, (3.15)
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where Vit(j) is the systematic component in the utility of alternative j for individual i at
replication t. The term Vit(j) is a linear function of an alternative-specific constant αj ,
predictor effects γlj , and attribute effects βn. That is,
Vit(j) = αj +
∑
l
γljklit +
∑
n
βnd
n
itj , (3.16)
Thus, the regression parameters corresponding to the predictor effects γlj are alternative-
specific.
In a latent class or finite mixture variant of the conditional model, it is assumed that
individuals belong to different latent classes that differ with respect to the parameters
appearing in the linear model for Vit(j). In order to indicate that the choice probabilities
depend on class membership x, the logistic model is now of the form:
P (yit = j|x,dattit ,kpreit ) =
exp(Vit|x(j))∑
J exp(Vit|x(j′))
, (3.17)
Here, Vit|x(j) is the systematic component in the utility of alternative j, given that
individual i belong to latent class x. As can be seen, the logit regression coefficients are
class-specific and the linear model for Vit|x(j) in this specific case is:
Vit|x(j) = αxj +
∑
l
γxljklit +
∑
n
βxnd
n
itj . (3.18)
In addition to the attributes and predictors, we include in our LCA another type of expla-
natory variable covariates in the latent class model. While attributes enter the regression
model for choices, covariates are used to predict class membership. When covariates are
included in the model, the probability density turns into the following form (Vermunt and
Magidson, 2005):
P (yi) =
X∑
x=1
P (x|zcovi )
Ti∏
t=1
P (yi|x,dattit ,kpreit ), (3.19)
where the class membership of individual i is now assumed to depend on a set of covariates
denoted by zcovi .
84
3. Networks as determinants of voter behavior for the farm and non-farm population
In the following, we specify our estimated LC model by network parameters and describe
the used data base.
3.4.2. Network Parameters as Voting Determinants
Given our theoretical model above, two main characteristics describing the ego-centric
network structure of individual voters are, in particular, network size and network density.
Network size, i.e. the total number of direct ties of one individual is considered by Lake
and Huckfeldt (1998) and is important for the voter’s information level since "network size
should serve to multiply the frequency and expertise of individual discussants.ßince the
larger networks are less likely to be fully interconnected, they should be more likely to
include independent sources of information and expertise; thereby, the relevant politics is
discussed more objectively (Lake and Huckfeldt, 1998). On the other side, if an individual
seldom talks about politics, the proliferation of contacts stochastically increases the odds
that this individual will finally discuss politically relevant information, since open networks
are more likely to introduce new ideas and opinions to their members than the closed
networks. Individuals with more connections to other members are likely to have access
to a wider range of information that helps them to generate a better opinion.
The network density, generally, is the degree to which a respondent’s ties know one
another. If a social network has n ’nodes’, people, firms or other social units, the density is
the ratio of realized ties among ego’s direct contacts over all possible connections among
alters in ego’s neighborhood . "The denser a network, the more unique paths along which
information, ideas and influence can travel between any two nodes. Thus, greater density
makes ideas about proper behavior likely to be encountered repeatedly, discussed and
fixed"(Granovetter, 2005).
Based on network theory (Lake and Huckfeldt, 1998) and the theory of special interest
groups (Lohmann, 1998), we set up the following hypotheses:
1. The information level of an individual voter depends on the ego-centric network
structure, where ceteris paribus the information level is the higher the larger the
network size, i.e. the larger the network size, the more policy-oriented is the voter’s
political choice.
2. Information on politics is lower with a higher density (clustering) of ego’s network,
i.e. the denser the ego-centric network, the less policy-oriented the voter is.
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3. The farmers, as a special interest group, vote in a more policy-oriented manner and,
hence, have greater policy weight.
3.4.3. Case Slovakia
Data
The data used for the empirical analysis is derived from a household questionnaire that
includes 269 non-farm and 122 farm households in four different rural communities in
Slovakia: Trnava, Galanta, Michalovce, and Trebisov. The communities have been selected
following a two-dimensional design covering economically high- and low-performing rural
regions and communities located close to or far from a major city. Personal interviews were
conducted by locally trained professional interviewers in 2007.
Interviewees were asked about the perceived positions of the parties and their self-
placement concerning three issues using the following questionnaires:
• EU −Subsidies (EU): Some people say that the Slovak government should lobby in
Bruxelles to obtain more subventions for agricultural sector in Slovakia. Others say
that the government should lobby for other issues
• Socio− economic trade− off (Eco): Some people say that tax should be increased
in favour of better public services and social security. Others say that public services
and social security should be cut down to reduce tax
• Social− cultural dimension (Soc): Some people agree with liberal policies like lega-
lizing abortion, homosexual marriage etc. Others disagree with such liberal policies
The questions referred to the most recent national parliamentary election which took
place on 17 June 2006. The relevant parties and their results at the latest election are
summarized in Table 3.2. Note that the following LCA includes only voters of those parties
to whom seats in the National Council (Narodna rada Slovenskej republiky) have been
allocated. This means parties with at least 5% of the nationwide votes.
Using a scale from one to seven, respondents score the parties and themselves concerning
the issues above. Based on these policy preferences of voters and their beliefs about all
parties in three dimensions, the squared (Euclidean) distances have been calculated for
each dimension and for each of six parties, so that these 18 distances have been taken as
attributes (policy variables) in LCA.
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Table 3.2.: Party System in Slowakia after Election 2006
Party Abbr. Ideology Votes,% Seats
Direction - Social Democracy (Smer) SMER Center left 29.14 50
Slovak Democratic and Christian Union SDKU Christian Democrat 18.35 31
Slovak National Party SNS Nationalist 11.73 20
Party of the Hungarian Coalition SMK Minority 11.68 20
People’s Party - Movement for a Democratic Slovakia HZDS Center right 8.79 15
Christian Democratic Movement KDH Conservative 8.31 14
Communist Party of Slovakia KSS 3.88
Free Forum SF 3.47
Alliance of the New Citizen ANO 1.42
other Parties under 1 % 3.23
The further socio-economic characteristics gathered from the household surveys were
also available for analysis. These are explanatory and class-membership-determining va-
riables:
• Subjective Characteristics:
– Age (Age)
– Education (Education): 1=basic, 2=vocational, 3=secondary, 4=high school, 5=university
– Total monthly income in Euro (Income)
– Farmer Affiliation (Farmer): 1=farmer, 0=non-farmer
• Regional Differences:
– Distance to city (Distance-to-city): 1=close, 0=distant
– Economic Performance of community (High-Performance): 1=high, 0=low
• Egocentric network parameters:
– Network Size (Network Size): Values are between 0 and 10
– Network Density (Network Density): Values are between 0 and 1
The ego-centered network data is derived from a network part of the Slovakian house-
hold questionnaire using name generators. The network questionnaire aims to specify five
different types of networks. These are exchange network, information network, advice net-
work, social network, and co-operation. Hence, the name generators cover different areas of
social life. For all interviewees in five name generators, we also asked for their gender, age,
education, and profession. Following the concept of Krackhardt (Wasserman and Faust,
1994), we asked interviewees to describe the pair-wise relations of 10 most important in-
dividuals mentioned on a three-point scale with 0 = "do not know each other", 1 = "know
each other", and 2 = "know each other very well". We extract the total number of relations
that a respondent mentions in all these name generators and consider this to be the size of
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the network. As the respondents also gave us the strengths of relationships between the 10
most important network members, we can also estimate whether all the network members
are closely connected among each other or whether they consist of different subgroups in
different realms of society (network density).
Results
Non-policy Voting
We estimated LCLM using a different number of classes. To decide on the best number
of classes we consider the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information
criterion (BIC). A formal comparison in terms of performance between AIC and BIC is
difficult, particularly because AIC and BIC address different questions. BIC assumes that
the true generation model is in the set of candidate models. Most simulations that prefer
BIC over AIC assume that the true model is in the candidate set and that it is relatively
low-dimensional. In contrast, the AIC does not assume that any of the candidate models
is necessarily true in order to make the best possible predictions. Most simulations that
favor AIC over BIC assume that reality is high or infinitely dimensional (Wagenmakers
and Farrell, 2004). Markon and Krueger (2004) noted that AIC performs relatively well in
small samples, but is inconsistent and does not improve in performance in large samples.
In contrast, BIC appears to perform relatively poorly in small samples, but is consistent
and improves in performance with larger sample size (De-Graft Acquah, 2010).
Table 3.3.: Fit for different number of latent classes
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC
2 classes model 1391.46 1097.78 1271.16 1096.53 1261.56 1094.87
3 classes model 1543.23 1086.83 1339.20 1061.39 1290.57 1028.64
4 classes model 1661.13 1042.01 1431.18 1050.19 1405.38 1048.20
Since our sample is relatively large and our model based on the network theory supposes
a low number of dimensions in which the network characteristics can have (or not have)
effects on policy choice, we decided to choose the model based on the BIC, which is also
more consistent. We see in Table 3.3 that BIC is more consistent than AIC and that
two-class models have the best fit.
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Estimation results for the latent class model are presented in Table 3.4. We consider
three models to point out the robustness of our results. In all three models, the class
membership probabilities (class sizes) are similar. Model 1 is the most filled: it includes
constants, attributes (Euclidean distances in three dimensions EU, ECO, SOC), and five
socio-economic and network characteristics (age, education, income, network size, and
network density) to predict preferences for one or another party according to these voter
features.
The results indicate heterogeneity of party preferences across the two latent classes. As
can be seen from Table 3.4, policy-oriented choice is different in both latent classes. For
instance, in Model 1, while Class 1 votes according to the preferences with significant and
negative parameters for all three dimensions, Class 2 has significant negative parameters
only for the ECO dimension. A negative sign for an attribute means that the less the
Euclidean distance between the voter and the party in this and that dimension, the more
the likelihood for the party to be elected.
Two classes are marked by different ideology constants. As can be seen from Model
1, Class 1 has great significant constants for three parties (HZDS, SMER, and SNS).
In contrast, Class 2 has this for SDKU and SMER. The socio-economic and network
predictors point out: Voters with which individual features have valence for a given party?
For instance, we see from Model 1 that larger network size and density significantly increase
the probability for party SMER to be elected in Class 1.
As can be seen from Table 3.4, the class membership of Model 1 is determined also
by these socio-economic and network characteristics as well as by two dummies (farmer
dummy and distance-to-city dummy) to form classes corresponding to the individual cha-
racteristics of voters. Only four variables have significant influence in class determination,
such as a farmer belonging, education, and both network parameters.
Regarding class membership, Class 1 voting being more policy-oriented is significantly
determined by farmers. Moreover, members of the class have a relatively higher education
level as well as larger and denser ego-centric networks.
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Further, we undertake several robustness checks to see whether the effects of network
parameters will remain stable. Our main aim is to analyze the effect of networks on voter
behavior namely, the relative importance of policy and non-policy voting. Hence, to test
also for more complex non-linear relations, we include network parameters as both predic-
tors of party preference and also as class membership predictors. In Model 2, we excluded
socio-economic variables as predictors of party preferences in the main equation. As one
can see in Model 2, Class 1 votes in a more policy-oriented manner than Class 2. Moreover,
Class 1 has higher and significant preferences for the two policy dimensions, EU and SOC,
while Class 2 has only significant and lower preferences for the policy dimension ECO.
Further in Model 3, we excluded two covariates income and distance-to-city as these were
found to be insignificant determinants of class membership in Model 2. The significant
influence of network parameters and the farmer dummy on class membership remains
independent in all three models; hence, we can consider these results as robust.
Further, we investigate implications of our estimation on voter behavior analyzing the
non-policy indicator.
Based on an estimated coefficient of the latent class model, this indicator can be calcu-
lated for each voter, each party, and each class as follows:
∣∣∣Idixj∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
∑J
h=1C
i
xjh
J − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
∑J
h=1 ((αxj − αxh) +
∑L
l=1 (γxlj − γxlh)tli)
(J − 1)∑Nn=1 βxn
∣∣∣∣∣ (3.20)
Averaging over parties results in a total index for each voter and each class:
Idix =
J∑
j=1
Sj ∗
∣∣∣Idixj∣∣∣ (3.21)
Finally, using voters’ individual posterior class membership probabilities Pˆ (x|yi) delivers
a single individual non-policy indicator for each voter i:
Idi =
∑
x∈X
IdixPˆ (x|yi) (3.22)
Further, we computed kernel-density plots of individual non-policy indicators separated
for Class 1 and Class 2.
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Figure 3.1.: Local polynomial smooth
Plots 1, 2 and 3 of Figure 3.1 provide evidence of heterogeneous non-policy preferences
across classes. As can be seen from these plots, the results for all three models are similar:
Class 1 with significant farmer affinity votes in a more policy-oriented way than Class 2
with non-farmer affinity. Moreover, Plot 4 provides the differences of non-policy voting
between farmers and non-farmers. We undertook a t-test and Levene’s test for all four
kernel-density estimations testing for the difference in means and variances. For Model 1,
a significant difference in both variance and mean of the non-policy indicator resulted in
means of 4.76 and 21.74 for Class 1 and 2, respectively. Analogously, significant differences
of variances and means between the two classes could be confirmed for Models 2 and
3. Also for Plot 4, we found significant differences both in means (9.29 and 12.04) and
variances between farmers and non-farmers, which confirm our third hypothesis.
Given our central theoretical hypotheses, the impact of social networks on voting beha-
vior is of special interest. As seen from Table 3.4, for all models, both network variables—
network size and density have a significant impact on class membership. Moreover, in
the main equation, both network variables have a significant impact on vote choice. To
test our theory, however, we are especially interested in the specific impact of the net-
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work variables on non-policy voting beyond statistical significance. Therefore, to visualize
the complex non-linear relationship between the calculated non-policy indicator and the
network parameters, we conducted kernel estimations separately as follows.
Figure 3.2.: Local polynomial smooth
The estimated kernels for all three models are presented in Figure 3.2. As can be seen
from Figure 3.2, the non-policy indicator does not increase by rising network density in
the farmer class (Class 1), whereas the more the network density, the more the non-policy
preferences in the non-farmer class (Class 2). Given the network size, non-policy preferences
for Class 1 remain relatively stable by increasing network size, while non-policy preferences
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for Class 2 decrease. These estimation results support our first and second hypotheses, i.e.
the importance of non-policy voting increases with network density, while it decreases
with network size. In other words, the larger and the less clustered the peer networks of
a voter, the higher ceteris paribus her or his information level regarding politics and the
less pronounced her or his choice in terms of non-policy voting. Moreover, as can be seen
from Plots 9 and 10 of Figure 3.2, we also found similar differences in the magnitude of
network effects between farmers and non-farmers.
In particular, the impact of social networks on non-policy voting is more pronounced for
the non-farmers, when compared to the farmers. One possible explanation for this finding
hints at Slovakian farmers being well-organized in farm interest groups; hence, they receive
information on relevant policies not via their peer networks but via their local farm intra-
organizational networks. Accordingly, it is conceivable that peer group information is far
less important for farmers when compared to non-farmers. However, in this empirical
application, we could not explicitly control for the organizational membership of voters to
test our hypotheses explicitly and, thus, leave this for future research.
Policy Voting
Further, we find the political weights for each voter. The political weights reflect a sen-
sitivity of voter probability on policy distance. Non-policy indicators and political weights
are highly correlated with -0.506***, which means the more the importance of non-policy
voting, the less sensitively voters react on policy issues. The relationship between both is
illustrated in Plot 11 of Figure 3.3. Moreover, Plot 12 of Figure 3.3 provides the differences
in political weights between farmers and non-farmers. The minimal significant differences
in means between both groups (2.89 and 2.41 respectively) were proved.
On the one hand, we show the impact of network parameters on the non-policy indicator.
On the other hand, the non-policy indicator is correlated with political weights. As the
next step, it is logical to consider also an impact of some independent variables on the
political weights. Regarding the linear regression model for all voters (Table 3.5), we see
that network size has a significant positive impact on political weights, thus confirming
our first hypothesis. Moreover, the network density has a considerable positive influence
on political weights, which partly contradicts our second hypothesis.
Further, we consider linear regressions separated for two samples: farmers and non-
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Figure 3.3.: Local polynomial smooth
Table 3.5.: Linear regression on political weights
all voters farmer non-farmer
independent variables coef. (stan.coef.) coef. (stan.coef.) coef. (stan.coef.)
Network Density 1.528*** (0.191) 2.335*** (0.285) 1.182** (0.151)
Network Size 0.107* (0.095) 0.106 (0.078) 0.117* (0.111)
Income 0.041** (0.116) 0.077** (0.221) 0.0123 (0.030)
Age -0.002 (-0.010) -0.012 (-0.069) 0.002 (0.013)
Education 0.012 (0.007) -0.034 (-0.018) 0.070 (0.045)
High-Performance 0.576*** (0.133) 0.803** (0.169) 0.480* (0.118)
Distance-to-city -0.554*** (-0.131) -0.676* (-0.146) -0.506** (-0.126)
Farmer 0.465* (0.103)
Constant 0.883 1.071 0.956
R-squared 0.123 0.206 0.086
Observations 391 122 269
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
farmers. Note that the farmers and non-farmers have principal differences in network
structure: Whereas the farmer network size is significantly smaller (mean 2.73) and corre-
lated with network density (0.335***), the non-farmer network size is significantly greater
(mean 3.59) and not correlated with network density. Regarding the linear regression for
the farmers, only network density and income have strong influence on political weights,
which points to a partial importance of peer networks for the farmers due to their proba-
ble intra-organizational networks. For the non-farmers, both network size and density are
significantly important for political weights.
By using political weights, we are able to evaluate capture between socio-economic
groups. Thus, the capture coefficient of 1.20 means a divergence of 20%, i.e. the farmers
are less captured by 20% as the non-farmers, confirming our third hypothesis.
The Gini coefficient for political weights is relatively great (0.452), i.e. there exist consi-
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derable differences in political weights between voters. We are interested to find all possible
sources of capture on a macro level, since the impact of two macro variables (economic
performance and distance-to-city) on political weights is evident from the linear regres-
sion (Table 3.5). According to these two dummy variables, we plot the political weights
as well as non-policy indicators for districts with high and low performance, which are
distant from or close to a city respectively. As seen from Plots 13 and 14 of Figure 3.4,
high-performing distant districts show the significant greatest political weights and the
significant smallest non-policy indicator. The capture coefficient for such districts is 1.39
in meaningless capture and there is more accountability by 39% when compared to all
other districts.
When applying also two network parameters, we see that the high-performing distant
districts have the significant greater and denser networks (Plots 15 and 16 of Figure 3.4),
when compared to all other districts.
Figure 3.4.: Local polynomial smooth
Thus, we show, first, that network density has primary importance for farmer political
weights, while network size has secondary importance for farmer behavior, probably since
their networks are significantly smaller. In contrast, for the non-farmers, both network
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parameters have a significant influence on political weights. That network density has
such an essential positive impact on political weights disproves our second hypothesis and
suggests that network density is able to intensify both non-policy and policy voting.
Second, a farmer group and the well-developed distant districts have the relatively lower
capture. Whereas the low capture of the well-developed distant districts can be explained
by the greater and denser networks, it is no longer applied to the farmers. This is due
to the essential role of density in farmer peer networks, and despite the smaller ones, the
farmer group is able to bargain better.
3.5. Conclusions
This paper provides a comprehensive theoretical and empirical analysis of the impact
of social network structure on voter behavior at the micro level and its implication for
government performance and capture at the macro level. At a theoretical level, this paper
develops a model explaining the impact of uncertainty, i.e. informational level of voters on
voter behavior.
At the methodological level, we apply a latent class approach to the probabilistic voter
model to take heterogeneous voter behavior explicitly into account, where the latent class
approach, in contrast to mixed logit approaches, allows one to identify the determinants
of heterogeneity (Boxall and Adamowicz, 2002).
We test our theory estimating a probabilistic voting model for Slovakia using our own
election survey data. Based on estimation results, we are able, first, to calculate the indi-
vidual and group-specific relations of non-policy and policy voting motives and, second, to
indicate the capture between the social groups based on the calculated political weights,
which have direct implications for government performance.
The main results of the empirical estimation are: (i) Social network structure repre-
sented by two network parameters size and density is a significant determinant of voting
behavior. (ii) Farmers vote in a more policy-oriented way and exhibit relatively lower cap-
ture compared to non-farmers. (iii) The low capture of the well-performing and distant
districts is related to the greater and denser networks. (iv) Increasing network size leads
to the lower importance of non-policy factors and the greater sensitivity of voter behavior
on policy issues, thus confirming our hypothesis. (v) Both the importance of non-policy
factors and voter sensitivity on policy issues rise with increasing network density, partly
confirming our expectation. (vi) Network effects are more pronounced for the non-farmer
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group when compared to the farmers. This finding hints at Slovakian farmers being well-
organized in farm interest groups and, hence, receiving information on relevant policies
via their local farm intra-organizational networks. Accordingly, it is conceivable that peer
group information is far less important for farmers compared to non-farmers. However, in
this empirical application, we could not explicitly control for organizational membership
of voters to test our hypotheses explicitly. Hence, we leave this for future research.
ANNEX
3.A. Political weights
The marginal effects of an independent policy alternative-specific variable dnij in a policy-
dimension n for individual i and party j on the choice probabilities is:
∂Pij
∂dnij
= Pij(1− Pij)βn
For the whole policy space with N variables, the total differential of the probability can
be gained accordingly:
dPij =
N∑
n=1
∂Pij
∂dnij
ddnij = Pij(1− Pij)
N∑
n=1
βnddnij
so that the absolute marginal effect for individual i, party j, and class x is:
MEijx = Pijx (1− Pijx)
∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
n=1
βnx
∣∣∣∣∣
which means how sensitively a voter reacts to the changing distance between one party
and him. The marginal effects over all classes is:
MEij =
X∑
x=1
Pˆ (x|yi) ∗MEijx
Moreover, the marginal effects over all parties are the sum weighted with the mean
party’s probabilities:
gi =
J∑
j=1
Sj ∗MEij
Finally, we estimate the normalized marginal effects, i.e. political weights, as:
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gi =
gi∑I
i gi
3.B. Capture
Straightforward definition of government capture corresponds to the degree to which po-
litical weights of social groups diverge from their corresponding population shares. The
higher the weight of a social group, when compared to its population shares, the more this
group is able to capture the government. Hence, we estimate the following capture index
for two voter groups l and m:
CAP l__m =
∑
i∈l gi
Sl∑
i∈m gi
Sm
CAP l__m > 1 means that group l is more accountable and, hence, less captured.
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Abstract
Empirically speaking, a persistence of inefficient (biased) agricultural policies can be ob-
served both in industrialized and developing countries. In democratic systems, a theory of
political economy explains biased agricultural policies by an influence of special interest
groups (SIGs) on policy makers. Policy makers often have incentives to implement special
politics at the expense of the general public, since voters often do not make their politi-
cal choice based on policy issues because of their low informational level. In terms of the
probabilistic theoretical works (Baron, 1994; Grossman and Helpman, 1996; Bardhan and
Mookherjee, 2002), voters are modeled to make a political choice based on their discrete
informational level. But we analyze voter behavior in two transition countries, Poland and
Slovakia, using individual non-discrete voting motives. These voting motives are calculated
as RMEs based on a latent class model. The factors affecting the individual informational
level refer to the individual characteristics and social organization of voters, whereby the
latter is presented by formal organization of voters in a farmer group and by informal com-
munication of voters in their social networks. An impact of social networks on individual
non-policy voting motives is analyzed by taking into account the quantitative (network size
and density) and qualitative (network ambivalence formulated by Nir (2005)) aspects of
informational flow. Further, assuming that the informational level corresponds to voters’
uncertainty about an impact of political instruments on policy outcome, we show theoreti-
cally that the non-policy motives increase with a declining informational level. Assuming
network ambivalence as a predictor for individual uncertainty, we confirm our theory.
4.1. Introduction
Empirically speaking, a persistence of inefficient (biased) agricultural policies can be ob-
served in both industrialized and developing countries. In democratic systems, a theory of
political economy explains biased agricultural policies by an influence of special interest
groups (SIG) on policy makers, since policy makers often have incentives to implement
special politics at the expense of the general public. Classical studies focus on lobbying ac-
tivities and understand a policy outcome as the result of political bargaining competition
among various interest groups for income or welfare redistribution (Olson, 1965; Bucha-
nan and Tullock, 1967; Coleman, 1973; Zusman, 1976; Becker, 1983; Tyers and Anderson,
1992). In contrast, more recent theoretical models of a micropolitical foundation of interest
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politics (Hinich and Munger, 1997; Baron, 1994; Grossman and Helpman, 1996; Bardhan
and Mookherjee, 2002; Persson and Tabellini, 2000), arising from classic spatial voting
works (Arrow, 1951; Downs, 1957), focus on explaining a policy outcome by probabilistic
voter behavior.
In terms of probabilistic theoretical works (Baron, 1994; Grossman and Helpman, 1996),
voters are modeled to make a political choice based on their level of information on politics.
In particular, political parties or candidates have incentives to serve special interests if
there exist relatively many uninformed and few informed voters. The policy positions of
candidates or parties depend, first of all, on the proportion of informed and uninformed
voters: The higher the proportion of uninformed voters, the more the candidates tend
toward interest groups and biased policies, since the productivity of campaign expenditures
is high.
A further probabilistic theoretical model is particularly applicable for developing coun-
tries (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2002). The authors distinguish among three population
classes (poor, middle, and rich), which differ from each other not only by the share of
informed voters, but also their degree of organization: The group of the rich is small and
well-organized; therefore, it is able to capture the politicians to create a desired specific
policy at the expense of the general public. The main attainment of these probabilistic
models (Baron, 1994; Grossman and Helpman, 1996; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2002) is
that the authors explain the biased policies by modeling voter behavior and involving
lobbying activities.
Thus, the authors of the probabilistic theoretical models (Baron, 1994; Grossman and
Helpman, 1996; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2002) show that an inefficient outcome in equi-
librium can be modeled by voter behavior. This leads to the following question: How can
we explain voter behavior? Especially Bardhan and Mookherjee (2002) try to explain po-
litical behavior by the individual characteristics of voters. In addition to voters’ affiliation
to one or another society group according to their income level, voters can be uninformed
and have a low political awareness because of analphabetism or their low education. In
this case, voters are likely to be influenced by campaigning spends (Bardhan and Mook-
herjee, 2002); hence, lobbying for campaign contributions is highly efficient due to specific
individual characteristics of voters.
However, in addition to the individual characteristics, we also found literature pointing
to the essential importance of social organizations of voters for their information level.
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Thus, in an interesting way, Lohmann (1998) shows theoretically that an informational
status depends on the formal organization of voters. The information asymmetry arises
endogenously as a result of a free-rider problem and the different organization degrees of
groups. While it is „costly“ for ordinary voters to gather the information, „special interests
are ’naturally’ better informed; compared to the general public, they get costless informa-
tion as a by-product of their specialized activities, and they have stronger incentives to
invest in costly information gathering, to pay costly attention to complex information, and
to invest in costly expertise that allows them to understand such information“ (Lohmann,
1998).
While Lohmann (1998) speaks about an impact of the formal organization of voters
on their informational status, we also found studies devoted to the analysis of informal
communication of voters in the peer groups in which political behavior and political prefe-
rences are influenced by discussing political issues or candidates. Within the framework of
these studies, it is possible to distinguish between the qualitative and quantitative aspects
of social networks. A quantitative aspect includes a network structure presented in this
paper by network size and network density. A qualitative aspect means a presence of homo-
geneous or heterogeneous preferences in a social network. Further, we give a short insight
into the results devoted to these aspects.
Regarding network density, Granovetter (2005) and Burt (1992) demonstrate the im-
portance of network density for the flow of information within networks. „The denser a
network, the more unique paths along which information, ideas and influence can travel
between any two nodes. Thus, greater density makes ideas about proper behavior likely to
be encountered repeatedly, discussed and fixed“ (Granovetter, 2005). Using individual-level
data, Fowler (2005) showed that the density of relationships among one’s acquaintances
has an impact on the incentive to vote: „people with a mix of ’weak’ and ’strong’ ties can
initiate larger turnout“ than people with all weak or all strong ties. We can see that this ef-
fect is not monotonically increased: When the relationships become too dense, the incentive
to vote declines because „people are less connected to the rest of society“ (Fowler, 2005).
Further, Huckfeldt et al. (2005) point out that political disagreement between discussion
partners, i.e. different political choice can be explained „by low-density characteristics of
political communication networks“ (Huckfeldt et al., 2005).
Regarding the qualitative aspects of networks, an impact of heterogeneous (homoge-
neous) preferences in networks on voter behavior is analyzed by Huckfeldt and Sprague
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(1987); Huckfeldt et al. (2002). Thus, Huckfeldt et al. (2002) point out that individuals
who hold minority preferences are less likely to be politically influential within networks of
social communication, compared to individuals with majority preferences. Moreover, the
holders of minority preferences are more likely to perceive majority preferences accurately:
They are more likely to perceive their discussion partner’s political preference correctly if
their discussion partners have other preferences (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1987).
Regarding qualitative aspects of networks, an impact of heterogeneous (homogeneous)
preferences in networks on voter behavior is analysed by Huckfeldt and Sprague (1987);
Huckfeldt et al. (2002). Thus, Huckfeldt et al. (2002) point to the fact that individuals
who hold minority preferences are less likely to be politically influential within networks
of social communication compared with individuals with majority preferences. Moreover,
the holders of a minority preferences are more likely to perceive the majority preferences
accurately: they are more likely to perceive their discussion partner’s political preference
correctly if their discussion partners have other preferences (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1987).
Further, individual partisan orientation arises from the social networks. Thus, Huckfeldt
and Sprague (1992) shows that „individual partisan orientations are subject to the influ-
ence of the individual’s partisan surroundings“. „In particular, the mean partisanship of
the neighborhood has important consequences for the partisanship of individuals who live
within the neighborhood“ Huckfeldt and Sprague (1992).
Moreover, Huckfeldt et al. (2004) provide interesting results about an autoregressive
effect of networks. One network member’s influence is highly dependent on the others in
the network, i.e. it is autoregressive. Accordingly, an ego is more influenced by an alter
if he finds another alter with the same political opinion in his network. These results
help explain why opinions are resistant, but not impregnable, to political change: „In
particular, new information is unlikely to gain acceptance until it is widely communicated
from a variety of sources“ Huckfeldt et al. (2004).
The next important aspect of the networks’ influence on voter behavior is analyzed
by Zuckerman et al. (1994). The authors consider both the interactions based on political
preferences and the interactions based on voters’ affiliation to a social class or group. They
find that „variations in the extent to which people regularly interact with individuals who
share the same political preferences and the same social class or ethnic associations have
a direct and strong impact on the likelihood that they will persistently support the same
political party.“ But „multiple and reinforcing interactions with others who have the same
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political preferences have a greater impact on voting decisions than do connections to
people of the same social class or ethnic group“ (Zuckerman et al., 1994).
1.
Further, the homogeneous or heterogeneous content of social networks is best articulated
by the concept of cross-pressure. First formulated by Lazarsfeld et al. (1968, Original 1944)
and later developed by Berelson et al. (1954); Campbell et al. (1960), the concept of cross-
pressure and ambivalence become widely recognized in more recent works (Thompson et
al., 1995; Mutz, 2002; Nir, 2005; Huckfeldt et al., 2004). Thus, Huckfeldt et al. (2004) show
that political diversity within networks creates the potential for political ambivalence:
„heterogeneous networks produce enhanced levels of attitudinal ambivalence regarding
candidates“ Mutz (2002) uses „cross-cutting social networks,“ denoting a person’s self-
reported exposure to disagreement with his or her own point of view in his or her discussion
networks, and shows that „cross-cutting exposure“ is negatively related to voting and
political participation. Moreover, the larger „cross-cutting exposure“ encourages people to
make up their minds later in the campaign (Mutz, 2002). The more the individuals are
between different conflicting opinions, the longer they need to formulate their own position
(Mutz, 2002). Further, Nir (2005) formulates social network ambivalence „as the balance of
competing considerations perceived by the individual within his or her social network.“ This
network ambivalence differs from previous operationalizations (Pinner, 1968; Lazarsfeld et
al., 1968; Powell, 1976; Mutz, 2002). Surprisingly, Nir (2005) found neither significant
effects of network ambivalence on political participation (to help a party or a candidate
to win the election) nor on the voting, since she used ordinary least squares (OLS) in
the first case and a logistic regression in the second case, whereby neither method reveals
heterogeneous preferences in contrast to the latent class analysis (LCA) used in this paper.
We start by explaining the contributions of this paper.
1. Probabilistic studies showed theoretically that the most important factor influencing
voter behavior is the informational level of voters (Baron, 1994; Grossman and Helpman,
1996; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2002). While probabilistic studies focus only on a dis-
crete information level of voters, we use non-discrete policy and non-policy voting motives
(whereby the latter are often linked to ideological preferences), since an identification of in-
formed and uninformed voters is very restricted in reality: The same voter can be informed
1There exist other studies devoted to an influence of social networks on party identity, party identification
or partisanship. But, since these definitions are ambiguous and the authors mean often differently
oriented voting motives, we let it for future research.
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in one policy issue and uninformed in another policy issue because of multidimensional
reality. We note that not only is an absolute level of the policy and non-policy motives
relevant for voter behavior and, therefore, for policy outcome, but rather the relative one.
2. Since a modeling of the non-discrete informational level of a voter can be best realized
by a formulation of a concept of uncertainty, i.e. voters have low informational level and,
therefore, are uncertain about an impact of political instruments on policy outcome we
use this concept to better explain individual non-policy motives in our analysis.
3. We formulate theoretically that the relative importance of a non-policy when com-
pared to policy-oriented voting increases with the voters’ uncertainty regarding the true
impact of policies, i.e. the less the informational level, the more ideologically people vote.
4. Higher uncertainty corresponds to a lower informational level of voters. However, we
know that not only does the amount of information (quantitative aspect) influence voting
behavior, but also its qualitative aspect. Hence, both quantitative and qualitative aspects
have an impact on uncertainty.
Moreover, a greater informational level can be attained by better formal organization
and informal communication of voters so that both sources have an impact on voters’ un-
certainty and, therefore, on voting behavior. Hence, we are interested to measure whether
the formal and informal organization of voters has an impact on their political behavior,
i.e. on the policy- and non-policy-oriented voting motives of voters.
A formal organization of voters is controlled by belonging, or not belonging, to a farmer
group. Hence, we consider two groups: farmer and non-farmer. While the assumption that
farmers are well-organized because of their homogeneous economic interests and, therefore,
vote in a more policy-oriented way is confirmed for the Slovak case by Henning and Petri
(2012), in this paper we extend our analysis with Polish data and show that not only does
belonging to one SIG have an impact on the political behavior of its members but also
the degree of organization of the members is important. For formal organization of voters,
exact separation into the qualitative and quantitative characteristics of information flow is
impossible based on our data.
An informal organization of voters is analyzed by social network characteristics, which
we decompose into quantitative and qualitative parameters. Quantitative parameters re-
flect whether social networks are able to provide much or limited information to voters.
The limited information, e.g. because of small networks, can raise voters’ uncertainty so
that they make their choice in a more non-policy-oriented manner (Henning and Petri,
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2013). Therefore, in our analysis, we consider a network structure, including network size
and density, which indicates the quantitative specifics of information flow. Qualitative pa-
rameters reflect a presence of homogeneous or heterogeneous preferences in the network,
i.e. qualitative features of providing information. Thus, if a voter has a large ego-centered
network but the political preferences in this network are strongly heterogeneous, the voter
can become essentially uncertain and undecided, i.e. ambivalent. In terms of the previous
studies, we apply a concept of network ambivalence (Nir, 2005), corresponding to „exter-
nal cross-pressure,“ in connection with LCA (Vermunt and Magidson, 2005) helping to
uncover heterogeneous preferences.
5. Methodically, using an LCA, we estimate a two-class model with „known class af-
filiation.“ Moreover, we estimate a model with „unknown class affiliation“ to see which
endogenous latent micro and macro characteristics of the voters’ social milieu are respon-
sible for the greater policy-oriented voting. Based on the marginal effects, we calculate a
relative non-policy component corresponding with a marginal rate of substitution and re-
flecting the extent to which a probability change of non-policy motives is greater compared
to a probability change of policy motives. Determination of non-policy motives because of
the different latent classes occurs based on voters’ individual characteristics (age, educati-
on, income), network characteristics (size, density, ambivalence), social group organization
(farmer versus non-farmer) as well as regional parameters (regional performance and di-
stance to city). In the context of formal organization and informal communication, we
investigate the question of the extent to which network structure (size and density) and
network ambivalence are important for the non-policy motives of farmer and non-farmer
groups in two countries, Poland and Slovakia.
6. Using network ambivalence as a predictor for uncertainty, we confirm our theory: We
gain positive effects between network ambivalence and non-policy voting motives in both
countries. We start with formulation of deterministic voter utility. Further, we present
our theoretical model and proceed with the empirical model: We explain data, formulate
the empirical model, and derive the RMEs measuring the importance of non-policy versus
policy voter motives. Finally, we present the results confirming our theoretical model and
discuss it.
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4.2. Policy- versus Non-policy-oriented Voting
Following the literature on the theory of voting, we assume that people vote for different
parties based on the utility which a voter affiliates to the different parties. The voter sup-
ports the candidate or party that maximizes his combination of measured and unmeasured
utilities. In random utility models, the utility Ui(j) provided to individual i by party j is
composed of a deterministic component Vi(j) and a stochastic component ij :
Ui(j) = Vi(j) + ij , (4.1)
where ij is a voter-specific random utility term that represents unmeasured components
of the voter i’s utility for a party j. Thus, the decision maker i chooses the party j if and
only if Ui(j) > Ui(j′), ∀j 6= j′. The assumption used in the logit estimation is that the
unobserved portion of utility ij follows independently and identically an extreme value
distribution. Extreme value distribution of a stochastic component allows derivation of an
analytical form for probability McFadden (1974):
Pij =
eVi(j)∑
J e
Vi(j′)
, (4.2)
Basically, the deterministic utility may consist of non-policy, policy, and retrospective
components:
Vi(j) = αj −
∑
n
βn(xin − sjn)2 +
∑
l
γljklit (4.3)
In a perfect political world, electoral competition would be based on policy platforms.
The motive of policy-oriented voting goes back to the classic voting theory created by
Downs (1957); Enelow and Hinich (1984). In the sense of the spatial theory of voting
(Downs, 1957; Enelow and Hinich, 1984), voters prefer the parties whose positions are
close to their own positions along a salient policy dimension. In other words, voters support
the candidates who best reflect their policy beliefs. Therefore, the modelers form a policy
component based on the negative squared distance between voter i at location xi and
candidate j at location sj in a multi-dimensional space with N issues. With the policy-
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salience parameter βn, the policy-oriented utility for the candidate’s policies is given by
−∑n βn(xin − sjn)2.
The next component,∑l γljklit, corresponds to the concept of retrospective voting (Fio-
rina, 1981), i.e. voters use observable welfare indicators, such as income growth or other
well-being indicators realized in the incumbent’s last election period, to update their eva-
luation of the incumbent’s competence and popularity. The retrospective component of
voters’ perceived utility is also a function of governmental policy. Since, in reality, electo-
ral competition is imperfect, the utility also incorporates a non-policy voting component,
or valence. While the transformation of policies into welfare is rather complex, the calcu-
lation of expected utility is also complex from the viewpoint of individual voters. Hence,
voters apply simple heuristics to estimate their expected utility. Basically, their behavior
is based on different types of non-policy factors. One type of non-policy-oriented factor
corresponds to the concept of valence (Schofield, 2007), which holds that based on specific
characteristics of the incumbent, such as appearance, charisma, occupation, and ethnicity,
voters perceive a specific competence or popularity of candidates and parties. Followi-
ng Grossman and Helpman (1996), voters are at least partially swayed by the relative
campaign spending of different parties. This effect may reflect the influence of election ad-
vertisements or other efforts made to mobilize support (e.g. election rallies, door-to-door
visits by campaign workers).
Another type of non-policy-oriented factor arises from party identity based on social,
political, religious or ethnic factors. This type of non-policy motive tends to not be influ-
enced by campaign spending. Following the theory of Lipset-Rokkan (Lipset and Rokkan,
1967), voters’ electoral choices are determined by their social class. Hence, an electoral
competition may imply incentives for elected politicians either to consider the needs only
of such a social class or to ignore such a social class completely. For example, ethnic voting
predominates vote choice in African democracies (Horowitz, 1985; Ferree and Horowitz,
2010; Bratton et al., 2011; Henning et al., 2014).
4.3. Theoretical approach
Next, we relate the relative importance of ideology when compared to policy preferences
with the voter’s uncertainty regarding the impact of policy on voters’ welfare. To this end,
we assume for simplicity that voters’ policy preferences correspond to one-dimensional
spatial policy preferences:
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W J(XA) = −|Y J − ZA|, ZA = T (XA)
ZA is the policy outcome, where Y J is the preferred policy outcome of a voter from the
group J . T (XA) denotes the political technology describing the technical transformation
of policy into outcomes.
Now, voters are uncertain regarding the true political technology. To describe this uncer-
tainty, we assume the following simple stochastic relation between policy XA and outcome
ZA (Gilligan and Krehbielm, 1989):
ZA = XA + ω,
where ω is a stochastic variable. For simplicity, we assume ω is uniformly distributed
between the intervals [− 12σ , 12σ ], i.e. we assume ω is uniformly distributed with a zero mean
and a variance of 12σ .
With assumption d = Y J −XA, we get:
W J(XA) = −|d− ω|
Accordingly, the expected utility for voters from policy X, EU(X), is then:
EU(X) = −σ
1/2σ∫
−1/2σ
|d− ω| dω = −σ(
d∫
−1/2σ
(d− ω) dω −
1/2σ∫
d
(d− ω) dω)
Thus, it follows from integration:
EU(X) = −σd

d∫
−1/2σ
dω −
1/2σ∫
d
dω
− σ

1/2σ∫
d
ωdω −
d∫
−1/2σ
ωdω

After rearrangement, it follows that:
EU(X) = −σd
(
d− (−1/2σ)− (1/2σ − d)
)
− σ2
( 1
4σ2 − d
2 − (d2 − 14σ2
)
= −(σd2 + 14σ )
Accordingly, the higher the uncertainty, i.e. the higher the variance of ω and the lower the
density σ the lower is the weight of the policy preference when compared to the ideological
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preference, i.e. the less informed a voter the more ideologically she votes ceteris paribus.
This is our formulated hypothesis for the further empirical analysis.
4.4. Empirical Model
4.4.1. Database
The data used for the empirical analysis is derived from a household questionnaire dis-
tributed among non-farm and farm households, which includes 391 households (31.20%
farmers and 68.80% non-farmers) in four Slovakian rural communities (Trnava, Galanta,
Michalovce, and Trebisov) and 569 households (50.44% farmers and 49.56% non-farmers)
in Polish rural regions (Chotcza, Kamieniec, Siemiatkowo, and Wieliszew). The commu-
nities were selected following a two-dimensional design covering economically high- and
low-performing rural regions and communities located close to or distant from a major
city. Personal interviews were undertaken by locally trained professional interviewers in
2007-2008. In addition to the individual socio-economic and egocentric network questions,
the interviewees were asked about the perceived positions of the parties and their own
positions on three issues using the following questionnaires:
• EU −Subsidies (EU): Some people say that the Slovak government should lobby in
Bruxelles to obtain more subventions for agricultural sector in Slovakia. Others say
that the government should lobby for other issues
• Socio− economic trade− off (Eco): Some people say that tax should be increased
in favour of better public services and social security. Others say that public services
and social security should be cut down to reduce tax
• Social− cultural dimension (Soc): Some people agree with liberal policies like lega-
lizing abortion, homosexual marriage etc. Others disagree with such liberal policies
On a scale from one to seven, respondents scored the parties and themselves regarding
the issues above. The ideal positions of voters of farm and non-farm groups over three
dimensions are given in the Appendix. Based on these policy preferences of voters and
their beliefs about all parties in three dimensions, the squared (Euclidean) distances were
calculated for each of three dimensions and for each of six parties. These 18 distances
were taken as attributes (policy variables) in LCA. The questions referred to the national
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parliamentary elections held in Slovakia on June 17, 2006 and in Poland on October 21,
2007. The relevant parties and their results at the most recent elections are summarized
in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. Note that the following LCA includes only voters of the parties to
whom seats in the National Council (Narodna rada and Sejm) have been allocated; these
are the parties with at least 5% of the nationwide votes.
Table 4.1.: Party System in Slovakia after Election 2006
Party Abbr. Ideology Votes,% Seats Sample,%
Direction - Social Democracy (Smer) SMER Social Democracy 29.14 50 40.41
Slovak Democratic and Christian Union SDKU Liberal Conservative 18.35 31 13.30
Slovak National Party SNS Nationalist 11.73 20 4.86
Party of the Hungarian Coalition SMK Minority 11.68 20 18.16
People’s Party Movement for a Dem. S. HZDS Nat. Conservative 8.79 15 12.53
Christian Democratic Movement KDH Conservative 8.31 14 10.74
Communist Party of Slovakia KSS 3.88
Free Forum SF 3.47
Alliance of the New Citizen ANO 1.42
other Parties under 1 % 3.23
Table 4.2.: Party System in Poland after Election 2007
Party Abbr. Ideology Votes,% Seats Sample,%
Civic Platform PO Liberal Conservative 41.5 209 33.57
Law and Justice Pis Nat. Conservative 32.1 166 25.48
Left and Democrats LiD Social Democracy 13.2 53 3.87
Polish People’s Party PSL Chr.-Democratic, Agrarian 8.9 31 37.08
Self-Defense of the Republic of P. SRP Nat. Conservative, Agrarian 1.5 0
League of Polish Families LPR Nat. Conservative 1.3 0
Polish Labour Party PPP Left, Socialism 1.0 0
other Parties under 1 % 0.5 0
From plots for choice distribution for the farmers and non-farmers in both countries
(Figure 4.1), we see that the political preferences of Polish farmers tend toward the
agrarian-oriented party PSL, whereas the nationwide winner PO lost the votes of the
farmer population. Interestingly, approximately 27% of the non-farmer population in our
sample voted for agrarian-oriented PSL that much more as the nationwide average was
8.9%. This may be explained by two points: First, being objectively justified, the promised
support of farmers is often perceived by people as total support of rural regions; second,
the communication and political discussions between farmers and non-farmers in networks
have impacts on the policy choice of the latter.
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Figure 4.1.: Party choice distribution for the farmers and non-farmers in Poland and Slovakia
The political choice of the Slovak farmers tenders to the winning party SMER, being
on an average the same also for the non-farmers, and the minority party SMK. The last
fact can be historically explained : The great share of farmers belong to the Hungarian
minority. Already in the 19th century, farmers in Slovak regions were peasant farmers in
tenancy on Hungarian estates. At present, 23.7% of the population in Trnava, more than
40% of the population in Galanta, and 30% in Trebisov belong to Hungarian minority.
The further socio-economic characteristics gauged from the household surveys were also
available for analysis, and are explanatory and class membership-determining variables:
• Subjective Characteristics:
– Age (Age)
– Education (Education): 1=basic, 2=vocational, 3=secondary, 4=high school, 5=university
– Total monthly income in Euro (Income)
– Farmer Affiliation (Farmer): 1=farmer, 0 otherwise
• Egocentric network parameters:
– Network Size (Network Size): Values are between 0 and 10
– Network Density (Network Density): Values are between 0 and 1
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– Ambivalence: from 0=lowly ambivalent to 4.5=highly ambivalent
• Regional Differences:
– Economic Performance of community (High-Performance): 1=high, 0=low
– Distance to city (Distance-to-city): 1=close, 0=distant
The ego-centered network data is derived from a network part of a Slovakian and Polish
household questionnaire using name generators. The network questionnaire has the aim to
specify a network of one person with different name generators covering different arenas of
social life: political discussion, advice network, and social co-operation. For all interviewees
in the name generators, we also asked for their gender, age, education, and profession.
Following the concept of Krackhardt (Wasserman and Faust, 1994), we asked interviewees
to describe the pair-wise relations of 10 most important individuals mentioned on a three-
point scale with 0 = „do not know each other“, 1 = „know each other“, and 2 = „know each
other very well“. We extract the total number of relations that a respondent mentions in all
these name generators and consider this as the size of the network. As the respondent also
gave us the strengths of relationships between the 10 most important network members,
we can estimate whether all the network members are closely connected with each other or
whether they consist of different subgroups in different realms of society (network density).
In addition, we use a measure for network ambivalence defined as the balance of com-
peting considerations perceived by the individual within his or her social network (Nir,
2005; Lavine, 2001). The network ambivalence was constructed using a method analogous
to the individual-level Griffen ambivalence index (Thompson et al., 1995; Lavine, 2001;
Mutz, 2002; Huckfeldt et al., 2004) according to the following formula:
Ambivalence = same+ other2 − |same− other|
where same corresponds to the number of alteri whose ideological orientation of the „left-
right“ scale corresponds to that of the respondent, and other is the number of alteri who
have a different ideological orientation. Hence, the balance of same and other opinions
captures the perceived „cross-pressures.“ The theoretical range of network ambivalence
was -2.5 to two, with the higher scores indicating greater ambivalence within the network
or stronger external cross-pressures (Nir, 2005). Moreover, this measure of ambivalence
includes two components: The first summand is „intensity“ and the second summand is
„polarization“ (Huckfeldt et al., 2004).
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4.4.2. Latent Class Analysis
Like economic analysis estimating consumers’ heterogeneous preferences for goods, the
political economy is interested to find voters’ heterogeneous preferences characterized by
their individual characteristics. When unobserved heterogeneity in the population is fore-
cast, this leads to a class of response models based on random utility maximization (RUM)
(McFadden and Train, 2000). There are mainly two types of models based on the idea of
using a mixture of a simple underlying model, such as multinomial logit, over the distribu-
tion of preferences: mixed multinomial logit models (MMLM) and latent class logit models
(LCLM). While in MMLM this distribution is continuous, in the latent class context, a
finite number of classes is used to express the heterogeneity (Hess et al., 2011). Both types
of models are RUM models generalizing standard logit by allowing the parameter associa-
ted with each observed variable to vary randomly across individuals. Although mixed logit
models explicitly account in a sense for heterogeneity, LCA is better suited to explain the
sources of heterogeneity that relate to the characteristics of individual consumers (Boxall
and Adamowicz, 2002).
Hence, we concentrate in this paper on the LCA, since it uncovers unobserved hetero-
geneity in a population and aims to find meaningful groups of voters that are similar in
their responses to measured variables. In an LCA, the parameter heterogeneity across in-
dividuals is modeled by a discrete distribution or set of classes. The estimation results in a
fixed number of classes; thereby, the parameters of the statistical model differ across these
latent classes formed by unobserved latent variables. Thus, the preferences of voters are
homogeneous within each latent class, but can vary between the classes. The latent class
estimation of this paper was realized in Latent GOLD Choice 4.0, developed by Vermunt
and Magidson (2005).
We estimate a model with individual utility Vi(j) as a linear function of an alternative-
specific constant αj and attribute effects βn, where I is used to refer to the number of
cases and i to a particular individual or case, J is the number of alternatives and j a
particular alternative, N is the number of attributes, and n a particular attribute. Let yit
denote the value of the dependent variable for case i at replication t, which can take on
values 1 ≤ j ≤ J . Note that each individual was observed only once; therefore, we have
one-to-one correspondence between replications and choice sets.
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That is,
Vi(j) = αj +
∑
n
βnd
n
ij , (4.4)
where ∑Jj=1 αj = 0 is presumed. The detailed form of estimated model is given then by
Vi(j) = αj + βEUdEUij + βEcodEcoij + βSocdSocij , (4.5)
where βEU , βEco, βSoc are attribute effects accordingly for attributes dEUij , dEcoij , dSocij ,
calculated Euclidean distances in three dimensions, which characterize a policy choice of
voters.
In a latent class variant of the conditional model, it is assumed that individuals belong
to different latent classes that differ with respect to βn. In order to indicate that the choice
probabilities depend on class membership x, the logistic model is of the form (cf. Vermunt
and Magidson 2005, p. 12):
P (yit = j|x) =
exp(Vi|x(j))∑
J exp(Vi|x(j′))
, (4.6)
Here, Vi|x(j) is the systematic component in the utility of alternative j, given that
individual i belong to latent class x. As can be seen, the logit regression coefficients are
class-specific and the linear model for Vi|x(j) in this specific case is:
Vi|x(j) = αxj +
∑
n
βxnd
n
ij . (4.7)
In addition to the attributes, we include in our LCA another type of explanatory variable
covariates in the LC model. While attributes enter the regression model for choices, cova-
riates are used to predict class membership. When covariates are included in the model,
the probability density took the following form (cf. Vermunt and Magidson 2005):
P (yi) =
X∑
x=1
P (x|zcovi )
Ti∏
t=1
P (yit|x), (4.8)
where zcovi is a set of covariates of individual i and yi a vector of all responses.
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4.4.3. Relative marginal effects
Based on LCA estimation, we are able to calculate the relative marginal effects (RMEs)
to see the extent to which the non-policy preferences are more important than policy-
oriented preferences. The greater the RME, the more that voters vote in a non-policy
oriented (ideological) manner. The RMEs are calculated in the following way.
The marginal effects of an independent policy alternative-specific variable dnij in a policy
dimension n for individual i and party j on the choice probabilities is:
∂Pij
∂dnij
= Pij(1− Pij)βn
For the whole policy space with N variables, the total differential of the probability can
be gained accordingly:
dPij =
N∑
n=1
∂Pij
∂dnij
ddnij = Pij (1− Pij)
N∑
n=1
βn
so that the absolute marginal effect in the policy dimension for individual i, party j,
and class x is:
PMEijx = Pijx(1− Pijx)|
N∑
n=1
βnx|
which means how sensitively a voter reacts to the changing distance between one party
and him. Further, we calculate the marginal effects for the non-policy dimension (NME)
reflected in constants. Given the constants being party-specific, we obtain for non-policy
preferences ti for individual i and party j the following NME:
∂Pij
∂ti
= Pij (1− Pij) (αj − αk)
with
αk =
J∑
k 6=j
[
Pik∑J
k 6=j Pik
αk
]
so that the absolute marginal effect in the non-policy dimension for individual i, party
j, and class x is
NMEijx = Pijx (1− Pijx) |αjx − αkx|
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.
Further, we find individual RMEs for each class and party:
RMEijx =
NMEijx
PMEijx
Weighting with the average party share, we obtain the RME over all parties:
RMEix =
J∑
j=1
sjRMEijx
Finally, we obtain individual RME over all classes on multiplying with the average class
probability:
RMEi =
X∑
x=1
P (x|zcovi )RMEix
Thus, we obtained individual-specific RME.
4.5. Results
4.5.1. Non-policy versus policy Voting
We estimated LCLM using a different number of classes. To decide on the best number
of classes, we consider the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information
criterion (BIC). A formal comparison in terms of performance between AIC and BIC is
difficult, particularly because AIC and BIC address different questions. BIC assumes that
the true generation model is in the set of candidate models. Most simulations that prefer
BIC over AIC assume that the true model is in the candidate set and that it is relatively
low-dimensional. In contrast, AIC does not assume that any of the candidate models is
necessarily true in order to make the best possible predictions. Most simulations that favor
AIC over BIC assume that reality is highly or infinitely dimensional (Wagenmakers and
Farrell, 2004). Markon and Krueger (2004) noted that AIC performs relatively well in
small samples, but is inconsistent and does not improve in performance in large samples.
Meanwhile, BIC appears to perform relatively poorly in small samples, but is consistent
and improves in performance with a larger sample size (De-Graft Acquah, 2010). Since our
sample is relatively large and our model based on network theory supposes the existence
of a low number of dimensions in which the network characteristics can have (or not have)
effects on policy choice, we decided to choose the model based on BIC as this is also more
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consistent (Table 4.3).
Table 4.3.: Fit for different number of latent classes
Slovakia Poland
BIC AIC BIC AIC
2 classes model 1204.822 1101.635 1282.092 1186.527
3 classes model 1235.387 1084.576 1304.873 1165.869
Based on individual distances between voters and parties in the political space as well
as regional, individual, and network characteristics, we estimate two kinds of models: with
known class membership for „farmer affiliation“ and unknown class membership (endo-
genously generated) to find which other hidden micro and macro characteristics, except
„farmer affiliation,“ influence voting in both countries. According to discrete choice mo-
dels, the voter supports the candidate or the party that maximizes his combination of
measured policy-related utilities and his unmeasured utilities. Therefore, we aim to inves-
tigate the nature of the relationship between the dependent (choosing a political party)
and independent variables (distances in three political dimensions). This relationship de-
pends also on covariates (regional, individual, and network characteristics) determining
the class probabilities.
Table 4.4 shows the results of the LCA with the estimated parameters, whereas Models 1
and 3 are endogenously generated, for Slovakia and Poland respectively, and Models 2 and
4 have known class membership (i.e. 100% of farmers belong to one class and 100% of non-
farmers belong to another class). The results indicate heterogeneity of party preferences
across the two latent classes. As can be seen from Table 4.4, policy-oriented choice has
been determined in both latent classes and in both kinds of models.
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Table 4.4.: Results of the Latent Class Analysis with the Estimated Parameters by z-values
Slovakia Model 1 Model 2
Class1 z-value Class2 z-value Class1 z-value Class2 z-value
Class size 50.13% 49.87% 31.25% 68.75%
Farmer shares
belonging to class 77.87% 22.13% 100% 0%
Constants:
HZDS 0.281 0.934 -0.770* -1.813 -0.181 -0.719 -0.224 -1.392
SDKU 0.180 0.578 0.048 0.199 0.014 0.054 0.058 0.374
SMER 0.815*** 2.459 1.426*** 7.929 0.995*** 5.467 1.088*** 9.758
SMK 0.551* 1.691 0.289 1.177 0.631*** 3.171 0.107 0.693
KDH 0.042 0.113 -0.424 -1.411 -0.166 -0.567 -0.046 -0.279
SNS -1.869** -2.255 -0.568* -1.725 -1.293*** -3.023 -0.983*** -4.364
Attributes:
EU -0.665*** -3.827 -0.001 -0.050 -0.168*** -3.922 -0.050*** -2.823
Eco -0.078 -1.001 -0.067*** -2.482 -0.005 -0.178 -0.090*** -4.028
Soc -0.654*** -3.789 0.007 0.410 -0.082*** -2.402 -0.044*** -3.410
Covariates:
Class Constant -1.479* -1.939 1.479* 1.939 -1.420*** -3.257 1.420*** 3.257
Age 0.010 1.293 -0.010 -1.293 0.008 1.621 -0.008 -1.621
Education 0.060 0.749 -0.060 -0.749 -0.100* -1.865 0.100* 1.865
Income 0.007 0.381 -0.007 -0.381 0.102*** 7.412 -0.102*** -7.412
Ambivalence -0.245* -1.664 0.245* 1.664 0.094 0.996 -0.094 -0.996
Network Size 0.027 0.442 -0.027 -0.442 -0.122*** -3.213 0.122*** 3.213
Network Density 0.460 1.204 -0.460 -1.204 -0.017 -0.071 0.017 0.071
High-Performance 0.507** 2.305 -0.507** -2.305 -0.053 -0.391 0.053 0.391
Distance-to-city -0.208 -1.032 0.208 1.032 0.345*** 2.549 -0.345*** -2.549
Farmer 0.589** 2.216 -0.589** -2.216 - - - -
LL function -524.818 -750.472
BIC 1204.822 1650.163
AIC 1101.635 1550.945
Poland Model 3 Model 4
Class1 z-value Class2 z-value Class1 z-value Class2 z-value
Class size 63.16% 36.84% 50.44% 49.56%
Farmer shares
belonging to class 70.38% 29.62% 100% 0%
Constants:
PO 0.563*** 3.488 1.056*** 4.922 0.517*** 3.680 0.745*** 7.026
PiS 0.313* 1.853 -0.783* -3.033 0.231 1.596 0.026 0.211
LiD -1.816*** -4.440 -0.241 -0.743 -1.529*** -5.252 -1.133*** -5.568
PSL 0.940*** 6.089 -0.032 -0.161 0.780*** 6.060 0.361*** 3.021
Attributes:
EU -0.040*** -2.544 -0.090*** -3.282 -0.058*** -4.208 -0.052*** -4.131
Eco 0.001 0.076 -0.092*** -3.068 -0.031 -1.451 -0.030* -1.819
Soc -0.014 -1.078 -0.170*** -5.104 -0.063*** -5.070 -0.051*** -4.020
Covariates:
Class constant 4.219 1.488 -4.219 -1.488 -0.234 -0.913 0.234 0.913
Age 0.008 0.216 -0.008 -0.216 0.005 1.151 -0.005 -1.151
Education 0.116 0.314 -0.116 -0.314 0.039 0.915 -0.039 -0.915
Income -0.044 -1.168 0.044 1.168 -0.001 -0.356 0.001 0.356
Ambivalence 1.680** 2.241 -1.680** -2.241 -0.330*** -3.747 0.330*** 3.747
Network Size 0.322 1.042 -0.322 -1.042 -0.025 -0.644 0.025 0.644
Network Density -1.138 -1.203 1.138 1.203 -0.146 -1.213 0.146 1.213
High-Performance -4.520*** -3.083 4.520*** 3.083 0.064 0.717 -0.064 -0.717
Distance-to-city -2.549*** -2.932 2.549*** 2.932 -0.085 -0.914 0.085 0.914
Farmer 1.940* 1.909 -1.940* -1.909 - - - -
LL function -571.264 -988.545
BIC 1282.092 2110.311
AIC 1186.527 2019.090
***p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10
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For models with pure farmer affiliation (Model 2 for Slovakia and Model 4 for Poland),
the economic issue of EU subsidies and social freedom seem rather important for the
farmers, while all three issues are important for the non-farmers. Why the economic issue
is non-relevant for farmers may be explained by the fact that the question about the
EU subsidies already contains economic voting for agrarian population. But it is more
interesting that the EU issue is also important for the rural non-agrarian population, but
not as strong as for the farmers. The Slovak farmer class demonstrates a significantly lower
education level, greater income, greater distance from the city, and a smaller network size.
In contrast, the Polish farmer class exhibits only significantly lower ambivalence („external
cross-pressure“). Thus, the farmer class in both countries has significant differences in
network characteristics.
Further, in the endogenously generated Models 1 and 3, we do not specify the „known
class belonging“ and allow the program to generate a model with the best fit. The BIC and
AIC in such models are much better compared to the models with „fix class belonging“.
In addition to farmer status, we also identify other important parameters influencing the
differences in policy versus non-policy voting: ambivalence, regional economic performance
level, and distance to city.
It is interesting that compared to our previous results (Henning and Petri, 2013), network
density and size are not more significant by class determination, while ambivalence becomes
significant. Thus, if ambivalence (i.e. network content) is presented, it appears even more
important than network structure.
We see that policy-oriented voting in Slovak Model 1 is stronger for Class 1, being rather
agrarian, with significantly lower ambivalence and higher economic performance, while the
policy-oriented voting in Polish Model 3 is stronger for Class 2, being rather not agrarian,
with lower ambivalence and higher performance. But this estimated level of policy-oriented
voting is rather absolute, since non-policy voting is not taken into consideration. Therefore,
assuming a relevance of the relative level of non-policy versus policy motives, we calculate
the individual marginal effects for policy variables as well as those for alternative specific
non-policy constants. Then we calculate RMEs indicating the extent to which the non-
policy preferences are more important than policy-oriented preferences. The greater the
RMEs, the more voters vote in a non-policy-oriented (ideological) manner.
Further, we computed kernel density plots of individual RMEs according to farmer
status (Figure 4.2) and economic framework conditions (Figure 4.3) as well as with detailed
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distributions of both parameters (Figure 4.6 in Appendix).
Based on the models with „fix class affiliation“ (Models 2 and 4), Figure 4.2 provides
us with the greater importance of non-policy-oriented voting for non-farmer groups and
greater importance of policy-oriented voting for farmer groups in both countries, although
the interval between both groups is larger in Slovakia. This means that farmer status is
relatively more important for voting determination in Slovakia than in Poland.
Figure 4.2.: Kernel density for relative marginal effects (RME), by for farmer status
Additionally, the endogenously determined models (Models 1 and 3) point to the same
results for Slovakia, i.e. greater policy-oriented voting for a farmer group (Figure 4.2) while
in Poland the farmers vote in an even more non-policy-oriented way (see correlation table
in Appendix). However, Figure 4.3 shows that voters from regions with better economic
performance vote in a more policy-oriented manner in both countries, whereas the interval
between both kinds of regions is larger in Poland. This means that macro economic con-
ditions are relatively more important for voting determination in Poland than in Slovakia.
Thus, based on these results from Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3, we see that while in Slova-
kia an affiliation to a farmer group is relatively more important than a macro economic
performance, macro economic conditions play a greater role than farmer status in Poland.
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Figure 4.3.: Kernel density for relative marginal effects (RME), by economic framework conditions
Further, we do plots regarding the Slovak minority party SMK and Polish agrarian-
oriented party PSL, since our sample is biased toward these parties by farmer group.
The results are implied in Figure 4.4. We see for Slovak data that SMK voters from
farmer groups make their policy choice in a more policy-oriented manner than those from
non-farmer groups. The same is true for the Polish party PSE: PSE voters with a farm
background vote in a more policy-oriented way than PSE non-farm voters.
Figure 4.4.: Kernel density for relative marginal effects regarding political parties
This indicates that though an external influence on voters (e.g. political discussion in
networks or fail perception of politics by the rural non-farm population) definitely has
impacts on party choice, it has much less effect on their policy-oriented behavior. It means
people can be externally convinced to vote for one or another pro-agrarian party because
of their neighbors and friends or their subjective perception of the agricultural politic, but
they do it in a non-policy-oriented way.
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4.5.2. RME and cross-pressure
Since individual network ambivalence was significant in both countries, we investigate the
cohesion between it and RMEs based on Models 1 and 3 regarding farmer status as well as
regional economic performance. The general correlation between ambivalence and RMEs
is 0.20*** for Slovak data and 0.17*** for Polish data. The plots in Figure 4.5 demonstrate
the increasing RMEs, i.e. increasing non-policy preferences compared to policy preferences
with rising ambivalence. This result confirms our theoretical approach that the more the
uncertainty, i.e. the more heterogeneous the network content the less voters vote in a
policy-oriented way.
Moreover, we find that the relationship between ambivalence and non-policy voting is
stronger for the Polish farmers (0.27***) versus non-farmers (0.14***) and better develo-
ped regions (0.25***) versus the worse ones (0.14***), while the results for Slovakia are
the converse: 0.16* versus 0.24*** as well as 0.20*** versus 0.24***, respectively. Thus,
these results point out that the significant influence of social networks on policy voting is
confirmed for both countries, but network content is relatively more important for SIG in
Poland, while the Slovak-representative farm group appears to be more organized; there-
fore, the Slovak farmers are less dependent on the information content in peer networks.
This can be indirectly confirmed by the facts that, first, the Slovak farmers have signi-
ficantly smaller network size compared to the Slovak non-farmers, and second, network
ambivalence is unrelated to farmer status in Slovakia while it is related negatively to far-
mer status in Poland (i.e. Polish farmers have more homogeneous information in their peer
networks).
However, these interesting results require an exact explanation. From our sample, we
know that 1.41% of farmers in Poland and 2.81% of farmers in Slovakia are members of
a professional association. Moreover, we investigate an organization degree of farmers at
the macro level in the following way.
We calculate an average number of agricultural cooperatives per agricultural unit. As
one agricultural unit, we use a normalized number of agricultural holdings, farm labour
force and utilised agricultural area, based on the statistics of the European Commission
(2008). According to Bandlerova et al. (2011); Matczak (2011), there were 1,492 agricul-
tural cooperatives in Slovakia and 9,311 in Poland in 2007. The calculated results are
given in Table 4.5. Knowing that the average size of agricultural producer cooperatives
was 222 ha in Poland and 1509 ha in Slovakia (Chloupkova, 2002), we conclude that the
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Figure 4.5.: RME and ambivalence
greater degree of Slovak farmers’ organization in agricultural cooperatives confirmed our
intuitive assumption and empirical results that formal organization of Slovak farmers is
relatively more important than that of Polish farmers, while Polish farmers are relatively
more reliant on information in informal networks compared to Slovak farmers.
Table 4.5.: Calculation of degree of farmer organisation in agricultural cooperatives, 2007
Slovakia Poland
Number of agric. cooperatives (AC) 1492 9311
Number of agric. holdings (AH), 1000 15.8 1128.1
Farm labour force (FLF), 1000 persons 88 2830
Utilised Agricultural Area (UAA), 1000 ha 1889 13856
Number of AC per 1000 AH 94.4 8.3
Number of AC per 1000 persons of FLF 17.0 3.3
Number of AC per 1000 hectares of UAA 0.79 0.67
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4.6. Conclusions
We provide a systematic analysis of policy- and non-policy-oriented voting motives in two
countries, Poland and Slovakia.
First, we start with the theoretical model. Assuming that voters have ideological prefe-
rences and are uncertain about the real positions of political decision makers, we derive
voters’ expected utility function and find that the higher the uncertainty, the lower the
weight of the policy preference when compared to the ideological preference, i.e. the less
informed a voter, the more ideologically he votes ceteris paribus. This model explains why
some social groups behave more ideologically than other interest groups. Based on the as-
sumption that the (un)certainty can arise from the formal organization of voters or their
informal communication in networks, we consider these two factors.
Second, we implement an LCA model based on the conditional logit model in Software
Latent GOLD Choice 4.0 (Vermunt and Magidson, 2005) and estimate two kinds of models
for both countries, with „fix class belonging“ and endogenously generated, to investigate
the objective results. While the model with fix class affiliation allows us to investigate the
voting being interested because of fixed parameters (in this case, farmer status), the model
endogenously generated uncovers the truth as well as hidden macro and micro parameters
which are very important for voting. For both models, we calculate the RME reflecting
an importance of non-policy versus policy voting motives. Thus, the empirical models and
RMEs provide the following results:
1. Regarding policy preferences, the perception of non-farmers is biased toward agri-
cultural subsidies and pro-agrarian parties in both countries. Although the perception
of non-farmers is pronounced by agrarian preferences, this biased perception determines
rather non-policy-oriented voting.
2. RMEs provide only relative statements about voting behavior. These statements
are dependent on the chosen variables taken into estimation because of multidimensional
reality. Therefore, an objectivity of results can be achieved by comparing the different
models and variables.
3. Thus, the models with „fix class belonging“ (Models 2 and 4) supply the more policy-
oriented voting of farmers compared to non-farmers in both countries. It applies if other
latent factors are not taken into consideration. Since the analysis based only on „fix class
belonging“ is not objective because of multidimensional reality, a final decision regarding
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whether the farmers vote really in a more or less policy-oriented way versus non-farmers,
is only possible when a substantial number of other exogenous micro and macro factors
are taken into analysis. For that reason, we also estimate endogenously generated models
(Models 1 and 3).
4. In the Slovak case, according to the endogenously generated models, the Slovak far-
mers vote in a more policy-oriented way. Therefore, an absolute statement based on both
kinds of models is possible: Since the results for both kinds of models are stable (correla-
tion between farmer status and RMEs have the same negative sign for both models), we
conclude that farmers vote in a more policy-oriented way. Moreover, the Slovak farmers
are better organized and farmer status is relatively more important compared to for Polish
farmers.
5. In the Polish case, according the endogenously generated models, Polish farmers
vote in an even less policy-oriented manner than non-farmers since farmer status appears
less important than other macro (closeness to city and economic performance) and micro
(ambivalence) characteristics. Therefore, an absolute statement based on both kinds of
models, whether farmers vote in more or less policy-oriented ways, is impossible since the
results for two models are not identical (while farmer status is positively related to policy-
oriented voting in Model 3, it is negatively related to one in Model 4). Thus, although
there are some clues for the policy-oriented behavior of the Polish farmers, other macro
and micro factors determine their behavior much more strongly.
6. Regarding our previous work (Henning and Petri, 2013), the network ambivalence
reflected in the qualitative aspects of a social network plays an even the greater role
compared to network structure. In contrast to Nir (2005), we showed an impact of network
ambivalence on voting behavior and non-policy-oriented voting.
7. Our theory is confirmed: The more the uncertainty, i.e. the more the network am-
bivalence the more voters vote in a non-policy-oriented way. This point can be discussed
further.
In particular, to reproduce uncertainty empirically, we used network ambivalence. In the
framework of this paper, uncertainty is defined regarding the extent to which a voter is
uncertain about an impact of a political instrument on policy outcome. We assumed that
uncertainty corresponding to the informational status of voters depends on the quantita-
tive and qualitative aspects of information, while network ambivalence reflects only the
qualitative aspect. Hence, we used an assumption that „more network ambivalence“ means
133
4. Social organization of voting and government performance
„more uncertainty“, but „more uncertainty“ does not mean „more network ambivalence“
because network ambivalence (in addition to network structure) is just one of the possible
external characteristics generated by a social network and affecting internal uncertainty.
Moreover, this assumption corresponds to the results of McGraw et al. (2003), which con-
firm that an „objective ambivalence“ is a significant predictor for „subjective uncertainty.“
8. On comparing two countries, we can say that the importance of network ambivalence
is a relatively more important factor of behavior determination for Polish farmers and
Slovak non-farmers compared to the Polish non-farmers and Slovak farmers, respectively.
On the whole, the voting behavior of Slovak farmers is pronounced by their formal
organization, while the voting behavior of Polish farmers is pronounced rather by informal
communication in peer networks.
ANNEX
Detailed distributions by farmer status and economic performance
Figure 4.6.: Kernel density for relative marginal effects (RME), together for farmer status and economic
framework conditions
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The plots of Figure 4.6 provide evidence of policy-oriented voting by both farmer status
and economic framework conditions. As can be seen in models with fix class affiliation
(Models 2 and 4), the farmers vote in a more policy-oriented way in both countries when
other hidden parameters, e.g. economic conditions affecting voting behavior are ignored. In
contrast, the models endogenously generated (Models 1 and 3) present much more import-
ance for economic framework conditions. The Slovak non-farmers with low performance
have the most non-policy preferences, while Slovak farmers with high performance vote in
the most policy-oriented way. In the Polish case, the farmers demonstrate the smaller po-
licy motives compared to the non-farmers both in low- and high-performing regions (4.6).
This is at odds with the results of Model 4 with fix class affiliation and can be explained
by the endogenously considered macro factor (economic performance and distance to city)
having latently more influence on voter behavior than affiliation to a farm group. This is
also confirmed by correlations.
Ideal positions of voters
Figure 4.7.: Ideal voter position in EU dimension for Slovakia and Poland
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Figure 4.8.: Ideal voter position in Eco dimension for Slovakia and Poland
Figure 4.9.: Ideal voter position in Soc dimension for Slovakia and Poland
Correlation tables
Table 4.6.: Slovakia
RME_model1 RME_model2 age education income economic distance_city n_size n_dens ambivalence
RME_model1
RME_model2 0.29***
age -0.17*** -0.05
education -0.03 0.04 -0.23***
income -0.21*** -0.40*** -0.16*** 0.07
economic -0.30*** 0.09* 0.02 0.04 -0.03
distance_city 0.10* -0.13*** 0.04 0.08 -0.10** -0.04
n_size -0.08 0.17*** -0.13** 0.06 -0.03 0.17*** -0.14***
n_dens -0.15*** -0.03 0.00 -0.07 0.03 -0.04 -0.04 0.14***
ambivalence 0.20*** 0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07
farmer -0.33*** -0.79*** 0.06 -0.08 0.42*** -0.06 0.09* -0.21*** -0.02 0.04
***p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10
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Table 4.7.: Slovakia, nonfarmer
RME_model1 RME_model2 age education income economic distance_city n_size n_dens
RME_model1
RME_model2 0.07
age -0.20*** -0.02
education -0.07 -0.05 -0.22***
income -0.08 -0.16*** -0.30*** 0.26***
economic -0.38*** 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.05
distance_city 0.18*** -0.11* 0.02 0.11* -0.09 -0.07
n_size -0.18*** 0.00 -0.10 0.04 0.17*** 0.19*** -0.22***
n_dens -0.12** -0.08 0.02 -0.04 0.11* -0.07 -0.08 0.05
ambivalence 0.24*** 0.08 -0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.02 -0.07 -0.07 -0.04
***p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10
Table 4.8.: Slovakia, farmer
RME_model1 RME_model2 age education income economic distance_city n_size n_dens
RME_model1
RME_model2 0.04
age -0.04 0.04
education -0.01 0.10 -0.22**
income -0.10 0.01 -0.05 -0.15*
economic -0.25*** 0.09 -0.09 0.06 -0.11
distance_city 0.02 -0.12 0.06 0.03 -0.28*** 0.05
n_size -0.11 0.07 -0.16* 0.07 -0.12 0.08 0.14
n_dens -0.29*** -0.08 -0.03 -0.13 -0.06 0.02 0.06 0.34***
ambivalence 0.16* 0.05 0.13 -0.05 -0.09 0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.14
***p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10
Table 4.9.: Poland
RME_model3 RME_model4 age education income economic distance n_size n_dens amb
RME_model3
RME_model4 -0.29***
age -0.05 -0.06
education -0.07 0.01 -0.17***
income -0.24*** 0.07 -0.03 0.11**
economic -0.75*** 0.12*** 0.04 0.09** 0.17***
distance_city -0.40*** 0.13*** 0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.13***
n_size -0.23*** 0.06 -0.04 0.05 0.13*** 0.24*** 0.34***
n_dens -0.16*** 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.19*** 0.34***
amb 0.17*** 0.07* 0.03 0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.16*** 0.01
farmer 0.21*** -0.74*** 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.07* -0.16***
***p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10
Table 4.10.: Poland, nonfarmer
RME_model3 RME_model4 age education income economic distance_city n_size n_dens
RME_model3
RME_model4 -0.27***
age -0.02 -0.06
education -0.09 0.06 -0.15**
income -0.42*** 0.22*** 0.06 0.16***
economic -0.88*** 0.26*** 0.04 0.13** 0.35***
distance_city -0.42*** 0.10 -0.06 0.02 0.20*** 0.23***
n_size -0.23*** 0.14** -0.06 0.04 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.46***
n_dens -0.06 -0.08 -0.01 -0.05 0.10* -0.08 0.24*** 0.33***
ambivalence 0.14** 0.13** 0.07 -0.01 0.02 0.06 -0.11* -0.12** 0.02
***p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10
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Table 4.11.: Poland, farmer
RME_model3 RME_model4 age education income economic distance_city n_size n_dens
RME_model3
RME_model4 -0.13**
age -0.10* -0.01
education -0.06 0.02 -0.20***
income -0.20*** 0.06 -0.09 0.10*
economic -0.66*** 0.15** 0.04 0.05 0.13**
distance_city -0.37*** 0.21*** 0.14** 0.08 -0.09 0.03
n_size -0.21*** -0.08 -0.01 0.05 0.12** 0.30*** 0.23***
n_dens -0.23*** -0.04 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.10* 0.15** 0.35***
ambivalence 0.27*** 0.04 0.00 0.11* -0.07 -0.10* 0.04 -0.21*** -0.01
***p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10
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Abstract
A persistence of state capture in the economic performance of firms and companies in
transition countries is confirmed. But does capture exist in the Russian elections? First,
this study aims to show whether a capture among different socio-economic groups can be
revealed by analyzing individual voting motives. Second, we hope to investigate whether
the non-policy voting motives of voters rise over time. Using the latent class approach,
we derive individual non-policy indicators (NPIs) and calculate individual political weights
with regard to a government party. Using the Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient, we
find that there is no large heterogeneity in the political weights of the population. It means
that although there are population groups which vote more or less ideologically, we cannot
find a definite population group by which the government party should have been strongly
captured.
5.1. Introduction
The electoral competition is a fundamental democratic mechanism for guaranteeing that
governmental policies reflect society’s interests. This mechanism performs well in democra-
tic countries. But a process of democratic development in Russia failed during the 2000s.
According to the results of Freedom House, while Russia was partly free from 1999 until
2004, since 2005 the country is ranked as „not free.“ In a non-free country, special interest
groups (SIGs) have much more possibilities to protect their financial and political interests
at the cost of ordinary people than in free countries (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2002).
On the one hand, SIGs can act as firms and companies to win state support and, there-
fore, additional financial profits. This phenomenon characterizes most transition countries,
since the separation of private and public interests has not been adequately defined after
the fall of the communist system (The World Bank, 2000). The interacting economic and
political elites led to state capture, i.e. the disproportional representation of interest groups
or local elites receiving legal and illegal advantages in institutional rules. A persistence of
state capture in the economic performance of firms and companies in transition countries
is confirmed by researchers (Hellman et al., 2003; Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya, 2006; Ya-
kovlev, 2011; Slinko et al., 2005). Hellman et al. (2003) showed that capture tends to be a
strategy of large private firms trying to compete in a market dominated by large incum-
bent (state-owned) firms. „These firms engage in capture to compensate for weakness in
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the overall legal framework and to gain improvements in the security of property rights“
(Hellman et al., 2003). For the Russian case, Slinko et al. (2005) showed that the political
power of firms yields substantial gains for these organizations, e.g. higher growth of profi-
tability and sales. Moreover, Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya (2006) showed that a capture has
changed its nature between Yeltsin’s and Putin’s time: There is a shift in the allocation
of bargaining power within regions from private firms and firms owned by the regional
government to firms of the federal government.
On the other hand, SIGs can influence a political outcome in the political elections
(Baron, 1994; Grossman and Helpman, 1996; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2002). In this
case, strong special interests lead to a biased policy because of the efficiency of campaign
spending if the voters are strongly uninformed (Baron, 1994; Grossman and Helpman,
1996; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2002). A key result of a theoretical work of Bardhan and
Mookherjee (2002) is that a necessary condition for government capture is that voters
make their party choice based not on policy issues but rather on non-policy factors. The
goal of this paper to investigate whether capture can be identified based on individual
party choice in the Russian elections. That means whether there exists a specific group
of the population (regarding socio-economic or regional characteristics) which should be
taken into account by the government to enhance the chance of the government being
re-elected. In contrast to most previous studies trying to explain a capture at the macro
(regional) level (Yakovlev, 2011; Frye and Iwasaki, 2011; Hellman et al., 2003; Slinko et
al., 2005; Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya, 2006), this paper concentrates on a possible capture
arising from the micro level, i.e. from an individual political choice.
In this work, we deal with policy and non-policy voting components, whereby the latter
are often linked to ideological preferences (Persson and Tabellini, 2000). We note that not
only is an absolute level of policy- and non-policy-oriented voting components relevant
for policy outcome but rather the relative one. Thus, we distinguish between policy- and
non-policy-oriented voting. Policy-oriented voting refers to the classic policy space model
(Downs, 1957), where informed voters prefer parties whose positions are close to their own
positions along a policy dimension. Non-policy voting includes valence, which is interpreted
as the non-policy basis of political judgment made by the electorate concerning the quality
of political candidates (Schofield, 2007), and the lobbying activities of SIGs Grossman and
Helpman (1996). In this work, we carry out the following steps. First, using probabilistic
latent class analysis (LCA), we estimate two-class latent conditional models for all available
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samples from the ESS for the years 2006–2012, referring to three election periods from
2003–2011. Second, we calculate an individual non-policy indicator (NPI) promoting the
extent to which non-policy-oriented voting is more important than the policy-oriented
version and analyze it according to the socio-economic and regional characteristics. Third,
we investigate a capture at the meso-level among socio-economic groups based on the
political weights for a government party. Using the Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient, we
analyze a heterogeneity of the political weights.
As Russia has become less democratic over time, we derive the following hypotheses
corresponding to a theoretical work of Bardhan and Mookherjee (2002). We expect that:
1. Non-policy-oriented voting should rise over time.
2. Capture should exist in Russian elections.
Moreover, some authors agree that the transition period has been characterized by
rapidly growing economic inequality among Russia’s regions. Based on a confirmed growing
regional polarization in Russia in the 90s Fedorov (2002), we form our third hypothesis:
3. The central regions should be much more important for Russian politicians and
therefore, distant regions should be captured by central regions.
5.2. Discrete Choice Models
Discrete choice models derived in a random utility maximization model (RUM) frame-
work assume that the decision maker chooses between two or more discrete alternatives
and behaves as the expected utility maximizer. In the case of spatial models, the voter
supports the candidate or the party that maximizes his combination of measured policy-
related utilities and his unmeasured utilities (Adams et al., 2005). Assume that there are
J alternatives for a decision maker. Thus, the decision maker i chooses the party j if and
only if:
Ui(j) > Ui(j′),∀j 6= j′. (5.1)
In RUMs, one presumes that the utility Ui(j) provided to individual i by party j is com-
posed of a deterministic component Vi(j), which can be calculated based on observed
characteristics, and a stochastic error component ij , which is unobserved, so that the
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formula for a random utility model determining only policy factors is given by
Ui(j) = Vi(j) + ij , (5.2)
where ij is a voter-specific random utility term that represents unmeasured components of
the voter i’s utility for a party j. Note that in all discrete choice models, the absolute level
of utility is irrelevant. The choice probability is Pij = Prob(Ui(j) > Ui(j′)) = Prob(Ui(j)−
Ui(j′) > 0), which depends only on the difference in utility and not its absolute level.
The conditional logit model (McFadden, 1974) can be utilized to estimate these proba-
bilities if the random terms are assumed to be independently distributed Type I extreme
value variates. Let yit denote the value of the dependent variable for individual i at replica-
tion t, which can take on values 1 ≤ j ≤ J . We use vector notation yi, zcovi , dattit , to refer to
all responses, all covariate values for individual i, and the attribute values corresponding
to individual i at replication t. The conditional logit model for the response probabilities
has the form (Vermunt and Magidson, 2005):
P (yit = j|dattit ) =
exp(Vit(j))∑
J exp(Vit(j′))
, (5.3)
where Vit(j) is the systematic component in the utility of alternative j for individual i at
replication t. The term Vit(j) is a linear function of an alternative-specific constant αj and
attribute effects βn:
Vit(j) = αj +
∑
n
βnd
n
itj , (5.4)
where the squared distance between the voter i at location xi and a candidate j at
location sj in a one-dimensional space n for observation t is calculated in the following
way:
dnitj = −(xin − sjn)2. (5.5)
In a latent class or finite mixture variant of the conditional model, it is assumed that
individuals belong to different latent classes differ with respect to the parameters appearing
in the linear model for Vit(j). In order to indicate that the choice probabilities depend on
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class membership x, the logistic model is now of the form:
P (yit = j|x,dattit ) =
exp(Vit|x(j))∑
J exp(Vit|x(j′))
, (5.6)
Here, Vit|x(j) is the systematic component in the utility of alternative j, given that
individual i belong to latent class x. As can be seen, the logit regression coefficients are
class-specific and the linear model for Vit|x(j) in this specific case is:
Vit|x(j) = αxj +
∑
n
βxnd
n
itj . (5.7)
In addition to the attributes, we include in our LCA another type of explanatory
variable—covariates—in the latent class model. This is used to predict a class membership.
When covariates are included in the model, the probability density turns into the following
form (Vermunt and Magidson, 2005):
P (yi) =
X∑
x=1
P (x|zcovi )
Ti∏
t=1
P (yi|x,dattit ), (5.8)
where the class membership of individual i is now assumed to depend on a set of covariates
denoted by zcovi . Class membership probability P (x|zcovi ) is:
P (x|zcovi ) =
exp(ηx|zi)∑
X exp(ηx′|zi)
(5.9)
with a linear term
ηx|zi = r0x +
H∑
h=1
rhxz
cov
ih (5.10)
Here, r0x denotes the constant corresponding to latent class x and rhx is the effect of the
hth covariate for class x.
In a perfect political world, the electoral competition would be based on policy platforms.
The motive of policy-oriented voting goes back to the classic voting theory created by
Downs (1957); Enelow and Hinich (1984). In the sense of the spatial theory of voting
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(Downs, 1957; Enelow and Hinich, 1984), voters prefer the parties whose positions are
close to their own positions along a salient policy dimension. In other words, the voters
support candidates who best reflect their policy beliefs. Therefore, the modelers form a
policy component based on the negative squared distance between the voter i at location
xi and the candidate j at location sj in a multi-dimensional space with N issues. With
the policy-salience parameter, βn, the policy-oriented utility for the candidate’s policies is
given by −∑n βn(xin − sjn)2.
Since in reality electoral competition is imperfect, the utility incorporates a non-policy
voting component, or valence, as well. The transformation of policies into welfare is rather
complex, while the calculation of expected utility is also rather complex from the viewpoint
of individual voters. Hence, voters apply simple heuristics to estimate their expected utility.
Basically, their behavior is based on the different types of non-policy factors. One type of
non-policy-oriented factor corresponds to the concept of valence (Schofield, 2007), which
holds that based on specific characteristics of the incumbent, such as appearance, charisma,
occupation, and ethnicity, voters perceive a specific competence or popularity of candidates
and parties. Following Grossman and Helpman (1996), voters are at least partially swayed
by the relative campaign spending of different parties. This effect may reflect the influence
of election advertisements or other efforts to mobilize support (e.g. election rallies, door-
to-door visits by campaign workers).
Another type of non-policy-oriented factor arises from party identity based on social,
political, religious or ethnic factors. This type of non-policy motive cannot be influenced
by campaign spending. Following the theory of Lipset-Rokkan (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967),
voters’ electoral choices are determined by their social class. Hence, electoral competition
may imply incentives for elected politicians either to consider the needs only of such a social
class or to ignore such a social class completely. For example, ethnic voting dominates vote
choice in African democracies.
5.2.1. Non-policy Indicator
To analyze the extent to which non-policy voting is greater than policy-oriented voting,
we calculate an indicator based on the relative marginal effects (RMEs) in the following
way. The marginal effects of an independent policy alternative-specific variable dnij in a
policy dimension n for individual i and party j on the choice probabilities is:
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∂Pij
∂dnij
= Pij(1− Pij)βn
For the whole policy space with N variables, the total differential of the probability can
be gained accordingly:
dPij =
N∑
n=1
∂Pij
∂dnij
ddnij = Pij (1− Pij)
N∑
n=1
βn
so that the absolute marginal effect in the policy dimension for individual i, party j,
and class x is:
PMEijx = Pijx(1− Pijx)|
N∑
n=1
βnx|
which indicates how sensitively a voter reacts to the changing distance between one
party and him. Further, we calculate the marginal effects for non-policy dimension (NME)
reflected in constants. Concerning the constants being party-specific, we obtain for non-
policy preferences ti for individual i and party j the following NME:
∂Pij
∂ti
= Pij (1− Pij) (αj − αk)
with
αk =
J∑
k 6=j
[
Pik∑J
k 6=j Pik
αk
]
so that the absolute marginal effect in the non-policy dimension for individual i, party
j, and class x is:
NMEijx = Pijx (1− Pijx) |αjx − αkx|
.
Further, we find individual RMEs for each class and party:
RMEijx =
NMEijx
PMEijx
Weighting with the average party share, we obtain RME over all parties:
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RMEix =
J∑
j=1
qjRMEijx
Finally, we obtain individual RME over all classes on multiplying with average class
probability:
RMEi =
X∑
x=1
P (x|zcovi )RMEix
Thus, we obtain the RME for each voter. We describe these RMEs as NPIs. Such an
indicator implies the extent to which the voters vote in a non-policy-oriented manner, i.e.
ideologically.
Relative importance of Voting Components
While the NPI based on the RMEs corresponds to the rate of substitution (i.e. by what
percentage the probability of non-policy changes with a 1% increase in the probability
of policy voting), the further index assesses the relative importance of different voting
motives to the sum of all marginal effects: 1 :
RIi
NP = NMEiNMEi+PMEi
RIi
P = PMEiNMEi+PMEi
5.3. Empirical Model
5.3.1. Heterogeneous Preferences in Random Utility Models and Latent Class
Analysis
Like economic analysis estimating consumers’ heterogeneous preferences for goods, the po-
litical economy is interested to find voters’ heterogeneous preferences characterized by their
individual characteristics. When unobserved heterogeneity in the population is forecast, it
leads to a class of response models based on random utility maximization (McFadden and
Train, 2000). There are mainly two types of models based on the idea of using a mixture of
1Relative importance of different voting motives (RI) is derived from non-policy indicator (NPI) because
of NME/(NME+PME) =1/(1+1/(NME/PME))
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a simple underlying model, such as multinomial logit, over the distribution of preferences:
mixed multinomial logit models (MMLM) and latent class logit models (LCLM). Whi-
le in MMLM this distribution is continuous, in the latent class context, a finite number
of classes is used to express the heterogeneity (Hess et al., 2011). Both types of models
are random utility maximization (RUM) models generalizing standard logit by allowing
the parameter associated with each observed variable to vary randomly across individu-
als. Although mixed logit models explicitly account, in a sense, for heterogeneity, LCA is
better suited to explain the sources of heterogeneity that relate to the characteristics of
individual consumers (Boxall and Adamowicz, 2002).
We tested both kinds of models, MMLM and LCLM, and found that the data are rather
heterogeneous. Hence, we concentrate in this paper on LCA, since it uncovers unobserved
heterogeneity in a population and aims to find meaningful groups of voters that are similar
in their responses to measured variables. In an LCA, the parameter heterogeneity across
individuals is modeled by a discrete distribution or set of classes. The estimation results in
a fixed number of classes; thereby, the parameters of statistical models differ across these
latent classes formed by unobserved latent variables. Thus, the preferences of voters are
homogeneous within each latent class, but can vary between the classes.
The latent class estimation of this paper was realized in Latent GOLD Choice 4.0, de-
veloped by Vermunt and Magidson (2005). The regression model that is used in Latent
GOLD Choice 4.0 is the conditional logit model developed by McFadden (1974) (Vermunt
and Magidson, 2005). Latent GOLD Choice implements a nonparametric variant of the
random coefficient or mixed conditional logit model (McFadden and Train, 2000; Vermunt
and Magidson, 2005). From three possible methods in Latent GOLD Choice 4.0 based on
different response formats (first choice, ranking task, rating task), the first choice for-
mat was selected as the most suitable method concerning the assumption that each choice
set has the same number of alternatives. Since random utility theory is first employed to
model choices among a set of substitutes or alternatives, we first provide its formalization.
5.3.2. Case of Russia
Data
The data used for the empirical analysis is derived from the European Social Survey (ESS).
The data for Russia are available from Round 3 (2006), Round 4 (2008), Round 5 (2010),
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and Round 6 (2012). The ESS questionnaire consists of a collection of questions on the
different themes (socio-demographics, subjective well-being, politics etc.). For our analysis
based on the probabilistic modeling of political choice, we selected the relevant questions
and included only the data for which the chosen party of the interviewee was available.
The relevant questions for political choice were: „Some people don’t vote nowadays for one
reason or another. Did you vote in the last [country] national election?“, „Which party
did you vote for in that election?“. The validation of data was referred to the last few
national parliamentary elections held in 2003, 2007, and 2011. The relevant parties and
their results at the last few elections are summarized in Table 5.1. We see that a party
system is no longer a „floating party system“ (Rose 2001) compared to a situation in
the 90s. Parliament formation is more or less constant over the time and only the four
largest parties have won seats in the Duma (ER, KPRF, LDPR, SR) for the last two
election periods. It is explained not only by the increased threshold but also by newly
implemented party legislation rules: Parties must overcome the hurdle of registration to
be legislated.
Table 5.1.: Party Seats in Duma after Elections 2003–2011 and party shares in our sample
.
Party (Ideology) Abb. Elect. Sample Elect. Sample Sample Elect. Sample
2003 2006 2007 2008 2010 2011 2012
% % % % % % %
United Russia ER 37.57 64.67 64.30 75.02 69.90 49.32 61.6
(centrism)
Communist Party KPRF 12.61 18.82 11.57 14.43 16.23 19.19 19.7
(socialism)
Lib.-Democ. Party LDPR 11.45 7.25 8.14 6.39 7.88 11.67 8.5
(national-cons.)
Rodina Rodina 9.02 4.84 - - - - -
(socialism)
Union of Right Forces SPS 3.97 2.84 0.96 - - - -
(liberal-cons.)
Just Russia SR - - 7.74 3.66 4.81 13.24 7.9
(social-democ.)
Yabloko Yabloko 4.30 1.58 1.59 0.5 1.18 3.43 2.3
(social-democ.)
others 21.08 - 5.7 - - 3.15 -
Total number of voters - 951 - 1393 1269 - 1191
Moreover, as can be seen from Table 5.1, our data pointed to some bias in favor of
ruling party ER because of regional distortions (the ruling party is more favored in distant
regions). Further, it can be also expected that the voters of the ruling party are more
willing to be interviewed while the voters of small parties are more worried about potential
consequences from the honest declaration of their political preferences. For that reason, our
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analysis includes not only the parties’ obtained relative large weight in the voting structure,
but also the parties that did not pass the 5% threshold (since 2007, the 7% threshold). For
example, the opposition party with liberal ideology Yabloko won parliamentary seats for
the last time in 2003. The probabilistic analysis of Russian parliamentary elections based
on the ESS is interesting because of finding the voters’ true motives and determinants of
ideological voting.
In our analysis, we use two kinds of variables to investigate policy- and non-policy-
oriented voting.
1. Policy variables
Since the structure of the ESS questionnaire of 2012 was modified, we chose three ques-
tions relating to political issues which corresponded with each other in all periods. The
interviewees were asked about their self-placement concerning political dimensions using
the following scales:
• Left − Right − Scala (L-R): In politics people sometimes talk of ’left’ and ’right’.
Where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means
the right?
Further, interviewees were asked about the extent to which they agree or disagree with
each of the four following statements, where 1 means „agree strongly“ and 5 means „disa-
gree strongly“:
• Economical dimension (Eco): Government should reduce differences in income le-
vels.
• Social−cultural dimension (Soc): Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their
own life as they wish.
The position of each party in this three-dimensional space was calculated as the mean of
the positions over the voters casting a vote for a corresponding party (Schofield, 2012).
Further, knowing the positions of voters and parties for each of the three dimensions, it is
possible to calculate square (Euclidean) distances, so that these policy variables are taken
as attributes in LCA.
2. Explanatory variables
The further data of socio-economic characteristics and regional differences were also
available for analysis which we use as explanatory and class-membership determining va-
riables:
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1. Age (Age)
2. Education (Education): 1=less than lower secondary, 2=lower secondary, 3=lower tier upper
secondary, 4=upper tier upper secondary, 5=advanced vocational, 6=lower tertiary educati-
on, BA level, 7=higher tertiary education, >= MA level
3. Total monthly income in Euro (Income): 1=Less than 6000 roubles, 2=6001-9000 roubles,
3=9001-12000 roubles, 4=12001-15000 roubles, 5=15001-18000 roubles, 6=18001-21000 roubles,
7=21001-25000 roubles, 8=25001-30000 roubles, 9=30001-40000 roubles, 10=More than 40000
roubles
4. Region (Region): 1=Centre, 2=North and North West, Volgo-Vyatsky, Central-Chernozhem,
3=Volga, North Caucasus, Ural, 4= West Siberia, East Siberia, Far East
5. Year (Year): 1=2008, 2=2010
From the descriptive statistics (see Appendix), we see that the data have a similar
structure, except the median for income which has an increasing tendency that can be
explained by rising income at a whole. The correlations between all explanatory variables
are also similar in all periods (see Appendix).
Thus, using two kinds of variables, we try to explain the parliamentary elections in
Russia by means of the policy issues and ideological components. The explanatory varia-
bles are responsible for determining class affiliation, while the policy variables determine
policy-oriented voting. All other remaining factors are unobservable and, therefore, contai-
ned in alternative-specific constants. Thereby, the alternative-specific constants and policy
coefficients are also determined by explanatory variables characterizing the class.
Results
Model
We estimated LCLM with a different number of classes. To decide on the best number of
classes, we consider the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information
criterion (BIC). A formal comparison in terms of performance between AIC and BIC is
difficult, particularly because AIC and BIC address different questions. BIC assumes that
the true generation model is in the set of candidate models. Most simulations that prefer
BIC over AIC assume that the true model is in the candidate set and that it is relatively
low-dimensional. In contrast, the AIC does not assume that any of the candidate models
is necessarily true in order to make the best possible predictions. Most simulations that
156
5. Capture in the Russian Parliamentary Elections 2003–2011
Table 5.2.: Fit for different number of latent classes
Model 2006 Model 2008 Model 2010 Model 2012
BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC
2 cl. model 1990.74 1888.73 2254.30 2154.75 2320.31 2222.54 2609.13 2512.57
3 cl. model 2045.14 1879.98 2292.09 2129.67 2377.79 2218.27 2653.50 2485.94
favor AIC over BIC assume that reality is highly or infinitely dimensional (Wagenmakers
and Farrell, 2004). Markon and Krueger (2004) noted that AIC performs relatively well in
small samples, but is inconsistent and does not improve in performance in large samples,
while BIC appears poorly in small samples, but is consistent and improves in performance
with larger sample sizes (De-Graft Acquah, 2010). Since our sample is relatively large and
two class models are more stable, we chose the model based on the BIC (5.2).
Estimation results for the latent class model are presented in Table 5.3. We consider the
same two-class model for each year. The model includes ideological constants, attributes
(Euclidean distances in three dimensions: Left-Right, Eco, Soc), and four individual cha-
racteristics (age, education, income, region) determining class membership probabilities.
The results indicate heterogeneity of party preferences across the two latent classes and
differ from year to year.
The means of party positions (how voters perceive it) can be found in the Appendix
and seem plausible for the left-right positioning of parties. It should be noted that most
Russian voters have in the economic dimension left-oriented preferences and in the socio-
cultural dimension rather centric ones. As can be seen from Models 1 to 4 of Table 5.3,
there is policy-oriented voting in all four years, whereby the most predictable dimension
is left-right positioning. A negative sign for an attribute means that the less the Euclidean
distance between the voter and the party in this or that dimension, the more the likelihood
for the party to be elected. We can see also a significantly great ideological constant for
ruling party ER: The greater the constant, the more party identity is based on unexplained
phenomena and unobserved factors influencing voter choice and the more the unexplained
part of probability for this party.
As can be seen, class membership probability is mainly determined significantly by age
and region. The significant influence of other explanatory variables is different in diverse
periods.
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-2.111
year*region
-
-
0.284***
2.836
-0.284***
-2.836
***
p
<
0.01;**
p
<
0.05;*
p
<
0.10
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As can be seen from Table 5.3, the results based on the samples from 2008 and 2010
and related to election 2007 are similar. Therefore, we consolidate both data sets in one
sample and estimate the models based on the consolidated sample to draw conclusions for
election 2007. Since the consolidation of both data sets may lead to result distortions, we
undertake two steps. First, we are concerned with Model 5 (Table 5.3) a one-class model
being equivalent to the conditional logit model to see the extent to which ideological effects
move over time.
Figure 5.1.: Distribution of relative marginal effects
for Model 5 (2008-2010)
Figure 5.2.: Distribution of relative marginal effects
for Model 6 (2008-2010)
Although by comparing Models 2 (2008) and 3 (2010) it is already recognizable that
policy-oriented voting is greater in 2008 and Model 5 shows a significantly shifted constant
for the ruling party (-0.339***), we cannot speak about the general shift of non-policy
voting unless we calculate the RMEs. Therefore, we calculated the RMEs for Model 5 (see
below for details) and obtained the following kernel density distributions for both years,
whereby the undertaken t-test and Levene’s test exhibited significant differences in means
and variances (plot 5.1). So, related to election 2007, we observe a significant increase in
the non-policy voting of sample 2010 compared to 2008. This result makes us think that a
timing point of data collection has an influence on people’s opinion, their policy positions,
and finally on non-policy voting. Whether a greater time lag between election year and
collection moment leads systematically to stronger non-policy voting in data since people
may be less worried about politics as well as since political competition and escalation of
political discussion may be much less compared with the election time period it cannot be
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exactly examined in the framework of this paper and should be verified in future.
As a second step, we are concerned with Model 6. The logic of Model 6 is the following.
We are interested to investigate the heterogeneous voting preferences in the election of
2007. Hence, in contrast to Model 5, a two-class LCA model should reveal better hete-
rogeneity. Further, we are interested to find not only the shifted ideological effects over
2008–2010 but also to analyze the non-policy components generating this shift. We expect
that the shift of the RMEs over the years occurs not only due to different timing points
but also due to the non-policy variables (age, education, income, region). Hence, we ta-
ke into account interaction effects (year*age, year*education, year*income, year*region),
i.e. we operate on the assumption that the shifted voting behavior is determined by the
different non-policy variables in addition to the different timing points. For example, the
older people from 2010 have other voting preferences not only related to the younger peo-
ple from 2010 but also related to the younger people from 2008. The results for Model 6
estimated based .on the consolidated sample for 2008 and 2010 are presented in Table 5.3:
The heterogeneity of non-policy voting as well as significant timing effects are detected
by three interaction variables: year*age, year*income, year*region. To control, we perform
density estimation by year (5.2). Comparing two plots 5.1 and 5.2 we see similar results
by year and, therefore, decide to use the results of Model 6 in our further analysis.
Non-policy Voting over Parties
We see the distributions of NPI over the parties (Figure 5.3). First, while some parties,
e.g. KPRF and LDPR, changed their positions (LDPR voters became less non-policy-
oriented and KPRF voters became more policy-oriented), other parties, e.g. ruling party
ER and opposition party Yabloko, retained their positions in a more or less stable manner.
ER has relatively more non-policy-oriented voters while Yabloko has relatively more policy-
oriented voters over time (Figure 5.3). Further, we can see heterogeneity among the parties
in 2006 and 2012. In contrast, the distributions of NPI in 2008 and 2010 as well as for the
consolidated sample (Model 6) do not exhibit great heterogeneity over the parties. This is
also why it makes sense to operate with one consolidated sample for 2008 and 2010. Thus,
we deal with Model 1 for election 2003 (sample 2006), Model 6 for election 2007 (samples
2008-2010), and Model 4 for election 2011 (sample 2012).
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Figure 5.3.: Distribution of NPI over the parties
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Relative Importance of Non-policy and Policy Voting Motives
Analyzing a relative importance of policy and non-policy motives, we see that a non-policy
voting component does not increase over time. Thus, while the mean RI for non-policy
voting in the election 2003 is 64% and 72% in 2007, the mean RI for non-policy voting in
election 2011 is only 52%. It means, in general, people voted in a relatively more policy-
oriented manner in election 2011 compared to elections 2007 and 2003. This also explains
the Russian protests after the uncovered falsifications of votes in election 2011, which were
also empirically confirmed (Kobak et al., 2012; Neretin, 2012). Voting motives are not
equally important for every voter and differ from person to person. For further insight into
the heterogeneity of voting behavior, we investigate NPIs by diverse socio-economic and
regional characteristics. In this way, we can better understand by which group of voters a
policy-oriented voting component increased over time.
Figure 5.4.: Election 2003 (Mo-
del 1)
Figure 5.5.: Election 2007 (Mo-
del 6)
Figure 5.6.: Election 2011 (Mo-
del 4)
Voting by Non-policy Variables
As a next step, we computed the kernel density plots of individual NPIs according to age,
education, income, and region to see to what extent the different groups of voters differ in
non-policy voting. We split up all voters into two groups, e.g. for age, the first voter group
with the greater age (relative to mean of age) and the second voter group with the smaller
age. While in election 2003 relatively younger people voted in a more non-policy-oriented
way (Figure 5.7), in elections 2007 and 2011 we observe relatively greater policy-oriented
voting of younger people (Figure 5.8,5.9). The results are especially interesting since the
variable age is significant in all periods. The significant correlation between age and NPI
in all periods is confirmed: -0.82*** (2003), 0.34*** (2007), and 0.45*** (2011). Thus, we
see a changing tendency in the cohesion between age and non-policy voting, confirmed by
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the next plots of nonparametric regression.
Figure 5.7.: Election 2003 (Mo-
del 1)
Figure 5.8.: Election 2007 (Mo-
del 6)
Figure 5.9.: Election 2011 (Mo-
del 4)
Figure 5.10.: Election 2003 Figure 5.11.: Election 2007 Figure 5.12.: Election 2011
Further, with the same splitting up of all voters into two groups according to their
education and income level, we make plots for NPI (Figure 5.13 -5.18). The similar but
reverse tendency compared to age can be recognized for education and income: Non-policy
voting for relatively better-educated and higher-earning voters decreases in 2006, while in
2012 better-educated and higher-earning voters vote in a relatively more policy-oriented
way.
Last, we also plot NPI according to the variable region. The influence tendency of NPI in
different regions changes in time by regions (Figure 5.19-5.21): Voters from central regions
become relatively more policy-oriented.
As can be seen from the results, all observed variables have an influence over the years.
An effect over the years changes in an interesting way: Policy-oriented voting is getting
„younger,“ „better educated,“ and „better earning“ from „central regions.“ Obviously, the
main variable inducing the shift in (non-)policy voting is age having the significantly
strongest effect on NPI in all periods (see Appendix). Two other individual variables
(education and income) have a significant influence on NPI and on the shift in policy
voting over time because of their relation to age. More precisely, the variable region is
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also identified as mostly a class-determining (i.e. policy voting) variable since it has no
permanent correlation with age.
Figure 5.13.: Election 2003
(Model 1)
Figure 5.14.: Election 2007
(Model 6)
Figure 5.15.: Election 2011
(Model 4)
Figure 5.16.: Election 2003
(Model 1)
Figure 5.17.: Election 2007
(Model 6)
Figure 5.18.: Election 2011
(Model 4)
Figure 5.19.: Election 2003
(Model 1)
Figure 5.20.: Election 2007
(Model 1)
Figure 5.21.: Election 2011
(Model 1)
Policy Voting
Further, using the estimated results of latent class models, we investigate the implications
of our estimation on voter behavior by analyzing the political weights for each voter. The
political weights reflect a sensitivity of probability on policy issues for government party
G and are calculated only for party ER as follows:
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giGx = PiGx(1− PiGx)|
N∑
n=1
βnx|
This shows the degree of sensitivity of a voter reaction on the changing distance between
him and the government party.
The marginal effect over all classes is the following:
giG =
X∑
x=1
Pˆ (x|zcovi ) ∗ giGx
where Pˆ (x|zcovi ) is the voters’ individual class membership probabilities. Finally, we
estimate the political weights as
giG =
giG∑I
i giG
For the one-class model, the following approximation could be applied:
giG =
giG∑I
i giG
≈ PiG(1− PiG)∑
i PiG(1− PiG)
From this approximation for the one-class model, it follows that swing voters (i.e. voters
with a probability to reelect the government party that is close to 0.5) have a particularly
high voting weight. It means such voters are important for policy makers to win a greater
voting share.
Our results indicate that the NPI is negatively correlated with political weights, i.e.
swing voters vote in the most policy-oriented way, whereby the correlation between both
rises: -0.67***(2003), -0.75***(2007) and -0.82***(2011). That means the cohesion between
political weights and the NPI becomes stronger.
Figure 5.22.: Distribution of effective voting weights in the elections 2003-2011
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In Figure 5.22, we present the relative distribution of the calculated voting weights.
As indicated by the Lorenz curve in Figure 5.22, the effective voting weights are more
or less equally distributed, with the corresponding relatively low Gini coefficients of 0.085
(2003), 0.149 (2007), and 0.126 (2011). Estimating models based on the four socio-economic
characteristics (age, education, income, region), we cannot find a great interdependence
between political weights in the population.
Moreover, we are interested to investigate by which voter group the government party
is captured (i.e. which voter groups have relatively higher political weights related to their
population share) and the political importance of which swing voters has increased over
time. The more that swing voters vote in a policy-oriented way, the more important their
voting becomes and the more their preferences should be taken into account by policy
makers to win their votes. To find out which voter group increasingly gained in political
importance, we calculate the capture indices. A straightforward definition of government
capture corresponds to the degree, to which political weights of social groups diverge from
their corresponding population shares, i.e. the higher the political weight of a social group
compared to its population shares, the more this group is able to capture the government.
Hence, we estimate the following capture index for two voter groups l and m:
CAP l__m =
∑
i∈l gi
Sl∑
i∈m gi
Sm
CAP l__m > 1 means that group l is more able to capture votes.
The following Table 5.4 presents the calculated capture indices for different social groups.
Table 5.4.: Capture coefficients over the time
Voter groups 2003 2007 2011
younger versus older 0.862 1.159 1.153
poorer versus richer 1.044 0.897 0.891
low educated versus higher educated 1.007 0.942 0.951
central versus distant regions 0.980 0.937 1.084
Gini-coeff. 0.085 0.149 0.126
The results correspond to the relation between NPI and social characteristics. Relatively
younger, richer, and better-educated individuals have higher political weights; hence, the
government seeking reelection should have more incentives to deliver policies and policy
outcomes to these groups by taking into account their preferences. However, based on
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a relatively low Gini coefficient, we cannot observe a politically strong group of voters
determined by one of four used non-policy characteristics with a really significant impact
on a government party. Therefore, an inclusion of further variables, e.g. a variable for the
information and satisfaction of voters with government performance, is essential to better
understand the voting motives of the Russian voter.
5.4. Conclusions
In contrast to most previous studies trying to explain election output at the macro level,
we concentrate on testing the influence of policy versus non-policy voting at the micro
level and try to reveal a capture at the meso level (level of population groups). We develop
an empirical framework to analyze policy- and non-policy-oriented voting. In our attempt
to understand how non-policy voting can be better analyzed, we used the innovative me-
thodology of latent class estimation.
We implement the LCA model based on the conditional logit model in Software Latent
GOLD Choice 4.0 (Vermunt and Magidson, 2005), which in turn follows from the data of
the ESS about the Russian parliamentary elections from 2003-2011. We estimate a two-
class model based on non-policy variables (age, education, income, region) and policy ones
(Euclidean distances in three political dimensions). The model estimations show relatively
stable results over time: Age is an important non-policy class-determining variable in all
periods, while self-positioning on the left-right scale is a relatively more important policy
issue for individual choice.
Based on the RMEs from probabilistic models, we develop a NPI corresponding with
the marginal rate of substitution and reflecting the extent to which a probability change
of non-policy motives is greater compared to a probability change of policy motives. Based
on the NPI, we could reveal interesting results. For example, in 2011, the voters of liberal
oppositional party Yabloko and the ambiguous party LDPR voted in the most policy-
oriented way.
Our first hypothesis is not confirmed: Policy-oriented voting in election 2011 was consi-
derably greater than in elections 2003 and 2007. A relative importance of policy-oriented
voting in 2011 was 48%, compared to 36% in 2003 and 28% in 2007. The policy-oriented
voting increased because younger, better-educated voters with higher income began to vote
in a more policy-oriented manner. While in election 2003 the younger population voted in
a relatively less policy-oriented way, in elections 2007–2011 they were more policy-oriented.
167
5. Capture in the Russian Parliamentary Elections 2003–2011
Moreover, central regions appear to vote in a more policy-oriented way as well: While in
elections 2003 and 2007 there were no great differences between the voters from diverse
regions, in election 2011, the central regions voted in a significantly more policy-oriented
manner.
Regarding our second hypothesis, we investigate a capture and define it regarding
the extent to which the political weights of social groups diverge from their corresponding
population shares. Using the Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient, we find that there is no
large heterogeneity in the political weights of the population. Surprisingly, although there
are population groups which vote more or less ideologically, we could not find a definite
population group by which the government party would have been strongly captured.
Our third hypothesis that the central regions capture the distant regions is not con-
firmed. This indicates that regional polarization is not generated by political factors. It
corresponds also with the empirical conclusions of Fedorov (2002) that „regional polariza-
tion is driven by structural differences between regions rather than geographic or political.“
Regarding national elections, we could not reveal a capture over the different socio-
economic groups based on the variables used in the analysis. But it does not matter that
capture is missing. It may exist, for example, in regional elections. However, a capture in
Russian elections may be absent because no group of ordinary voters is able to capture the
government party for two reasons: a) great importance of the economic and political elites
and, therefore, b) low importance of voters and the elections as a whole in the political
system of Russia.
Although we could not find a capture in parliamentary elections, a changing tendency
of voting behavior is very interesting. Thus, the following questions arise: Is this tendency
accidental? Or does it indicate a switching political awareness of young people in Russia?
Appendix
Table 5.5.: Descreptive Statistics
Variable 2006 2006 2008 2008 2010 2010 2012 2012
mean/ SD mean/ SD mean/ SD mean/ SD
median median median median
age 52.41 16.60 51.57 17.84 52.26 17.00 50.91 17.23
income 2 - 4 - 4 - 6 -
education 5 - 5 - 5 - 5 -
region 3 - 3 - 3 - 3 -
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Table 5.6.: Perceived positions in policy dimensions over parties and years
2006 2008-2010 2012
Variable Left-Right Eco Soc Left-Right Eco Soc Left-Right Eco Soc
Scale 0-10 1-5 1-5 0-10 1-5 1-5 0-10 1-5 1-5
ER 5.33 1.85 3.14 5.59 1.89 3.43 5.70 1.86 3.52
KPRF 4.02 1.51 3.69 4.46 1.71 3.66 4.32 1.60 3.74
LDPR 4.72 2.02 3.28 4.83 1.88 3.36 5.18 1.97 3.33
Rodina 5.09 1.65 3.41 - - - - - -
SPS 6.23 2.48 2.78 - - - - - -
SR - - - 5.31 1.88 3.43 5.14 1.75 3.75
Yabloko 6.11 2.07 3.13 5.75 1.77 3.09 5.26 1.74 3.67
Table 5.7.: Correlations 2006
NPI age educ income region
NPI
age -0.82***
educ 0.22*** -0.33***
income 0.33*** -0.37*** 0.32***
region -0.09** -0.06 0.05 -0.06*
political weights -0.67*** 0.54*** -0.13*** -0.14*** 0.06*
***p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10
Table 5.8.: Correlations 2008-2010
NPI age educ income region
NPI
age 0.34***
educ -0.09*** -0.34***
income -0.22*** -0.40*** 0.34***
region -0.14*** -0.02 -0.05* -0.14***
political weights -0.75*** -0.32*** 0.10*** 0.22*** 0.14***
***p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10
Table 5.9.: Correlations 2012
NPI age educ income region
NPI
age 0.45***
educ -0.24*** -0.27***
income -0.40*** -0.37*** 0.34***
region 0.27*** -0.01 -0.08** -0.14***
political weights -0.82*** -0.34*** 0.13*** 0.27*** -0.17***
***p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10
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Abstract
We show empirically how media and voter satisfaction with government performance in-
fluence voting behavior in the Russian parliamentary elections from 2003–2011. In terms
of probabilistic voting models, we investigate retrospective, policy, and non-policy voting
motives. We use satisfaction with government performance as a component for retrospecti-
ve voting. We take into account media as an important determinant of non-policy motives
because of a great bias of the Russian media toward the pro-Kremlin party. Based on
relative marginal effects, we derive indices that measure non-policy, policy, and retrospec-
tive voting components. Empirically, we confirm that the considered voting components
are strongly pronounced by value of satisfaction with government performance and media.
The more the satisfaction of voters, the more the non-policy voting is and the less the poli-
cy and retrospective voting. As a whole, we showed that accountability of the government
falls over time.
6.1. Introduction
Two mechanisms government capture and a lack of government accountability lead to the
biased policy and arise from low political awareness based on the bad informational level
of voters (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2002). In addition to a social organization of voters
(Lohmann, 1998; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1987; Huckfeldt et al., 2002, 2004), the media
have a great impact on voting behavior because they influence public opinion (Baron, 2006;
Besley and Prat, 2006). In addition to media, we take into account a voter’s satisfaction
with government performance, since, in contrast to media and public opinion, satisfaction
is internally determined by voters. Therefore, a consideration of satisfaction is crucial for
understanding retrospective voting motives, especially if the information space is strongly
biased toward a government party but people do not believe the media and vote due to their
feelings about perceived welfare. Thus, the goal of this paper is to investigate individual
voting motives based on panel data from Russian parliamentary elections in the period
2003–2011.
Reviewing the relevant literature, the first strand of studies devoted to the effects of
mass media on public opinion and voter behavior is enormous. While some studies inves-
tigate empirically the effects of mass media on voting behavior in western democracies
(Wagner, 1983; Mutz, 1992; Dalton et al., 1998; Beck et al., 2002; Schmitt-Beck, 03; Ger-
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ber et al., 2006; DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2006; McDonald Ladd, 2010; Schmitt-Beck and
Mackenrodt, 2010; McCombs, 2004), other studies empirically research mass media and
running democratic processes in transforming and developing countries by using not only
descriptive but also quantitative methods (Voltmer, ed, 2006; Bourgault, 1995; Hyden et
al., eds, 2003; Gunther and Mughan, 2000; Zasurskii, 2004; White et al., 2005; Enikolopov
et al., 2010). Moreover, some studies derive a theoretical basis to explain the effects of
mass media on public opinion and elections (Baron, 2006; Besley and Prat, 2006; Petrova,
2008; Chan and Suen, 2009; Corneo, 2006). For example, Besley and Prat (2006) develops
a theoretical model produced by a number of predictions on the relationship between fea-
tures of the media industry, media capture, and political outcomes. This model provides a
link between media capture and government accountability. The author discusses the role
of the media in achieving government accountability, pointing to the important factors
of reducing media capture: media pluralism and independent ownership of media. In this
model, media capture endogenously determined affects the voters’ information and, hence,
their voting decision. The baseline of the model is a pure adverse-selection model, where
the policy outcome is a function solely of the politician’s type based on an intrinsic ability
to produce public goods or steal resources from voters. In equilibrium, the bargaining game
determines whether the media are an effective information provider: If the media receive a
transfer in exchange for silence, media is defined as captured, and otherwise as independent.
Media capture affects political outcome represented in the model by turnover, defined as
the probability that an incumbent is replaced by a challenger, and by voter welfare.
The second strand of studies is devoted to an empirical and theoretical analysis of econo-
mic (retrospective) voting on political behavior and elections (Fiorina, 1978, 1981; Powell
and Whitten, 1993; Anderson, 2000; Tucker, 2006; Gomez and Wilson, 2001, 2003). An in-
fluence of economic circumstances on voter behavior is evident (Fiorina, 1978, 1981; Powell
and Whitten, 1993; Anderson, 2000; Tucker, 2006). Researchers distinguish between so-
ciotropic and egocentric measures of economic perception. While the sociotropic questions
are related to perceptions of voters about the economic situation in a country, egocentric
questions refer to the individual financial situation. Thus, Anderson (2000) provides an
empirical model based on individual-level cross-national data and ascertains that econo-
mic voting is stronger in countries with a higher level of government responsibility and
better clarity of this responsibility. This indicates that transparency and clarity of rules
motivate voters to vote more retrospectively. Sociotropic economic effects on government
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party voting consistently outperformed egocentric ones in countries with lower as well as
higher government responsibility. Further, Gomez and Wilson (2001) show that political
choice depends not only on sociotropic or egocentric parameters but also on an ability of
voters to attribute causal responsibility for changes in both personal and national econo-
mic conditions, i.e. on a level of political sophistication. The sophistication level of voters
in turn is dependent on their information level. The authors also confirm a thesis about a
better and more consistent evaluation of candidates based on sociotropic measures, where-
as egocentric voting generally occurs only among the more politically sophisticated voters.
Since egocentric voting is dependent on the sophistication (informational) level of voters
(Gomez and Wilson, 2001), which we do not know from our data, in this work we use a
sociotropic measure reflecting voters’ satisfaction with government performance calculated
by factor analysis.
6.1.1. Public Opinion and Voter Beliefs in Russia
The main principals that should be used as instruments for effective democratic output,
e.g. freedom are injured in Russia. Moreover, the beliefs of Russian voters about freedom
are also biased. Thus, in a BBC survey from 2007, 47 percent of Russians put stability
first, while 39 percent chose freedom, compared to Western European countries, where
the overwhelming majority believes press freedom is most important. Moreover, although
Russians are not strong advocates of media freedom and do not generally believe in having
a say in news reporting decisions, 57 percent of Russians believe that media ownership is
a major issue because the owner’s political views often emerge in the news. As can be
seen, Russians are ambiguously related to the actual political system, since they are in a
dilemma over the choice between stability or freedom, a dilemma that is being reinforced
by the pro-Kremlin media.
Thus, the nature of Russian beliefs has a very biased character, essentially enforced by
the lack of information freedom in the media landscape. Regarding the current situation
in information space, we note that there is generally a very low level of debate; hence,
meaningful criticism of the authorities is absent. This is due to a lack of access to critical
media as well as popularity of TV media largely controlled by the Kremlin. Moreover, the
current results of the Levada Centre survey (Volkov and Goncharov, 2014) show that the
internet as a source of information cannot currently substitute the traditional mass media
(television, radio, newspapers). Even in Moscow, TV remains a monopoly for formation of
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public opinion within the country: 90 percent of Russians mostly get news from the TV, 25
percent from their friends and relatives, 24 percent from the internet, and 19 percent from
newspapers. According to analysis of the Levada Center, half of the population receives
news mainly from one source, every fifth (20 percent) from two, 17 percent from three,
and 12 percent use more than three sources. For those who receive a one-sided opinion
about the world, the main information channel is the TV (85 percent). Thus, the most
poorly informed Russians largely depend on TV, whereas the information sources are
relatively more various for the inhabitants of Moscow and other big cities as well as for
better-educated and well-earning respondents. Further, 57 percent of survey participants
are regular internet users (for Moscow 73 percent), whereby only half of regular network
users, i.e. one in every three Russians, uses the internet to read news, while other internet
users see it as a means for communication or entertainment. Moreover, 70 percent of
Russians think that federal mass media spoke objectively about the recent political events
in Ukraine and in the Crimea (22 percent „objectively“, 48 percent „mostly objectively“).
The authors explain the great trust for television springs from its repeating the same
information: The more the propaganda and the less the count of alternative sources, the
more people start believing in it.
6.1.2. Hypotheses
That the voters’ preferences are biased in favor of the pro-Kremlin party is confirmed.
Regarding the effects of media on voters’ preferences in Russia, White et al. (2005) indicate
that media exposure influences voting behavior: Those who watch state television regularly
are much more likely to support the pro-Kremlin party. Further, voters of the ruling
party are more likely than nearly all others to think the state television is objective and
trustworthy. Enikolopov et al. (2010) show that in the parliamentary election of 1999,
independent TV was able to decrease aggregate votes for the ruling party as well as
increase the combined vote for major opposition parties. But the effects of media and
voters’ satisfaction on different motives of voting behavior in Russia over time have not
been provided yet.
In this study, we develop a framework for an empirical approach. To confirm our hy-
potheses (see below), we estimate a probabilistic voting model applying a latent class
approach using the Russian panel data of the European Social Survey (ESS) from the
rounds of 2006–2012. We distinguish between three components of voting motives: poli-
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cy, non-policy, and retrospective. The policy voting component refers to the classic policy
space model (Downs, 1957), where the voters prefer parties whose positions are close to
their own positions along the policy dimension. The non-policy voting component, i.e.
voters’ political judgment based on the leadership characteristics of a political candidate
(Schofield, 2007; Miller and Shanks, 1996) or lobby activities, is not discussed here in-
depth and related to the constants determined by individual idiosyncratic characteristics.
Finally, the retrospective voting component is based on voters’ satisfaction with govern-
ment performance (Fiorina, 1981). Based on relative marginal effects, we derive indices of
importance of non-policy, policy, and retrospective voting motives.
In terms of theoretical and empirical findings, we formulate the following hypotheses:
1. The biased Russian media positively influences satisfaction with government perfor-
mance since the media (mostly TV) suppresses negative signals about the government
and the ruling party.
2. The biased Russian media negatively influences rational voting behavior, i.e. those
who watch TV relatively much should vote more ideologically and in a less policy-
oriented (and less retrospective) way.
3. A greater satisfaction negatively influences rational voting behavior, i.e. those who
are more satisfied with government performance, should vote more ideologically and
in a less policy-oriented (and less retrospective) way, since they are assumed to be
non-informed about government performance.
4. The voters of the government party should watch more TV, be more satisfied, and
vote more ideologically.
Moreover, we derive a theoretical approach and confirm it. However, an empirical part
is central to this work, since a goal of this paper is to investigate the effects of media and
voters’ satisfaction on voting behavior over time. We try to better understand hidden po-
litical processes running in government accountability as well as in the political awareness
of Russian voters.
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6.2. An Informational Rationale for the Importance of Policy versus
Non-policy Voting: A Theoretical Framework
We relate the relative importance of policy when compared to policy preferences with voter
uncertainty regarding the impact of policy on voters’ welfare. Voters can be separated into
different social groups J = 1, .., ng. There are two parties, denoted as A and B. In the
Downsian tradition, parties announce policies prior to the election and are assumed to
credibly commit to these once elected. Voters engage in probabilistic voting, i.e. a voter
j ∈ J of group J will vote for party A as long as:
W J(XA)−W J(XB) + αJjA − αJjB > 0 (6.1)
W J(Xk) denote voter j′s welfare derived from the policy platform Xk, announced by
party k=A,B.
While political economists interpret non-policy factors as ideological preferences (Pers-
son and Tabellini, 2000), political scientists interpret non-policy factors as valence percei-
ved by individual voters (Hinich and Munger, 1997; Schofield, 2003).
We relate the relative importance of non-policy when compared to policy preferences in
voter uncertainty regarding the impact of policy on voters’ welfare. To this end, we assume
for simplicity’s sake that voters’ policy preferences correspond to one-dimensional spatial
policy preferences:
W J(XA) = −|Y J − ZA|, ZA = T (XA)
ZA is the policy outcome, where Y J is the preferred policy outcome of voters from group
J . T (XA) denotes political technology describing the technical transformation of policy
into outcomes.
Now, voters are uncertain regarding the true political technology. To describe this uncer-
tainty, we assume the following simple stochastic relation between policy XA and outcome
ZA (Gilligan and Krehbielm, 1989):
ZA = XA + ω,
where ω is a stochastic variable. For simplicity, we assume ω is uniformly distributed
between the interval [− 12σ , 12σ ], i.e. we assume ω is uniformly distributed with a zero mean
180
6. Satisfaction and Media as Determinants of Voting Behavior
and variance of 12σ .
With assumption d = Y J −XA, it follows
W J(XA) = −|d− ω|
Accordingly, the expected utility for voters from policy X, EU(X), is then:
EU(X) = −σ
1/2σ∫
−1/2σ
|d− ω| dω = −σ(
d∫
−1/2σ
(d− ω) dω −
1/2σ∫
d
(d− ω) dω)
Thus, it follows from integration:
EU(X) = −σd

d∫
−1/2σ
dω −
1/2σ∫
d
dω
− σ

1/2σ∫
d
ωdω −
d∫
−1/2σ
ωdω

After rearrangement, it follows:
EU(X) = −σd
(
d− (−1/2σ)− (1/2σ − d)
)
− σ2
( 1
4σ2 − d
2 − (d2 − 14σ2
)
= −(σd2 + 14σ )
Accordingly, the higher the uncertainty, i.e. the higher the variance of ω and the lower
the density σ, the lower is the weight of the policy preferences when compared to the non-
policy preferences, i.e. the less informed a voter, the more non-policy-oriented her vote
will be ceteris paribus.
6.3. Discrete Choice Models
Discrete choice models derived in a random utility model (RUM) framework assume that
the decision maker chooses between two or more discrete alternatives and behaves as an
expected utility maximizer. In the case of spatial models, the voter supports the candidate
or the party that maximizes his combination of measured policy-related utilities and his
unmeasured utilities (Adams et al., 2005). Assume there are J alternatives for a decision
maker. Thus, the decision maker i chooses the party j if and only if:
Ui(j) > Ui(j′),∀j 6= j′. (6.2)
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In random utility models, one presumes that the utility Ui(j) provided to individual i by
party j is composed of a deterministic component Vi(j), which can be calculated based
on observed characteristics, and a stochastic error component ij , which is unobserved, so
that the formula for a random utility model determining only policy factors is given by:
Ui(j) = Vi(j) + ij , (6.3)
where ij is a voter-specific random utility term that represents unmeasured components of
the voter i’s utility for a party j. Note that in all discrete choice models, the absolute level
of utility is irrelevant. The choice probability is Pij = Prob(Ui(j) > Ui(j′)) = Prob(Ui(j)−
Ui(j′) > 0), which depends only on the difference in utility and not its absolute level.
The conditional logit model (McFadden, 1974) can be utilized to estimate these proba-
bilities if the random terms are assumed to be independently distributed Type I extreme
value variates. Let yit denote the value of the dependent variable for individual i at repli-
cation t, which can take on values 1 ≤ j ≤ J . We use vector notation yi, zcovi , dattit , kpreit to
refer to all responses, all covariate values for individual i, and the attribute and predictor
values corresponding to individual i at replication t. The conditional logit model for the
response probabilities has the form (Vermunt and Magidson, 2005):
P (yit = j|dattit ,kpreit ) =
exp(Vit(j))∑
J exp(Vit(j′))
, (6.4)
where Vit(j) is the systematic component in the utility of alternative j for individual i at
replication t. The term Vit(j) is a linear function of an alternative-specific constant αj ,
predictor effects γlj , and attribute effects βn:
Vit(j) = αj +
∑
l
γljklit +
∑
n
βnd
n
itj , (6.5)
where the squared distance between the voter i at location xi and a candidate j at
location sj in a one-dimensional space n is calculated in the following way:
dnij = −(xni − snj )2. (6.6)
182
6. Satisfaction and Media as Determinants of Voting Behavior
The regression parameters corresponding to the predictor effects γlj are alternative-
specific.
In a latent class or finite-mixture variant of the conditional model, it is assumed that
individuals belong to different latent classes that differ with respect to the parameters
appearing in the linear model for Vit(j). In order to indicate that the choice probabilities
depend on class membership x, the logistic model is now of the form:
P (yit = j|x,dattit ,kpreit ) =
exp(Vit|x(j))∑
J exp(Vit|x(j′))
, (6.7)
Here, Vit|x(j) is the systematic component in the utility of alternative j, given that
individual i belong to latent class x. As can be seen, the logit regression coefficients are
class-specific and the linear model for Vit|x(j) in this specific case is:
Vit|x(j) = αxj +
∑
l
γxljklit +
∑
n
βxnd
n
itj . (6.8)
In addition to the attributes and predictors, we include in our latent class analysis (LCA)
another type of explanatory variable covariates in the latent class model. While attributes
enter in the regression model for choices, covariates are used to predict class membership.
When covariates are included in the model, the probability density occupies the following
form (Vermunt and Magidson, 2005):
P (yi) =
X∑
x=1
P (x|zcovi )
Ti∏
t=1
P (yi|x,dattit ,kpreit ), (6.9)
where class membership of individual i is now assumed to depend on a set of covariates
denoted by zcovi . The class membership probability is: P (x | zcovi ) is:
P (x | zcovi ) =
exp(ηx|zi)∑
X exp(ηx′|zi)
(6.10)
with linear term
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ηx|zi = r0x +
H∑
h=1
rhxz
cov
ih (6.11)
Here, r0x denotes the constant corresponding to latent class x and rhx is the effect of
the hth covariate for class x.
6.3.1. Marginal Effects
To analyze the extent to which non-policy voting is greater than policy-oriented and retro-
spective voting, which impacts individual characteristics have on non-policy voting, and
whether we can find the essential differences in all three voting components over the years,
we calculate, first, marginal effects for all three components: policy-oriented, non-policy-
oriented, and retrospective. Second, based on these components, we are able to define the
relative importance of each voting vis-à-vis the two others.
Thus, the marginal effects of an independent policy alternative-specific variable dnij in a
policy dimension n for individual i and party j on the choice probabilities is:
∂Pij
∂dnij
= Pij(1− Pij)βn
For the whole policy space with N variables, the total differential of the probability can
be gained accordingly:
dPij =
N∑
n=1
∂Pij
∂dnij
ddnij = Pij (1− Pij)
N∑
n=1
βn
so that the absolute marginal effect in the policy dimension for individual i, party j,
and class x is:
PMEijx = Pijx(1− Pijx)|
N∑
n=1
βnx|
This means how sensitively a voter reacts to the changing distance between one party
and him.
Further, we calculate the marginal effects for retrospective preferences (ReME) reflected
in individual satisfaction si by:
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∂Pij
∂si
= Pij (1− Pij) (γj − γk)
with
γk =
J∑
k 6=j
[
Pik∑J
k 6=j Pik
γk
]
so that the absolute marginal effect for retrospective voting for individual i, party j,
and class x is
ReMEijx = Pijx (1− Pijx) |γjx − γkx|
.
In the same way, we calculate the marginal effects for non-policy preferences (NME)
reflected in constants. In terms of the constants being party-specific, we obtain for the
unobservable non-policy preferences ti for individual i and party j the following NME:
NMEijx = Pijx (1− Pijx) |αjx − αkx|
with
αk =
J∑
k 6=j
[
Pik∑J
k 6=j Pik
αk
]
Thus, we obtained three components (PME, NME, ReME) using which we are able
to find a relative importance of one component relative to both others. In this way, we
calculate relative marginal effects to the sum of both other marginal effects. The composed
indices PV, NPV, and RV reflect the importance of policy, non-policy, and retrospective
voting accordingly:
PV ijx =
PMEijx
NMEijx +ReMEijx
(6.12)
NPV ijx =
NMEijx
PMEijx +ReMEijx
(6.13)
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RV ijx =
ReMEijx
PMEijx +NMEijx
(6.14)
For example, the index PV ijx measures the extent to which policy voting is more im-
portant than non-policy and retrospective voting together for individual i related to party
j if the individual belongs to class x. Further, we weight the party and class-specific indi-
ces with the average party share and individual posterior class probability to obtain three
weighted indices for each voter PV i, NPV i, RV i.
6.4. Empirical Model
6.4.1. Heterogeneous Preferences in Random Utility Models and Latent Class
Analysis
Like economic analysis estimating consumers’ heterogeneous preferences for goods, the
political economy is interested to find voters’ heterogeneous preferences characterized by
their individual characteristics. When unobserved heterogeneity in the population is fore-
cast, this leads to a class of response models based on random utility maximization (RUM)
(McFadden and Train, 2000). There are mainly two types of models based on the idea of
using a mixture of a simple underlying model, such as multinomial logit, over the distribu-
tion of preferences: mixed multinomial logit models (MMLM) and latent class logit models
(LCLM). While in MMLM this distribution is continuous, in the latent class context a fini-
te number of classes is used to express the heterogeneity (Hess et al., 2011). Both types of
models are RUM models generalizing standard logit by allowing the parameter associated
with each observed variable to vary randomly across individuals. Although mixed logit
models explicitly account in a sense for heterogeneity, LCA is better suited to explain the
sources of heterogeneity that relate to the characteristics of individual consumers (Boxall
and Adamowicz, 2002). Hence, we concentrate in this paper on LCA, since it uncovers
unobserved heterogeneity in a population and aims to find meaningful groups of voters
that are similar in their responses to measured variables. In an LCA, the parameter hete-
rogeneity across individuals is modeled by a discrete distribution or a set of classes. The
estimation results in a fixed number of classes; thereby, the parameters of the statistical
model differ across these latent classes formed by unobserved latent variables. Thus, the
preferences of voters are homogeneous within each latent class, but can vary between the
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classes.
The latent class estimation of this paper was realized in Latent GOLD Choice 4.0,
developed by Vermunt and Magidson (2005). The regression model that is used in Latent
GOLD Choice 4.0 is the conditional logit model developed by McFadden (1974) (Vermunt
and Magidson, 2005). Latent GOLD Choice implements a nonparametric variant of the
random-coefficient or mixed conditional logit model (McFadden and Train, 2000; Vermunt
and Magidson, 2005). From three possible methods in Latent GOLD Choice 4.0 based on
different response formats (first choice, ranking task, rating task), the first choice format
was selected as the most suitable method concerning the assumption that each choice set
has the same number of alternatives. Since random utility theory is employed to the model
choices among a set of substitutes or alternatives, we first provide its formalization.
6.4.2. Case of Russia
Data
The data used for the empirical analysis is derived from the European Social Survey (ESS).
The data for Russia are available from Round 3 (2006), Round 4 (2008), Round 5 (2010),
and Round 6 (2012). The ESS questionnaire consists of a collection of questions on the
different themes (socio-demographics, subjective well-being, politics, etc.). For our analysis
based on the probabilistic modeling of political choice, we selected the relevant questions
and included only the data for which the party choice of the interviewee was available.
The relevant questions for political choice were: „Some people don’t vote nowadays for one
reason or another. Did you vote in the last [country] national election?,“ „Which party did
you vote for in that election?.“ Therefore, the validation of data was referred to the most
recent national parliamentary elections held in 2003, 2007, and 2011. The relevant parties
and their results at the latest elections are summarized in Table 6.1. As can be seen from
Table 6.1, the conducted data sets from 2008 and 2010 are very similar and related to
election 2007. Therefore, we consolidate both data sets to one sample in our next work
and undertake a few steps (e.g. using interaction effects) to specify the results.
Moreover, Table 6.1 shows that our data pointed to some bias in favor of ruling party
United Russian (ER) because of regional distortions (the ruling party is more favored
in distant regions). Further, it can be also expected that the voters of the ruling party
are more willing to be interviewed while the voters of small parties are more worried
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Table 6.1.: Party Seats in Duma after Elections 2003–2011 and party shares in our sample
.
Party (Ideology) Abb. Elect. Sample Elect. Sample Sample Elect. Sample
2003 2006 2007 2008 2010 2011 2012
% % % % % % %
United Russia ER 37.57 64.67 64.30 75.02 69.90 49.32 61.6
(centrism)
Communist Party KPRF 12.61 18.82 11.57 14.43 16.23 19.19 19.7
(socialism)
Lib.-Democ. Party LDPR 11.45 7.25 8.14 6.39 7.88 11.67 8.5
(national-cons.)
Rodina Rodina 9.02 4.84 - - - - -
(socialism)
Union of Right Forces SPS 3.97 2.84 0.96 - - - -
(liberal-cons.)
Just Russia SR - - 7.74 3.66 4.81 13.24 7.9
(social-democ.)
Yabloko Yabloko 4.30 1.58 1.59 0.5 1.18 3.43 2.3
(social-democ.)
others 21.08 - 5.7 - - 3.15 -
Total number of voters - 951 - 1393 1269 - 1191
about potential consequences from the honest declaration of their political preferences.
For that reason, our analysis includes not only the parties that obtained a relatively large
weight in the voting structure, but also the parties that did not pass the 5% threshold
(since 2007, the 7% threshold). For example, the opposition party with a liberal ideology
Yabloko received parliamentary seats for the last time in 2003. The probabilistic analysis
of Russian parliamentary elections based on the ESS is interesting because of findings
regarding voters’ true motives and the determinants of ideological voting.
In our analysis, we use two kinds of variables to investigate policy- and non-policy-
oriented voting.
1. Policy variables
In the ESS questionnaire, interviewees were asked about their self-placement concerning
five political dimensions using the following scales:
• Left − Right − Scala (L-R): In politics people sometimes talk of ’left’ and ’right’.
Where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means
the right?
Further, interviewees were asked to what extent they agree or disagree with each of
the four following statements, where 1 means „agree strongly“ and 5 means „disagree
strongly“:
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• Economical dimension (Eco): Government should reduce differences in income le-
vels.
• Social−cultural dimension (Soc): Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their
own life as they wish.
• Democracy (Dem): Political parties that wish to overthrow democracy should be
banned.
• Modern science (Mod): Modern science can be relied on to solve our environmental
problems.
Moreover, the following issues about political system in country were available only from
round 6, where interviewees used a scale from 0 (does not apply at all) to 10 (applies
completely):
• Free election: In country national elections are free and fair.
• Free alternatives: In country different political parties offer clear alternatives to
one another.
• Free critic: In country opposition parties are free to criticize the government.
• Free discuss: Voters discuss politics with people they know before deciding how to
vote.
• Gov. decision: In country the government explains its decisions to voters.
• Courts: In country the courts treat everyone the same.
Further, we undertake a reduction of policy space number to better specify political
preferences. Taking the positions of voters on the five issues into a factor analysis, we
constructed a two-dimensional policy space according to the following results 6.2:
In this way, we achieved factor values reproducing voter positions in a two-dimensional
space. The high values of the first factor represent economic and social freedom but also
„right“ political preferences. Hence, this dimension can be described as not liberal versus
liberal. For 2006-2010, the second factor with high factor loadings for the issues of modern
science and democracy represent voters who disagree with both questions; hence, we call
this dimension progressive versus conservative. For 2012, the second factor represents voter
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Table 6.2.: Factor analysis
.
2006 (El.2003) 2008 (El.2007) 2010 (El.2007) 2012 (El.2011)
Issues Fac.1 Fac.2 Fac.1 Fac.2 Fac.1 Fac.2 Fac.1 Fac.2
not lib. progr. not lib. progr. not lib. progr. not lib. polit.
/liberal /cons. /liberal /cons. /liberal /cons. /liberal system
Social-cultural dim. -0.689 0.151 -0.717 0.096 -0.677 0.294 -0.601 0.045
Economic. dim. 0.555 0.385 0.744 0.179 0.723 0.226 0.774 -0.030
Left-Right-Scala 0.647 -0.081 0.330 -0.529 0.484 -0.037 0.254 0.182
Modern science -0.152 0.735 0.123 0.691 -0.170 0.723 - -
Democracy 0.026 0.688 0.066 0.617 0.104 0.706 - -
Free elections - - - - - - 0.137 0.764
Free alternatives - - - - - - -0.023 0.760
Free critic - - - - - - -0.015 0.758
Free discuss - - - - - - -0.060 0.742
Gov.decision - - - - - - 0.236 0.707
Courts - - - - - - 0.414 0.529
beliefs about the freedom and fairness of the political system in the country. The position
of each party in this two-dimensional space was calculated as the mean of the voters casting
a vote for the corresponding party (Schofield and Zakharov, 2010). Furthermore, knowing
the positions of voters and parties for each of two dimensions, it is possible to calculate
square (Euclidean) distances, so that these policy variables (12 distances for 2006 and 10
distances for 2008–2012) are taken as attributes in LCA.
2. Retrospective variables
We also take into account the data reflecting the voters’ assessment of government
performance. Therefore, we put the three variables of voter satisfaction in a factor analysis
and obtained one factor. The results of factor analysis for voter satisfaction over all years
are in Table 6.3. The voters should respond to the following questions on a scale from 0
meaning „extremely unsatisfied“ to 10 meaning „extremely satisfied“:
• How satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in country? (economy)
• What do you think overall about the state of education in country nowadays? (education)
• What do you think overall about the state of health services in country nowadays? (health)
Table 6.3.: Factor analysis for satisfaction variables: factor loading matrix
.
Issues Election 2003 (data 2006) Election 2007 (data 2008-10) Election 2011 (data 2012)
economy 0.757 0.764 0.718
education 0.850 0.854 0.858
health 0.871 0.868 0.879
Variance,% 68.4 68.9 67.5
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3. Explanatory variables
The further data of socio-economic characteristics, regional differences, and voter infor-
mational level were also available for analysis. We used these as explanatory and class-
membership-determining variables:
1. Age (Age)1
2. Education (Education): 1=less than lower secondary, 2=lower secondary, 3=lower tier upper
secondary, 4=upper tier upper secondary, 5=advanced vocational, 6=lower tertiary educati-
on, BA level, 7=higher tertiary education, >= MA level
3. Total monthly income in Euro (Income): 1=Less than 6000 roubles, 2=6001-9000 roubles,
3=9001-12000 roubles, 4=12001-15000 roubles, 5=15001-18000 roubles, 6=18001-21000 roubles,
7=21001-25000 roubles, 8=25001-30000 roubles, 9=30001-40000 roubles, 10=More than 40000
roubles
4. Region (Region): 1=Center, 2=North and North West, Volgo-Vyatsky, Central-Chernozhem,
3=Volga, North Caucasus, Ural, 4= West Siberia, East Siberia, Far East
5. Information (Info): Further, the eight following questions for information were included in
factor analysis to determine factors for information sources:
a) On an average weekday, how much time, in total, do you spend watching television?
(tv-t)
b) How much of your time watching television is spent watching news or programs about
politics and current affairs? (tv-p)
c) How much time, in total, do you spend listening to the radio? (radio-t)
d) How much of your time listening to the radio is spent listening to news or programs
about politics and current affairs? (radio-p)
e) How much time, in total, do you spend reading the newspapers? (news-t)
f) How much of this time is spent reading about politics and current affairs? (news-p)
g) How often do you use the internet, the World Wide Web or e-mail - whether at home
or at work - for your personal use? (internet)
h) How interested would you say you are in politics (pol-int.): 1=Not at all interested...
4=Very interested
i) In country the media are free to criticize the government (m-free): 0=the statement
does not apply at all... 10=statement applies completely
1Moreover, for data set 2008-2010 we use interaction effects such as year*age, year*income etc, where
year is a dummy variable with value 1 for 2008 and 2 for 2010
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j) In country the media provide citizens with reliable information to judge the government
(m-real.): 0=the statement does not apply at all... 10=statement applies completely2
As can be seen from Table 6.4, issues relating to information sources and informational
level were loaded in three factors: newspapers, radio, and TV versus internet for 2006-2010
as well as in two factors for 2012. Note that the question about the political interest of
voters is related to the factor newspapers. The factor media for 2012 has high values for
the people thinking that the media in Russia is free and reliable; this factor creates great
interest for our research.
Table 6.4.: Factor analysis for information sources: factor loading matrix
.
2006 2008 2010 2012
Issues Fac.1 Fac.2 Fac.3 Fac.1 Fac.2 Fac.3 Fac.1 Fac.2 Fac.3 Fac.1 Fac.2
Newsp. Radio TV Newsp. Radio TV Newsp. Radio TV Media TV
news-p 0.897 0.017 0.012 0.867 0.085 -0.051 0.900 0.023 -0.017 - -
news-t 0.846 0.062 -0.064 0.826 0.072 -0.033 0.859 0.077 -0.061 - -
pol-int. 0.582 0.110 0.193 0.605 0.078 0.059 0.511 0.120 0.257 - -
radio-t 0.016 0.927 -0.022 0.041 0.908 0.004 0.063 0.913 -0.074 - -
radio-p 0.154 0.903 0.068 0.171 0.882 0.049 0.116 0.907 0.050 - -
internet 0.065 0.085 -0.476 0.150 0.061 -0.501 0.032 0.096 -0.487 - -
tv-t 0.037 0.077 0.827 0.059 0.071 0.833 -0.038 0.054 0.805 0.065 0.941
tv-p 0.289 0.138 0.743 0.459 0.137 0.603 0.339 0.080 0.719 -0.037 0.614
m-free - - - - - - - - - 0.877 0.032
m-real. - - - - - - - - - 0.877 0.015
Thus, using three kinds of variables, we try to explain the parliamentary elections in Rus-
sia by means of the policy, non-policy, and retrospective voting factors. The explanatory
variables are responsible for determining class affiliation, while the policy and retrospec-
tive variables are in the main model. All other remaining factors are unobservable and
contained, therefore, in constants.
Results
Parties and voters
First, we look at the distributions of satisfaction for different years arising from the
separated factor analyses. From Figure 6.1, we see that voters of the Kremlin party ER
are significantly more satisfied than the voters of other parties. Moreover, the discrepancy
in satisfaction level between ER voters and other voters enlarged in 2011. To find a possible
change in satisfaction, we also perform one-factor analysis for all years. The results can be
2Both last questions were available only for 2012
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seen on Plot 4 of Figure 6.1. There are no essential shifts in the average level of satisfaction
over time.
Figure 6.1.: Distribution of voter satisfaction for all years and over years
It is interesting to see how far satisfaction is correlated with other parameters (see
Appendix). For example, the correlation between satisfaction and age becomes weaker from
-0.11***(2003) to -0.08***(2007) and not more significant in 2011. Meanwhile, correlation
between satisfaction and income becomes less essential: The correlation intensity sinks
from 0.13***(2003) to 0.07***(2007) and has no more significance in 2011. Based on it, we
can assume that taking into account only material welfare is no longer sufficient to explain
satisfaction.
Further, the satisfaction level does not depend on a distance of regions to a centre. The
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correlation between satisfaction and intensity of TV watching decreases over time and
does not become more significant in the last two periods, i.e. the widespread opinion that
Kremlin propaganda makes the people more satisfied with government performance is not
correct. On the other hand, the more the people think that the media are free and reliable,
the more they are satisfied (0.31*** in 2011).
Additionally, we consider the relation of information sources to other independent va-
riables. Though a correlation between information sources and satisfaction level is only
fragmentarily significant (see Appendix), the appointed information variables are well-
correlated with individual characteristics. For example, the better-educated voters read
more newspapers (0.17*** in 2003, 0.14*** in 2007). Note that the newspaper source is
most related to education and not to age, since the older persons have less funds to buy
newspapers. Also, one can see the strongest cohesion between the TV source and the older
voters, equivalent to one between the internet source and the younger generation (0.29***,
0.39***, 0.27*** in 2003–2011 accordingly). Moreover, TV is watched more by low-skilled
and low-earning voters. This is interesting for media freedom. It is not related to individual
characteristics, except to satisfaction with government performance.
Model
We estimated LCLM with a different number of classes. To decide on the best number of
classes, we consider the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information
criterion (BIC). A formal comparison in terms of performance between AIC and BIC is very
difficult, particularly because AIC and BIC address different questions. BIC assumes that
the true generation model is in the set of candidate models. Most simulations that prefer
BIC over AIC assume that the true model is in the candidate set and that it is relatively
low-dimensional. In contrast, AIC does not assume that any of the candidate models is
necessarily true in order to make the best possible predictions. Most simulations that favor
AIC over BIC assume that reality is highly or infinitely dimensional (Wagenmakers and
Farrell, 2004). Markon and Krueger (2004) noted that AIC performs relatively well in
small samples, but is inconsistent and does not improve in performance in large samples
while BIC appears poorly in small samples, but is consistent and improves in performance
with a larger sample size (De-Graft Acquah, 2010). Since our sample is large and two-class
models are more stable, we chose the model based on BIC (Table 6.5).
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Table 6.5.: Fit for different number of latent classes
Election 2003 Election 2007 Election 2011
Model 1 (2006) Model 2 (2008-2010) Model 3 (2012)
BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC
2 cl. model 2064.31 1908.87 4622.73 4457.90 2641.02 2503.79
3 cl. model 2165.77 1913.18 4696.03 4425.24 2718.55 2494.92
Estimation results for the latent class model are presented in Table 6.6. We consider the
same two-class model for each year. The model includes constants, attributes (Euclidean
distances in two dimensions – liberalism as well as either conservatism or political system),
predictor as satisfaction level, and seven individual characteristics (age, education, income,
region, and information sources for Models 1 and 3 as well as corresponding interaction
variables for Model 2) determining class membership probabilities.
The results indicate heterogeneity of party preferences across the two latent classes and
differ from year to year. As can be seen from Table 6.6, there is policy-oriented voting in all
four years and according to both dimensions. A negative sign for an attribute means that
the less the Euclidean distance between the voter and the party in this or that dimension,
the greater the likelihood for the party to be elected. Further, we see strong retrospective
voting in Model 2, i.e. voting according to satisfaction with government performance: The
more the voters are satisfied, the more probability for voting for the pro-Kremlin party
ER. However, since we have more than two parties, we are able to find the comparative
advantages for ER only after calculating marginal effects.
As can be seen, class membership probability is mainly determined significantly by the
following variables: age, income, region, and information sources. As can be seen from
Table 6.6, while in 2003 the „older“ class voted in a more policy-oriented way than the
„younger“ class, in 2007 the situation changed, i.e. the class determined by the lower
age voted in a more policy-oriented way. In 2011, the class of the younger people, who
earned better and perceived the media as non-free, voted in a more policy-oriented manner
according to the dimension political system.
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Non-Policy, Policy, and Retrospective Voting
To analyze which impacts the individual and regional characteristics have on policy,
non-policy, and retrospective voting for each year as well as over the years, we calculate
the indices according to Formulas 6.12, 6.13 and 6.14. These indices imply the extent to
which one component, e.g. policy voting, is greater than the two other components. In this
way, we receive tree indicators for each year and each voter, and can examine the relation
of these indicators to voter characteristics.
First, we consider the relationship between individual satisfaction level and different
voting components (Plots 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4). On increasing satisfaction with government
performance, the retrospective voting falls in all periods (plot 6.2): Accordingly, the cor-
relation coefficients in elections 2003, 2007, and 2011 are -0.36***, -0.22***, and -0.20***.
Thus, the more the voters are satisfied, the less the component of retrospective voting is
compared to both others, i.e. the less they vote according to their satisfaction and opinion
about government performance.
Figure 6.2.: Relationship between satisfaction with government performance and the retrospective voting
Figure 6.3.: Relationship between satisfaction with government performance and non-policy voting
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Figure 6.4.: Relationship between satisfaction with government performance and policy voting
Further, Plot 6.3 shows that with rising satisfaction, the non-policy voting permanently
increases (0.28***, 0.42***, 0.53***) and the connection between both becomes stronger
over time. Finally, with increasing satisfaction, we also see a fall in policy voting with a
stronger tendency over time 6.4: -0.22***, -0.26***, -0.31*** accordingly. Thus, we see
that satisfaction level has a permanent effect on individual voting. Thereby, to vote in a
mostly policy-oriented way, people must be extremely unsatisfied. In this regard, people
understanding that the media in Russia is not free vote when voting in a more policy-
oriented way and retrospectively. Hence, the amount of TV watching has a switching effect
on voting components over time: While in 2003 TV watching was positively correlated
with policy voting (0.32***) and negatively with non-policy voting (-0.36***), in 2011 the
situation changed; TV watching became positively related to non-policy voting (0.10***)
and negatively to policy voting (-0.10***).
Thus, on the one hand, we see diverging processes in the satisfaction level of Russian
society over time, e.g. in the stronger relationship between satisfaction and voting com-
ponents reflected, first, in the increasing differences in satisfaction level between the voters
of the Kremlin party and of other parties (Figure 6.1), and second, in increasing heteroge-
neity in satisfaction within the whole population (e.g. satisfaction is not more correlated
with age). On the other hand, we see the changing as well as converging processes in non-
policy (or policy) voting: While in 2003 the relative greater non-policy voting has the most
relevance to younger people from central regions who earn well and watch TV relatively
less, in 2011 the relative greater non-policy voting moves to older people from distant regi-
ons who earn relatively less and watch TV relatively more (Figure 6.5). Logically, we find
a converse process in policy voting converging in a similar way: The disparity in policy
voting has become smaller (Figure 6.6).
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Figure 6.5.: Kernel density estimation for Non-policy voting
Figure 6.6.: Kernel density estimation for Policy voting
Analysis of voting components
First, we look at the correlation between three kinds of voting components. While retro-
spective voting can be defined as a voting process whereby people vote for a party based
on past occurrences and opinions reflected in their actual satisfaction degree, this kind
of voting cannot be clearly related to policy or non-policy preferences, as we see in the
correlation in Tables 6.8, 6.9, and 6.10 (see Appendix). While in 2003 retrospective voting
has a bearing on the non-policy aspect (0.30***), in 2011 it is strongly associated with
policy voting (0.87***). Moreover, we do kernel estimation for all voting components and
years, whereby Figure 6.7 provides interesting results. While the mean non-policy voting
is relatively constant over time (approximately 1.5), the mean retrospective voting com-
ponent increases from about 0.11 (2003 and 2007) to 0.3 (2011). Moreover, we consider a
rapid reduction of the mean policy voting from 1.1 in election 2003 to 0.5 in 2007 and 0.35
in 2011.
199
6. Satisfaction and Media as Determinants of Voting Behavior
Figure 6.7.: Distribution of voting components
Thus, from the correlation in Tables 6.8, 6.9, and 6.10 (see Appendix) it can be seen
that all considered voting components are strongly pronounced by value of satisfaction
level, age, and information resources (especially TV watching and media). For example,
for 2011, the unsatisfied younger people who watch TV relatively less and think that
the Russian media is not free tend to vote in a more policy-oriented way. Hence, we are
also interested to find the extent to which voting components differ between voters of
the Kremlin party ER and other parties. Therefore, we do the plots of kernel estimation
density for these separated sets (Figures 6.8, 6.9, 6.10). Figure 6.8 provides the diverging
process in retrospective voting corresponding also to the divergence of satisfaction. While
in election 2003 there are no significant differences in the means of retrospective voting
between parties, in 2007 there are significant differences in the means by about 0.05 (with
less retrospective voting for Kremlin party). In 2011, these voting differences in the means
are essential by approximately 0.2.
Figure 6.8.: Distributions of Retrospective Voting
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Figure 6.9.: Distributions of Non-policy Voting
Figure 6.10.: Distributions of Policy Voting
Regarding non-policy and policy voting (Figure 6.9 and 6.10), we do not see any changes
but in the permanently greater non-policy voting for the Kremlin party and the dominantly
greater policy voting for other parties. Thus, the voters of the ruling party vote more
ideologically based on their satisfaction as well as their policy preferences.
Capture
Further, using estimated results of latent class models, we investigate implications for
our estimation on voter behavior by analyzing the political weights for each voter. The
political weights reflect a sensitivity of probability on policy issues for the government
party G, since they are calculated only for a ruling party as follows:
giGx = PiGx(1− PiGx)|
N∑
n=1
βnx|
This means how sensitively a voter reacts to the changing distance between government
party and him, i.e. how important the voter is for the party in a political dimension.
The marginal effect over all classes is:
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giG =
X∑
x=1
Pˆ (x|zcovi ) ∗ giGx
where Pˆ (x|zcovi ) represents the voters’ individual class membership probabilities. Finally,
we estimate the political weights as:
giG =
giG∑I
i giG
For the one-class model, the following approximation can be applied:
giG =
giG∑I
i giG
≈ PiG(1− PiG)∑
i PiG(1− PiG)
It follows from this approximation for the one-class model that swing voters (i.e. voters
with a probability to reelect the government party that is close to 0.5) have a particularly
high voting weight. It means such voters are important for policy makers to win a greater
vote share.
Calculating the political weights we find, first, that the political weights permanently
negatively correlate with the non-policy and retrospective voting. It is of special interest to
consider the changing influence of the voters on the policy process: While in 2003 voters
with greater policy voting have the larger political weights (0.83***), i.e. their opinion
about policy issues was essential for the power party to be again elected, this cohesion
drops to 0.41*** in 2007. But in 2011 this relationship is negative, i.e. the more the voters
vote in a policy-oriented way, the less important they are for the power party. This confirms
our hypothesis that the weighing of the power party has increased over time, mainly due
to support from an ideologically oriented population, i.e. accountability of Russian policy
makers has a decreasing tendency. These results correspond with the results from our
previous study.
Further, we present the effective voting weights over the different groups which are more
or less equally distributed, with corresponding relatively low Gini coefficients of 0.178
(2003), 0.154 (2007), and 0.170 (2011). We cannot find great interdependence between
political weights in population, which corresponds to the results of our previous study.
Further, we are keen to investigate by which voter groups the government party is
captured (i.e. which voter groups have relatively higher political weights related to their
population share) and the political importance of which swing voters has increased over
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time. The more that swing voters vote in a policy-oriented way, the more important their
voting and the more strongly their preferences should be taken into account by policy
makers to win their votes. To find out which voter group increasingly gained in political
importance, we calculate capture indices. A straightforward definition of government cap-
ture corresponds to the degree of electoral competition which implies the political weights
of social groups diverge from their corresponding population shares, where the higher the
weight of a social group when compared to its population shares the more this group is
able to capture the government. Hence, we estimate the following capture index for two
voter groups l and m:
CAP l_m =
∑
i∈l gi
Sl∑
i∈m gi
Sm
CAP l_m > 1 means that group l is more able to capture.
Table 6.7 presents the calculated capture indices for different social groups. First, the
results correspond to our previous study: Relatively younger, richer, and better-educated
individuals have relatively higher political weights. Hence, the government seeking reelec-
tion should have more incentives to deliver policies and policy outcomes to these groups by
taking into account their preferences. In reality, this is not applied because of a negative
correlation between effective voting weights and policy components.
Second, based on a relatively low Gini-coefficient we cannot observe a politically strong
group of voters determined by one of the considered individual characteristics having a
permanent impact on the ruling party over time.
Table 6.7.: Capture coefficients over time
Voter groups 2003 2007 2011
(2006) (2008-2010) (2012)
unsatisfied versus satisfied 1.111 1.287 0.955
younger versus older 0.879 1.195 1.009
poorer versus richer 1.230 0.905 0.977
low educated versus higher educated 1.018 0.943 0.979
central versus distant regions 0.919 0.921 0.977
less NP reading versus more NP reading 0.844 0.975 -
less radio versus more radio 0.976 1.062 -
less TV versus more TV 0.849 1.030 0.985
not free media versus free media - - 1.026
Gini-coeff. 0.178 0.154 0.170
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6.5. Conclusion
We develop a theoretical and empirical framework to analyze retrospective, policy- and
non-policy-oriented voting. First, assuming that voters have ideological preferences and
are uncertain about the real positions of the political decision maker, we derive voters’
expected utility function and find that the higher the uncertainty, the lower is the weight of
the policy preferences when compared to the ideological preferences, i.e. the less informed
a voter, the more ideologically she or he votes ceteris paribus. Empirically, we confirm our
theory: The more people think that the Russian media is free, the more ideologically, i.e.
the less policy-oriented and retrospectively they vote.
Our first hypothesis that media (mostly TV) positively affects voters’ satisfaction with
government performance is not confirmed. Surprisingly, TV watching is not correlated with
satisfaction in 2007 and 2011, and is even negatively correlated in 2003. This suggests that
the media have no direct effects on the satisfaction of voters. Voters form their satisfaction
based exclusively on their own feelings and opinion. However, satisfaction is positively
related to whether the media are free. Those people who really think this are more satisfied
(0.31***).
Our second hypothesis that the media influence voting behavior is partly confirmed. We
found the changing process over time: While in 2003 TV watching is positively correlated
with policy voting and negatively with non-policy voting, in 2007–2011 the situation chan-
ges; TV watching is positively related to non-policy voting and negatively to policy voting.
This also confirms the negative influence of TV propaganda on the political awareness of
Russian voters in recent years.
Our third hypothesis is confirmed. The findings support the idea that all voting com-
ponents are strongly pronounced by value of satisfaction with government performance.
The more the satisfaction of voters, the more is the non-policy voting and the less the
policy and retrospective voting. Thereby, we see the reinforcing process over time. The po-
sitive relation between satisfaction and non-policy voting as well as the negative relation
between satisfaction and policy voting increased over all periods. In contrast, a negative
relation between satisfaction and retrospective voting becomes weaker.
Our fourth hypothesis is confirmed too. The voters of the pro-Kremlin party are per-
manently more satisfied with government performance and vote more ideologically com-
pared to voters from other parties, whereby the difference in retrospective voting between
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this party and other parties increase over time.
Our further results are also interesting. We consider that the changes in policy and non-
policy voting proceed between the diverse voter groups. The relatively greater non-policy
motives move over time to older people from distant regions earning relatively less and
watching TV relatively more, whereas the role of centric regions and young voters with
higher education becomes more important for policy-oriented voting.
The retrospective voting motives approach policy motives over time. While retrospective
motives gain in importance, policy motives lose their importance; hence, both are relatively
small and positively correlated in 2011. In contrast, ideological motives remain relatively
constant and high.
Finally, we find that the political weights permanently negatively correlate with the non-
policy and retrospective voting motives. It is of special interest to consider the changing
influence of voters on the policy process. While in 2003 the voters with greater policy
voting dominated the larger political weights (0.83***), i.e. their opinion on policy issues
was essential for the power party to be re-elected, this cohesion drops to 0.41*** in 2007.
In contrast, in 2011 this relationship is negative, i.e. the more the voters vote in a policy-
oriented way, the less important they are for the power party. This points out that the
weight of the power party has increased over time mainly because of the support of an
ideologically oriented population, i.e. the accountability of Russian policy makers
has a decreasing tendency.
Discussion
Based on the findings from our previous study (Petri and Henning, 2014) as well as the
current findings, we would like to discuss a consistency of the results. On the one hand,
in our previous study we found that policy-oriented voting was greater in 2011 compared
to 2003 and 2007, without taking into account retrospective voting. On the other hand,
the results of the current study reveal the decreasing tendency of policy-oriented voting
if retrospective voting is included. The results are not ambiguous. They can really hap-
pen if retrospective voting takes place. Exactly this tendency can be seen in the current
analysis, where retrospective voting rises from 0.11 to 0.3. Moreover, we conclude that the
results of the current study are more objective because of consideration of the retrospective
component.
The latent class approach also provides relatively robust results for two class models,
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since, for example, both studies reveal the same trend in increasing policy motives for
younger people and centric regions.
The future analysis of voting behavior should concentrate on a deeper consideration of
information in the voting process, whereby the deriving of a theoretical model includes
the individual informational level and the deriving of an empirical measure for the infor-
mational level of voters is conceivable. Moreover, the deeper consideration of a dynamic
in probabilistic models is conceivable, for example, by taking satisfaction from a previous
election period into a subsequent election period because of the long-term thinking of
voters and the short-term political actions of politicians who are interested to provide
targetable public goods (Keefer and Khemani, 2005; Tucker, 2006).
Appendix
Table 6.8.: Correlation table for 2006 (Election 2003)
RV NPV PV satis age educ income region newspapers radio tv
RV
NPV 0.30***
PV -0.39*** -0.92***
satis -0.36*** 0.28*** -0.22***
age -0.30*** -0.71*** 0.67*** -0.11***
educ 0.00 0.13*** -0.13*** 0.02 -0.33***
income 0.07* 0.35*** -0.31*** 0.13*** -0.37*** 0.32***
region -0.02 -0.10** 0.10** -0.01 -0.06 0.05 -0.06*
newspapers -0.17*** -0.34*** 0.32*** -0.03 0.09** 0.17*** 0.08* -0.02
radio -0.08* -0.09** 0.09** 0.01 0.10** 0.02 0.05 -0.07* 0.00
tv -0.14*** -0.36*** 0.32*** -0.07* 0.29*** -0.16*** -0.21*** 0.02 0.00 0.00
political weights -0.30*** -0.91*** 0.83*** -0.22*** 0.69*** -0.12*** -0.33*** 0.11*** 0.34*** 0.09** 0.34***
***p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10
Table 6.9.: Correlation table for 2008-2010 (Election 2007)
RV NPV PV satis age educ income region newspapers radio tv
RV
NPV -0.53***
PV -0.49*** -0.27***
satis -0.22*** 0.42*** -0.26***
age 0.73*** -0.41*** -0.36*** -0.08***
educ -0.26*** 0.15*** 0.17*** -0.04* -0.34***
income -0.42*** 0.27*** 0.19*** 0.07*** -0.40*** 0.34***
region -0.21*** 0.11*** 0.08*** 0.01 -0.02 -0.05* -0.14***
newspapers -0.03 -0.02 0.06** -0.07*** 0.04* 0.14*** 0.07*** 0.00
radio 0.06** -0.01 -0.04* 0.04* 0.04 0.04* 0.05** -0.08*** 0.00
tv 0.21*** -0.15*** -0.06** -0.04 0.39*** -0.16*** -0.23*** 0.01 -0.01 0.00
political weights -0.42*** -0.03 0.41*** -0.57*** -0.38*** 0.15*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.06** -0.11*** -0.07***
***p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10
206
Literaturverzeichnis
Table 6.10.: Correlation table for 2012 (Election 2011)
RV NPV PV satis age educ income region tv media
RV
NPV -0.85***
PV 0.87*** -0.81***
satis -0.20*** 0.53*** -0.31***
age -0.20*** 0.14*** -0.18*** -0.05
educ 0.12*** -0.09** 0.11*** -0.06 -0.27***
income 0.19*** -0.18*** 0.18*** -0.05 -0.37*** 0.34***
region -0.17*** 0.14*** -0.15*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.08** -0.14***
tv -0.13*** 0.10*** -0.10*** 0.00 0.27*** -0.10*** -0.11*** 0.05
media -0.20*** 0.26*** -0.27*** 0.31*** 0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.00
political weights -0.11*** -0.06* -0.26*** -0.02 -0.04 0.03 0.05 -0.04 0.00 -0.06
***p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10
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7. Kapitel
Erläuterung der Methoden
7.1. Grundlagen der Sozialen Netzwerktheorie
Die Netzwerkanalyse als sozialwissenschaftliche Methode befasst sich mit der Untersu-
chung der Beziehungen zwischen zuvor definierten Akteuren sowie strukturellen und in-
haltlichen Eigenschaften dieser Beziehungen (Jansen, 2003; Wasserman und Faust, 1994;
Trappmann et al., 2005) und hat sich als wichtiger Bestandteil der theoretischen und empi-
rischen Forschung in unterschiedlichen wissenschaftlichen Bereichen wie Soziologie (Burt,
1982, 1992; Coleman, 1988a,b; Granovetter, 1985; Fukuyama, 1995), Politikwissenschaft
(Pappi und Shikano, 2007; Putnam et al., 1993; Hardin, 1999; Van Deth et al., 1999),
Wirtschaft (Alesina und La Ferrara, 2000; Knack und Keefer, 1997; Granovetter, 2005),
Medizin, Pädagogik usw. etabliert.
Netzwerkanalytische Theorien werden häufig mit Rational-Choice-Ansatz (Coleman,
1988b; Burt, 1982, 1992) verbunden, gemäß dem ein individuelles Verhalten als Ergeb-
nis eines nutzenmaximierenden Vorhabens interpretiert wird. Als Ausgangspunkt sozialer
Phänomene kann dabei ein Akteur in Abhängigkeit von der betrachteten Ebene (Indivi-
duum, Gruppe, Organisation usw.) angesehen werden. Um soziale Phänomene erklären zu
können, muss deshalb auf handelnde Akteure zurückgegriffenen werden. Während der Zu-
sammenhang zwischen nutzenorientiertem Handeln von Akteuren und sozialen Netzwerken
darin besteht, dass die Individuen die Beziehungen eingehen, um ihre persönliche Inter-
essen zu verfolgen (Coleman, 1988b; Burt, 1982; Florack, 2010), stellen die strukturellen
Netzwerkcharakteristika nicht nur zusätzliche Handlungsmöglichkeiten für die beteiligten
Akteure sondern auch Handlungsbeschränkungen dar.
Die mit Netzwerken gebundene Theorie des sozialen Kapitals beruht auf der Annahme,
dass neben physischem und Humankapital die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung sowie das Wohl-
befinden und die Leistung einer Gesellschaft zusätzlich von dem sozialen Umfeld abhängen.
Soziale Netzwerke sind eine strukturelle Komponente des Sozialkapitals und bilden neben
Vertrauen, Normen und Werten einen Bestandteil des ganzen Konzeptes des Sozialkapitals
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(Gabriel et al., 2002; Westle und Gabriel, 2008), die theoretische Fundierung und empi-
rische Erklärung dessen sowohl in den Schriften klassischer soziologischer Autoren, z.B.
Weber (1921), als auch in den neueren wissenschaftlichen Arbeiten (Bourdieu, 1986; Cole-
man, 1988b; Putnam et al., 1993; Putnam, 2000; Fukuyama, 1995) zu finden sind. Dabei
unterscheiden sich die theoretischen und empirischen Ansätze der Sozialkapitaltheorie, die
eher die Systemebene (Makroebene) untersuchen, d.h. gesamtgesellschaftliche Folgen des
Sozialkapitals hervorheben, von solchen Ansätzen, die sich auf den Einfluss des Sozialka-
pitals auf Individuen und Beziehungen zwischen Individuen (Mikroebene) konzentrieren
(Coleman, 1988b; Westle und Gabriel, 2008). Aufgrund der starken Korrespondenz zur
Sozialkapitaltheorie tritt die soziale Netzwerkanalyse auch auf beiden Ebenen auf. Der
Unterschied zwischen beiden Herangehensweisen besteht vor allem darin, ob man die Be-
ziehungen zwischen mehreren Einheiten betrachtet (Gesamtnetzwerk) oder das Netzwerk
aus der Perspektive von Ego untersucht (Pappi, 1987). Die egozentrierte und soziozentrier-
te Netzwerkanalyse korrespondiert mit den entsprechenden Aspekten des Sozialkapitals auf
den beiden Ebenen (Westle und Gabriel, 2008) (siehe Abbildung 7.1).
Figure 7.1.: Sozialkapital auf Makro- und Mikroebenen
Die Popularität des Sozialkapitalansatzes in der Politikwissenschaft geht vor allem auf
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die Arbeit von Putnam zur Performanz der Demokratie in Italien zurück (Putnam et al.,
1993). Putnam et al. (1993) definieren Sozialkapital als ’...features of social organization,
such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating
coordinated actions’ und betonen die Partizipation der Menschen mit sozialer und politi-
scher Einbindung, wobei ein hohes Maß an Einbindung ihrer Ansicht nach positiv auf die
Leistung der Regierung wirkt. Soziale Netzwerke und das durch sie produzierte Vertrauen
stehen nach Putnam et al. (1993) im Mittelpunkt der Entstehung sozialer Kooperation,
sodass kollektive politische Ziele mit weniger Aufwand zu erreichen sind. Darüber hin-
aus reduzieren sich die Kontroll- und Verhandlungskosten. Die Zivilgesellschaft wird nach
Putnam durch soziale Netzwerkstrukturen (Vereine, Verbände und Parteien) gebildet, wo
Kooperation, Vertrauen und zivile Partizipation verstärkt werden.
Neben der Analyse der Government Performance mithilfe der Sozialkapitaltheorie (Put-
nam et al., 1993) gibt es innerhalb der Politikwissenschaft vielfältige Bereiche (Internatio-
nale Beziehungen unter der Globalisierung sowie Vertrags-, Handels- und Kommunikati-
onsnetzwerke von Staaten und NGOs) und Anwendungen, die ihre Auswertungen aufgrund
der Sozialen Netzwerkanalyse vornehmen. Vor allem handelt es sich dabei um zwei Konzep-
te: Politiknetzwerke und egozentrierte Netzwerke, die sich entsprechend den beiden Her-
angehensweisen in Datenerhebung und Datenauswertung unterscheiden (Serdült, 2002).
Während Politiknetzwerke die Auswirkungen des Zusammenspiels von unterschiedlichen
exekutiven, legislativen, judikativen und gesellschaftlichen Institutionen und Gruppen bei
der Entstehung, Entscheidung und Durchführung von staatlichen Maßnahmen innerhalb
eines thematisch abgegrenzten Politikfeldes abbilden, spiegeln die egozentrierten Netzwer-
ke das soziale Umfeld der einzelnen Wähler wider und repräsentieren den Zugang von Ego
zu sozial wichtigen Informationen. Im Vergleich zu Politiknetzwerken, die ein Teil der Er-
klärung eines politischen Prozesses sind und dazu beitragen, Entscheidungsfindungs- und
Implementationsstrukturen innerhalb eines Politikbereichs zu analysieren, tragen die ego-
zentrierten Netzwerke dazu bei, Wahl und Abstimmungsresultate auf der Mikroebene zu
untersuchen (Serdült, 2002).
Die Pionierstudien zum Einfluss der sozialen Netzwerke auf die politischenWahlen führte
schon in den vierzigern Jahren die Columbia-Schule durch (Lazarsfeld, 1950; Lazarsfeld
und Henry, 1968; Berelson et al., 1954; Katz und Lazarsfeld, 1955). Aufgrund, dass es
die Wähler gibt, die gleichzeitig zu mehreren Gruppen mit unterschiedlichen politischen
Interessen gehören und daher dem sog. cross pressure (Lazarsfeld et al., 1968; Berelson
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et al., 1954; Campbell et al., 1960) ausgesetzt sind, etabliert sich in Sozialforschung das
Konzept sozialer Netzwerke. Nach diesem Konzept wird mit Hilfe der netzwerkanalytischen
Methode der Einfluss des sozialen Umfeldes auf die Wähler in die Analyse einbezogen,
sodass ein Wähler nicht nur von einem Diskussionspartner Informationen erhält und sich
davon beeinflussen lässt, sondern diese mit den weiteren Informationen in seinem Netzwerk
vergleicht und dann entscheidet, ob er davon überzeugt ist. Huckfeldt et al. (2004) stellen in
ihrer Analyse der egozentrierten Netzwerke fest, dass die Wähler von einem Netzwerk mit
konsistenten Präferenzen mehr beeinflusst werden als von einem mit weniger konsistenten
Präferenzen.
Das Grundmodell eines egozentrierten Netzwerkes basiert auf der Beziehung zwischen
einem Ego genannten Individuum zu einer Alter genannten Person und den Beziehungen
zwischen den mehreren möglichen Alteri untereinander. Da Ego in der sozialen Realität in
eine Vielzahl von Beziehungen mit Alteri eingebettet ist, wird Ego mit einem sogenannten
Namensgenerator aufgefordert, Personen zu nennen, zu denen Ego soziale Beziehungen un-
terhält, wobei für diese Alteri zusätzliche Angaben wie Alter, Geschlecht, Bildungsniveau,
politische Einstellungen erfragt werden. Die grundlegenden Maße zur Charakterisierung ei-
nes Ego-Netzwerkes, die in vorliegenden Beiträgen verwendet wurden, sind Netzwerkgröße
(Zahl der Alteri), Netzwerkdichte (Verhältnis der vorhandenen Beziehungen im Netzwerk
zur Zahl der möglichen Beziehungen) sowie Netzwerkambivalenz (zu welchem Maß die un-
tereinander konkurrierenden Einstellungen aller Alteri eines Egos unterschiedlich sind).
Die weiteren Netzwerk charakterisierenden Merkmale sowie die Konzepte und Methoden
der sozialen Netzwerkanalysen sind in Knoke und Kuklinski (1982), Pappi (1987), Wasser-
man und Faust (1994), Pappi (1987), Jansen (2003), Scott (1991, 2000), Jackson (2008)
detailliert beschrieben.
7.2. Empirische Wählerforschung
Die moderne Wahlforschung basiert auf quantitativen Entscheidungsmodellen, die auf der
Grundlage von repräsentativen Befragungsdaten mit Hilfe von ökonometrischen Metho-
den spezifiziert werden. Methodisch hat sich in der empirischen Wahlforschung heute das
probabilistische Wählermodell als Standardansatz bewährt, welches grundsätzlich alle re-
levanten Elemente der unterschiedlichen sozialpsychologischen, soziologischen und räum-
lichen Wählertheorie integriert und geeignet ist, die relative Bedeutung der im obigen
Abschnitt herausgearbeiteten politikorientierten und nicht-politikorientierten Wahlmotive
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abzubilden (Pappi und Shikano, 2007; Adams et al., 2005).
Nach der probabilistischen Entscheidungstheorie wird das Wählen als Selektion zwischen
Alternativen konzipiert. Diese Selektion erfolgt auf der Basis der Bewertung von einzelnen
Alternativen. Im Rational-Choice-Ansatz wird die Bewertung der Alternativen explizit als
Nutzen formuliert. In probabilistischen Modellen wird angenommen, dass der Nutzen, den
ein Individuum einer Partei zuordnet, aus zwei Komponenten besteht: einer deterministi-
schen Nutzenkomponente, die aufgrund beobachteter Charakteristika kalkulierbar ist, und
einer stochastischen Error-Komponente, die grundsätzlich nicht beobachtbar ist. Die de-
terministische Nutzenkomponente kann unterschiedliche Komponenten beinhalten, die mit
den oben genannten unterschiedlichen Wählermotiven korrespondieren (Pappi und Shika-
no, 2007). Der räumlichen Nutzentheorie1 von Enelow und Hinich (1984) folgend kann
die politikorientierte Komponente als gewichtete euklidische Distanz (ED) oder gewichte-
te quadrierte euklidische Distanz (QED) zwischen der eigenen Wählerposition (xni) und
der jeweiligen Parteiposition (snj) auf relevante Politikdimensionen modelliert werden:
ED =
√∑
n
βn(xni − snj)2
QED =
∑
n
βn(xni − snj)2
Alternativ zu der euklidischen Distanz gibt es aber auch andere räumliche Nutzenfunk-
tionen, z.B. das Richtungsmodell von Rabinowitz und Macdonald (1989). Eine interessante
Erweiterung der räumlichen Wählermodelle geht auf Hinich et al. (2004) zurück, die das
ursprüngliche Modell von Downs mit dem Richtungsmodell von Rabinowitz zu einem ge-
meinsamen räumlichen Modell vereint (Hinich et al., 2004; Henning et al., 2007) .
Bereits Enelow und Hinich (1984) haben neben der politikorientierten Nutzenkompo-
nente eine weitere sogenannte Valenzkomponente2 eingeführt, die nicht auf die Politik
bezogene Faktoren abhebt. Inhaltlich lässt sich die Bedeutung von nicht auf die Politik
bezogenen Determinanten für die Bewertung und Wahl von Parteien dadurch erklären,
dass individuelle Wähler nur begrenzte Informationen hinsichtlich der Wirkung von Poli-
tiken auf ihre Wohlfahrt haben, deshalb benutzen sie andere nicht auf die Politik bezogene
1Obwohl die Theorie der räumlichen Modellen sich in den letzten Jahren erheblich entwickelt hat, gehen
ihre theoretischen Grundlagen auf die Arbeiten von Hotelling (1929); Downs (1957); Black (1958) zurück
2Die Valenzkomponente wird in einer Reihe von neueren Studien (Abney et al., 2011; Clarke et al.,
2011; Johns, 2011; Hummel, 2010; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita, 2009; Lupia and Menning, 2009;
Schofield, 2004, 2003; Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2000) verstärkt untersucht
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Indikatoren, um den Teilnutzen, den sie durch die Wahl einer speziellen Partei erwarten
können, abzuschätzen. Eine Möglichkeit dies zu tun kann z.B. die Affinität einer Partei
zu bestimmten sozialen oder ethnischen Gruppen abzuschätzen sein. Dabei macht es Sinn,
dass diese auf Politik unabhängigen Kompetenzeinschätzungen der Parteien systematisch
für bestimmte sozioökonomische Gruppen variieren, so dass diese Teilkomponente neben
parteispezifischen Charakteristika auch von individuellen Wählercharakteristika wie Alter,
Geschlecht, Beruf, Bildung, Einkommen, etc. (Z) abhängen kann. Eine spezielle individu-
elle Wählercharakteristik korrespondiert mit der von Wählern individuell wahrgenomme-
nen Performanz der Parteien in vorangegangenen Legislaturperioden, diese wird auch als
Parteiloyalität interpretiert (vgl. Pappi und Shikano 2007). Weiterhin wird als weitere spe-
zielle Nutzenkomponente, die von Wählern in der letzten Legislaturperiode beobachtete
eigene ökonomische Entwicklung bzw. die beobachtete regionale oder nationale ökono-
mische Entwicklung, als Bewertungskriterium der Parteien herangezogen. Dieser Aspekt
der Bewertung von Parteien durch den Wähler wird als retrospektives Wählen bezeichnet
(Fiorina, 1981).
7.3. Probabilistische Wählermodelle
In der Wahl- und Wählerforschung3 wird das Wählen als Selektion zwischen Alternativen
konzipiert. Diese Selektion erfolgt auf der Basis der Bewertungen von einzelnen Alternati-
ven. Im Rational-Choice-Ansatz wird die Bewertung der Alternativen explizit als Nutzen
angesprochen. Die auf diesem Ansatz basierenden probabilistischen Wählermodelle gehen
davon aus, dass ein Wähler i als rationaler Nutzenmaximierer sich verhält und aufgrund
dessen diejenige Alternative j wählt, die ihm den größten Nutzen bringt:
Ui(j) > Ui(j′), ∀j 6= j′. (7.1)
In probabilistischen Modellen wird angenommen, dass der Nutzen Ui(j) vom Individu-
um i für Partei j als Komposition von zwei Komponenten darstellbar ist: zum einen,
deterministische Komponente Vi(j), die aufgrund der beobachteten Charakteristika kal-
kulierbar ist, zum anderen stochastische Nutzenkomponente ij , wobei die stochastische
3Eine detaillierte Einführung in die Modellierung des politischen Verhaltens der Wähler sowie angewandte
multivariate Analyseverfahren der Soziologie und Politikwissenschaften sind in Thurner (1998); Andreß
et al. (1997) gegeben.
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Nutzenkomponente über alle Alternativen und Individuen unabhängig voneinander, iden-
tisch und extremwert verteilt sind (Train, 2003). Der zu schätzende Nutzen nimmt dann
die folgende Form an:
Ui(j) = Vi(j) + ij = −
∑
n
βn(xni − snj)2 + ij , (7.2)
wobei die deterministische politische Komponente Vi(j) den Nutzen darstellt, der mithilfe
z.B. quadratischer Nutzenfunktion aufgrund den generischen (Policy-Variablen) gebildet
wird. Die Policy-Variablen sind im Sinne der räumlichen Modelle die in einzelnen poli-
tischen n-Dimensionen berechneten Euklidischen Distanzen, wobei das negative Zeichen
vor den Distanzen bedeutet: je kleiner die Distanz zwischen Position des Wählers i und
Position der Partei j ist, desto größer ist der Nutzen.
Um abzuschätzen, inwiefern die individuellen Nonpolicy-Charakteristika (z.B. Alter,
Ausbildung, Einkommen, religiöse Zugehörigkeit) die individuelle Wahlentscheidung be-
einflussen, können auch diese Charakteristika in die deterministische Komponente des
Modells aufgenommen werden. Diese Variablen sind alternativenspezifisch, weil die Re-
gressionskoeffizienten γjl über die Alternativen unterschiedlich sind:
Ui(j) = αij +
∑
l
γjltil +
∑
n
βn(xni − snj)2 + ij , (7.3)
wobei til individuelle l-Charakteristika von Wähler i ist.
Aufgrund der Tatsache, dass die politischen Determinanten gegenüber den unpolitischen
Komponenten bei der Schätzung des individuellen Wählernutzens gestellt werden, lassen
sich die politikorientierten Wahlen von ideologischen Wahlen unterscheiden und empi-
risch schätzen. Beruht die Wahlentscheidung auf individuellen politischen Einstellungen,
wird von politikorientierten Wahlen gesprochen, die mithilfe der Euklidischen Distanzen
in einem mehr dimensionalen Policy-Raum aufgrund der aus Umfrage erhaltenen politi-
schen Positionen geschätzt werden. Wählen dagegen die Wähler aufgrund der Nonpolicy-
Faktoren, finden die ideologischenWahlen statt. Von politischen und ideologischenWahlen
sind auch die retrospektiven Wahlen zu unterscheiden, in denen der zeitliche Bezug der
Wählerurteile und Erwartungen über das Regierungshandeln bezüglich öffentlicher Güter
berücksichtigt wird (Hinich und Munger, 1994; Pappi und Shikano, 2007; Alvarez, 1996).
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7.3.1. Das MNL-Modell
Die Methode, mit der die Nutzenfunktion den einzelnen Wahlalternativen zugeordnet wird,
ist das diskrete Entscheidungsmodell (Discrete Choice Model), welches als Standard eta-
bliert ist und die Parameter dessen mithilfe des multinomialen (oder konditionalen4) Logit-
Modells (MNL) empirisch schätzbar sind (Adams et al., 2005; Temme, 2007; Thurner, 1998;
Andreß et al., 1997). Die MNL-Modelle untersuchen den Zusammenhang einer kategoria-
len abhängigen Variablen und einer oder mehrerer unabhängiger Variablen, die sowohl
metrisch als auch kategorial skaliert sein können, und werden somit als eine Erweiterung
der logistischen Regression im Fall einer abhängigen Variable mit mehr als zwei diskreten
Merkmalen gesehen (Temme, 2007).
In allen diskreten Entscheidungsmodellen ist das absolute Niveau des Nutzens irrelevant.
Die Tatsache, dass die Wahlwahrscheinlichkeit Pij = Prob(Uij > Uik) = Prob(Uij −Uik >
0) nur von der Nutzendifferenz abhängig ist, hat die Implikation auf die Spezifizierung
in Logit-Modellen, sodass die Wahrscheinlichkeit Pij als Verhältnis von Exponenten einer
deterministischen Komponente und der Summe allen Exponenten geschätzt wird:
Pij =
eVi(j)∑
K e
Vi(k)
. (7.4)
Beim Anschauen der Odds (Relation von Wahrscheinlichkeiten) wird es klar, dass ledig-
lich die Differenz zwischen zwei Nutzen aus unterschiedlichen Alternativen für die Wahl-
entscheidung von Bedeutung ist (Thurner, 1998). Für jedes Alternativenpaar j und h lässt
sich folgende lineare Logitform bilden:
Pij
Pih
= e(Vi(j)−Vi(h)) = e((αij−αih)+
∑
l
(γjl−γhl)til+
∑
n
βn(dnij−dnih)) (7.5)
(7.6)
ln(Pij
Pih
) = Vi(j)− Vi(h) = (αij − αih) +
∑
l
(γjl − γhl)til +
∑
n
βn(dnij − dnih)
Bei der logistischen Regression ist die abhängige Variable ein logarithmiertes Wahr-
scheinlichkeitsverhältnis. Die Regressionskoeffizienten der logistischen Regression bezeich-
nen deswegen die Veränderung im logarithmierten Wahrscheinlichkeitsverhältnis, dass eine
Alternative eintritt, wenn eine unabhängige Variable um eine Einheit ansteigt. Die Ko-
4Multinomiale und konditionale Logit Modelle lassen sich systematisch in das allgemeine Logit-Modell
überführen (Thurner, 1998; Andreß et al., 1997)
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effizienten sind schwer zu interpretieren und man beschränkt sich deswegen darauf, die
Vorzeichen der Koeffizienten zu vergleichen. Es ist wichtig zu erwähnen, dass es zwei un-
terschiedliche Arten der Kodierung der unabhängigen Variablen gibt, Dummykodierung
und Effektkodierung. Bei Dummykodierung benutzt man eine Referenzkategorie (eine Al-
ternative), mit der alle anderen Alternativen verglichen werden. Bei der Dummykodierung
schätzen die Regressionskoeffizienten die Abweichung des Logits in der betrachteten Ka-
tegorie (Alternative) vom Logit der Referenzkategorie. Die Effektkodierung unterscheidet
sich von der Dummykodierung dadurch, dass es bei der Effektkodierung keiner Referenzka-
tegorie gibt und die Regressionskoeffizienten die Differenz der Logits zum arithmetischen
Mittel der Logits über aller Alternativen messen. Welche Kodierung gewählt wird, ist für
die Modellschätzung unwichtig. Die geschätzten bedingten Wahrscheinlichkeiten sind bei
beiden Kodierungen gleich (Andreß et al., 1997). Man spricht von unterschiedlichen Re-
parametrisierungen eines Logitmodells (Andreß et al., 1997). Im Rahmen dieser Arbeit
wurden Modelle mit Effektkodierung geschätzt (Vermunt und Magidson, 2005).
7.3.2. Die Parameterschätzung
Die von McFadden (1974) präsentierte Maximum Likelihood Estimation (ML) ist am meis-
ten verwendete Schätzungsmethode und wird in der folgenden Form geleitet (Temme,
2007):
L(C) =
I∏
i=1
∏
j∈J
Pi(j)yji
wobei C unbekannter Parametervektor ist. yji nimmt 1 an, wenn der Entscheidungsträ-
ger i eine Alternative j auswählt, und sonst null. Die Log-Likelihoodfunktion wird durch
Logarithmieren bestimmt, die optimiert werden muss:
LL(C) =
∑
i
∑
j
yjiln(Pi(j))
An der Stelle, wo LL(C) maximiert wird, ergibt sich der Schätzer für den Parametervektor
C.
7.4. Latent-Class-Modelle
Im Gegensatz zu multinomialen logistischen Modellen (MNL), die seit vielen Jahren eine
fundamentale Basis für die Discrete-Choice-Modelle darstellen und eine große Einschrän-
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kung hinsichtlich der IIA-Annahme aufweisen (Interdependence of Irrelevant Alternati-
ves)5, lassen sich Mixed-Logit- (MLM) und Latent-Class-Modelle (LCM) in der empi-
rischen Forschung auch dann verwenden, wenn eine Verletzung dieser Annahme vorliegt
und/oder unbeobachtete Heterogenität zwischen den Entscheidungsträgern existiert (Tem-
me, 2007). Die großen Vorteile der Latent-Class Modelle sind eine höhere Handhabbarkeit,
Plausibilität und statistische Prüfbarkeit, weil die Annahme über die Verteilung der He-
terogenität determinierenden Parameter nicht spezifiziert werden muss.
Die Latent-Class-Modelle sind als eine logistische Erweiterung der probabilistischen
Wählermodelle anzusehen (Lazarsfeld und Henry, 1968; Vermunt und Magidson, 2005),
die ein tieferes Verständnis der Determinanten von ideologischen und politikorientierten
Wahlen liefern können. Mithilfe der Latent-Class-Analyse (LCA) können die Wähler nach
Heterogenität in ihren sozioökonomischen Charakteristika und politischen Präferenzen un-
tersucht werden, sodass durch die ermittelte probabilistische Zugehörigkeit der Wähler zu
einer oder einer anderen latenten Klasse analysiert werden kann, welche Wählerklassen
ideologischer wählen. Der Unterschied zum MNL-Modell besteht in der Nutzenfunktion.
Beim Latent-Class-Modell werden zusätzliche segmentspezifische Parameter (Kovariaten)
geschätzt, die eine Klassenzugehörigkeit erklären. Die Wahrscheinlichkeitsdichte nimmt
dann die folgende Form an (Vermunt und Magidson, 2005):
P (yi) =
X∑
x=1
P (x|zcovi )
Ti∏
t=1
P (yi|x,dattit ,kpreit ), (7.7)
wo Klassenzugehörigkeit des Individuums i vom Kovariatenvektor zcovi abhängig ist. Die
Wahrscheinlichkeit der Klassenzugehörigkeit P (x | zcovi ) hat die folgende Form:
P (x | zcovi ) =
exp(ηx|zi)∑
X exp(ηx′|zi)
(7.8)
mit linearem Term:
ηx|zi = r0x +
H∑
h=1
rhxz
cov
ih , (7.9)
5Gemäß IIA-Annahme ist der relative Nutzen einer Alternative im Vergleich zu einer anderen unabhängig
gegenüber der Existenz einer dritten Alternative
222
7. Erläuterung der Methoden
wobei rhx einen Einfluss der Kovariate zcovih auf das Determinieren der Klasse x abbildet.
7.5. Marginale Effekte
Die geschätzten Parameter geben die Einflussstärke der unabhängigen Variablen auf die ab-
hängige Entscheidungen für eine Alternative an. Der Regressionskoeffizient der logistischen
Regression ist schwer zu interpretieren, denn die abhängige Variable bildet logarithmierte
Wahrscheinlichkeitsverhältnisse zwischen den Alternativen ab. Der Regressionskoeffizient
bezeichnet den Einfluss einer unabhängigen Variable auf die Logits einer Kategorie versus
der anderen alternativen Kategorie einer abhängigen Variablen. Da es sich um eine nicht-
lineare Funktion handelt, verändern sich die logarithmierten Odds (Wahrscheinlichkeits-
verhältnisse) nicht konstant über den gesamten Wertebereich der unabhängigen Variablen,
sondern in Abhängigkeit von deren jeweiligen Ausprägungen (Thurner, 1998).
Während die Regressionskoeffizienten einen Effekt der unabhängigen Variable auf die
Wahrscheinlichkeitsverhältnisse darstellen, sind die empirischen Analysen oft daran inter-
essiert, die direkten Effekte der Prädiktoren auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Wahl einer
Alternative zu ermitteln. Diese partielle Ableitungen werden auch marginale Effekte ge-
nannt. Die partiellen Ableitungen zeigen, wie sich die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Wahl einer
Alternative prozentual bei Veränderung der unabhängigen Variablen um eine Einheit än-
dert. Ausgehend davon, dass die Variablen in generischen (Attributen) und alternativen-
spezifischen Variablen sich unterscheiden, werden entsprechend ihre marginale Effekte in
verschiedener Weise berechnet. Aufgrund einer Relation der unterschiedlichen margina-
len Effekte werden in Rahmen dieser Arbeit unterschiedliche Indikatoren gebildet. Diese
Relation spiegelt eine relative Wichtigkeit der Non-policy-Komponente zu einer Policy-
Komponente wider und korrespondiert mit einer Grenzrate der Substitution.
Ableitung der marginalen Effekte für alternativenspezifische (Non-policy) Variablen
Sei tli eine alternativenspezifische Variable l für Individuum i, wie z.B. Alter, Ausbil-
dung oder Einkommen. Es gibt J Alternativen mit 1..j ∈ J . Die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass
Individuum i die erste Alternative wählt ist:
Pi1 =
eUi1∑J
j=1 e
Uij
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Die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass Individuum i die erste Alternative nicht wählt, ist dagegen:
1− Pi1 =
J∑
j=2
Pij = 1− e
Ui1∑J
j=1 e
Uij
=
∑J
j=1 e
Uij∑J
j=1 e
Uij
− e
Ui1∑J
j=1 e
Uij
=
∑J
j=2 e
Uij∑J
j=1 e
Uij
Dann werden die marginalen Effekte für die erste Alternative als die Ableitung der
entsprechenden Wahrscheinlichkeit bezüglich dieser Variable folgendermaßen berechnet:
∂Pi1
∂tli
=
∂eUi1
∂tli
∗
(∑J
j=1 e
Uij
)
− eUi1 ∗
∂
(∑J
j=1 e
Uij
)
∂tli(∑J
j=1 e
Uij
)2 =
=
eUi1 ∗ ∂U i1∂tli ∗
(∑J
j=1 e
Uki
)
− eUi1 ∗
(
eUi1 ∗ ∂U i1∂tli + eUi2 ∗
∂U i2
∂tli
+ · · ·+ eUiJ ∗ ∂U iJ∂tli
)
(∑J
j=1 e
Uij
)2 =
=
eUi1 ∗ γl1 ∗
(∑J
j=1 e
Uij
)
− eUi1 ∗
(
eUi1 ∗ γl1 + eUi2 ∗ γl2 + · · ·+ eUiJ ∗ γlJ
)
(∑J
j=1 e
Uij
)2 =
=
eUi1
∑J
j=1 e
Uij
(
γl1 − e
Ui1∗γl1+eUi2∗γl2+···+eUiJ ∗γlJ∑J
j=1 e
Uij
)
(∑J
j=1 e
Uij
)2 =
=
eUi1
(
γl1 − e
Ui1∗γl1+eUi2∗γl2+···+eUiJ ∗γlJ∑J
j=1 e
Uij
)
∑J
j=1 e
Uij
=
= Pi1 ∗
(
γl1 − e
Ui1 ∗ γl1 + eUi2 ∗ γl2 + · · ·+ eUiJ ∗ γlJ∑J
j=1 e
Uij
)
=
= Pi1 ∗
γl1 − J∑
j=1
eUij∑J
j=1 e
Uij
γlj
 =
= Pi1 ∗ (γl1 −
J∑
j=1
Pijγlj ) = Pi1 ∗ (γl1 − Pi1γl1 −
J∑
j 6=1
Pijγlj ) =
= Pi1 ∗ (γl1(1− Pi1)−
J∑
j 6=1
Pijγlj ) = Pi1(1− Pi1)(γl1 −
J∑
j 6=1
Pij
(1− Pi1) γlj) =
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= Pi1 (1− Pi1)
(
γl1 − γlj
)
wobei γlj =
∑J
j 6=1
[
Pij∑J
j 6=1 Pij
γlj
]
Ableitung der marginalen Effekte für generische (Policy) Variablen
Sei dni1 eine generische Variable für Individuum i bezüglich der ersten Alternative, z.B.
Euklidische Distanz zwischen dem Individuum und Partei 1 in einem n-dimensionalen
Raum. Die Veränderung der Wahrscheinlichkeit, wenn die Distanz dni1 sich ändert, ist:
∂Pi1
∂dni1
=
∂eUi1
∂dni1
(∑J
j=1 e
Uij
)
− eUi1
∂
(∑J
j=1 e
Uij
)
∂dni1(∑J
j=1 e
Uij
)2 =
=
eUi1 ∂U i1∂dni1
(∑J
j=1 e
Uij
)
− eUi1eUi1βn(∑J
j=1 e
Uij
)2 =
= e
Ui1∑J
j=1 e
Uij
βn − e
Ui1eUi1(∑J
j=1 e
Uij
)2βn = βn eUi1∑J
j=1 e
Uij
(
1− e
Ui1∑J
j=1 e
Uij
)
= Pi1(1− Pi1)βn
Offensichtlich ist die Steigerung der Wahrscheinlichkeit am größten bei einer Wahr-
scheinlichkeit von 0,5 und wird zunehmend kleiner, je mehr man sich 0 bzw. 1 annähert.
Um eine globale Kennziffer zu erhalten ist es möglich, die einzelnen durch die unabhängi-
ge Variable induzierten Veränderungsraten aufzusummieren und den Mittelwert über alle
individuellen Veränderungsraten zu bilden (Thurner, 1998). Mittlere prozentuale Verän-
derungsraten geben an, wie sich die Auswahlwahrscheinlichkeiten einer jeden Alternative
im Durchschnitt prozentual verändern, wenn sich der Wert einer unabhängigen Variable
um eine Einheit ändert.
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Schlussbetrachtung
Diese Arbeit entstand vor dem Hintergrund, politik- und nicht-politikorientierte Wahl-
motive, die durch bestimmte sozioökonomische Charakteristika der Wähler determiniert
werden, zu untersuchen und somit zu einem besseren Verständnis des komplexen Zusam-
menhanges zwischen den politischen Wahlen und Government Performance in postsozia-
listischen Ländern beizutragen. Im Rahmen dieser Arbeit wird unter Government Perfor-
mance das Vorhandensein der Anreizstrukturen verstanden, die einer Regierung (Macht-
partei) ein Signal geben, in welchem Maße die Regierung sich anstrengen soll, um ihre
Chancen, wieder gewählt zu werden, zu erhöhen.
Der Fokus der Untersuchungen lag dabei auf Industrieländern, der Slowakei, Polen und
Russland, die jedoch in ihrer historischen Entwicklung unterschiedlich stark vom sozialis-
tischen System geprägt sind. Durch das Aufgreifen bestehender Theorien und Weiterfüh-
ren der innovativen empirischen Methoden der probabilistischen Wählerforschung wurden
bestehende Kenntnisse erweitert und theoretisch postulierte Zusammenhänge bestätigt.
Einen besonderen Anteil lieferte hierbei die Schätzung der probabilistischen Modelle mit-
hilfe der bislang in Wählerforschung nicht breit genutzten Latent-Class-Analysen, die eine
Einbettung aller die Wahlen determinierenden Komponenten erlauben. Darüber hinaus
lieferte die Einbeziehung sozialer Netzwerke einen zusätzlichen Erklärungsbeitrag zu der
Diskussion unterschiedlicher Wissenschaftsdisziplinen über die Bedeutung sozialer Netz-
werke.
Die in dieser Arbeit vorgelegte empirische Anwendung der Latent-Class-Modelle stellt
sich als eine plausible Methode für die Ermittlung des heterogenen Wählerverhaltens in der
Wählerforschung dar. Die Ergebnisse der verschiedenen Beiträge zeigen, dass das Verhalten
der Wähler im politischen Prozess in Abhängigkeit von ihren sozialen, ökonomischen, kul-
turellen und politischen Charakteristika sehr heterogen sein kann. Aus diesem Grund wer-
den alle Wahlmotive in ’politik-orientierte’, ’ideologische’ und ’retrospektive’ Komponente
aufgeteilt. Während die ’politik-orientierte’ Komponente die politischen Präferenzen der
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Wähler im mehrdimensionalen Policy-Raum widerspiegelt, bildet eine ’ideologische’ Kom-
ponente die Non-policy-Präferenzen ab, die unter anderem durch sozioökonomische Cha-
rakteristika der Wähler determiniert werden. Durch eine retrospektive Wahlkomponente
wird die Analyse eines Einflusses der Zufriedenheit auf das Wahlverhalten ermöglicht.
Als wichtige Indikatoren für Government Performance haben sich die relative Größe
der ’ideologischen’ Komponente sowie der berechnete Capture-Index herausgestellt. Auf
einer Seite können die ineffizienten Politiken dadurch erklärt werden, dass eine Bevölke-
rungsgruppe im Vergleich zu einer anderen Bevölkerungsgruppe ein viel größeres politi-
sches Gewicht aufweist. Dies wurde mithilfe des Capture-Index untersucht. Die positiven
Ergebnisse dieser Annahme wurden am Beispiel zweier Gruppen (Landwirte versus Nicht-
Landwirte) in den beiden ersten Beiträgen ermittelt. Auf der anderen Seite kann niedrige
Government Performance durch die starke Bedeutung der ’ideologischen’ Komponente
erklärt werden, auch dann, wenn die Diskrepanzen in den politischen Gewichten über un-
terschiedliche Bevölkerungsgruppen gering ausfallen (d.h. Capture-Index ist relativ klein).
Die entsprechenden Ergebnisse sind in den beiden letzten Beiträgen zu politischen Wahlen
in Russland zu finden.
Testing micropolitical foundation of agricultural protection: Latent Class
approach to Slovakia
In diesem Ansatz werden aufgrund der slowakischen Daten zwei Interessengruppen, Land-
wirte und Nicht-Landwirte, analysiert. Ein erarbeitetes Modell leitet eine theoretische
Erklärung dafür ab, dass in einem politischen System mit Verhältniswahlen ein politi-
scher Kandidat die Transferleistungen an Landwirte (Subventionen) dann präferiert, wenn
Letztere relativ gesehen besser organisiert sind und stärker politik-orientiert wählen. Die
theoretischen Ergebnisse des Modells korrespondieren mit dem bekannten development
paradox, wenn die relativ größeren Kosten der kollektiven Entscheidungen von Landwir-
ten im Vergleich zu den kleineren und besser organisierten Gruppen des Industriesektors
eine Besteuerung des Agrarsektors in Entwicklungsländern verursachen. Außerdem liefert
das theoretische Modell die wichtigen Determinanten der Agrarprotektion, d.h. das er-
wartete Niveau der Agrarprotektion ist umso höher, je höher die relative Wichtigkeit des
nicht-politikorientierten Wählens und je größer die Diskrepanz in relativen politischen Ge-
wichten zwischen den Agrariern und anderen Bevölkerungsgruppen ist. Im empirischen
Beitrag dieses Ansatzes wird auf die Schätzung der Discrete-Choice-Modelle mithilfe der
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Latent-Class-Analysen (LCA) (McFadden, 1974; Vermunt und Magidson, 2005) innovativ
eingegangen. Diese Art von Modellen geht davon aus, dass ein Wähler bei seiner politi-
schen Wahl sich als Nutzenmaximierer verhält. Im Vergleich zu klassischen logistischen
oder Mixed-Logit Modellen jedoch, die keine oder nur teilweise eine Heterogenität in indi-
viduellen Charakteristika der Wähler identifizieren können, bieten die LCA-Modelle eine
bessere Möglichkeit an, die (latenten) Klassen aufgrund der heterogenen politischen und
nicht-politischen Präferenzen der Wähler zu determinieren. Während die Variablen der
politischen Komponente der Wähler als die berechneten Distanzen in einem mehrdimen-
sionalen politischen Raum auftreten (Downs, 1957; Hinich und Munger, 1997), werden
die sozioökonomischen Charakteristika (Alter, Ausbildung, Einkommen, Zugehörigkeit zu
Landwirten, regionale ökonomische Performanz und Distanz zu einer Stadt) als nicht-
politische Variablen der Mikro- und Makroebene für die Analyse herangezogen.
Da das empirische Ziel darin besteht, die Bedeutung der ideologischen Wahlen im Ver-
gleich zu politik-orientierten Wahlen für zwei Bevölkerungsgruppen, Landwirte versus
Nicht-Landwirte, zu untersuchen, wobei ein handhabungsfähiges Instrumentarium not-
wendig ist, wird basierend auf einer Post-logit-Evaluation des Modells ein ideologischer
Indikator entwickelt. Der ideologische Indikator stellt ein hypothetisches Maß dar und
besagt, zu welchem Grad ein Individuum mehr ideologisch wählt, d.h. wie stark soll die
politische Komponente hypothetisch erhöht werden, um die ideologischen Vorteile auszu-
gleichen. Des Weiteren werden aufgrund der berechneten relativen politischen Gewichten
aus logistischen Schätzungen die theoretischen Hypothesen bestätigt. Tatsächlich ist der
berechnete ideologische Indikator für Landwirte sowie für die Wähler aus ökonomisch bes-
ser entwickelten Regionen signifikant höher als für Nicht-Landwirte und Regionen mit
schwacher ökonomischer Performanz, d.h. die Gruppe der Landwirte, die signifikant höhe-
re relative Gewichte aufweisen, wählt tatsächlich mehr politik-orientiert, wobei das durch
Landwirte verursachte Capture für ländliche Bewohner erheblich größer ist als für städti-
sche. Somit werden in diesem Ansatz die zwei wichtigen Punkte empirisch erläutert: Zum
einen hat Zugehörigkeit der Wähler zu Interessengruppen einen signifikanten Einfluss auf
politik-orientierte Wahlen und damit letztendlich auf das politische Outcome, zum anderen
erklären die bestätigte Existenz des Lobbykanals und die stark verzerrten Wählerbeliefs
das hohe Niveau der Agrarprotektion.
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Networks as determinants of voter behavior for the farm and non-farm
population: An estimation of spatial voting models using Latent Class Analysis
Das theoretische Modell dieses Beitrages leitet das Ergebnis ab, dass mit steigender Un-
sicherheit der Wählervorstellungen darüber, wie ein politisches System funktioniert, das
Gewicht der politischen Präferenzen im Vergleich zu ideologischen Präferenzen sinkt, d.h.
je weniger die Wähler informiert sind, desto ideologischer wählen sie. Des Weiteren bietet
dieser Beitrag eine Einbettung der sozialen Netzwerke als die Determinante der indivi-
duellen Wahlentscheidung in die Latent-Class-Analyse und entfaltet eine evidente Kor-
respondenz der sozioökonomischen Charakteristika, unter denen auch die egozentrierten
sozialen Netzwerke eine bedeutende Rolle spielen, nicht nur mit ideologischen Motiven,
sondern auch mit politischen Gewichten der Wähler. Neben der praktischen Anwendung
des Discrete-Choice-Ansatzes sowie des in der ersten Arbeit entwickelten Ideologischen
Indikators aufgrund der post-logistischen Evaluierung wird die Analyse der politischen
Präferenzen sowohl auf Mikro- als auch auf Makroebene unternommen.
Aufgrund der Netzwerkansätze (Lake und Huckfeldt, 1998; Granovetter, 2005), denen
zufolge neue Informationen die Menschen mit großen Netzwerken schneller als die Men-
schen mit kleinen und dichten Netzwerken erreichen, werden neben der unabhängigen
Variablen der Non-Policy-Dimension (Alter, Ausbildung, Einkommen) auch die weiteren
die Netzwerkstruktur charakterisierenden Parameter, Netzwerkgröße und Netzwerkdichte,
eingeführt. Aufgrund dessen besteht der Sinn der Modellierung darin, dass die bestimm-
ten Eigenschaften der sozialen Netzwerke, die mithilfe der Netzwerkindikatoren abgebildet
werden, den Zufluss der Information zu Wählern im ideologischen Raum erleichtern oder
erschweren, so dass die Wähler sich weniger oder mehr ideologisch verhalten.
Obwohl der Schwerpunkt dieser Arbeit auf die Untersuchung der Wirkung der sozialen
Netzwerke auf die individuelle politische Entscheidung gelegt wird, wird implizit auch auf
die strukturellen Unterschiede in sozialen Netzwerken zwischen Landwirten und Nicht-
Landwirten eingegangen. Es wird gezeigt, dass Netzwerke sowohl einen Einfluss auf die
Präferenzen individueller Akteure haben können (mit steigender Netzwerkdichte und sin-
kender Netzwerkgröße steigen die ideologischen Präferenzen) als auch eine unterschiedliche
Wirkung in Abhängigkeit von der Gruppe und ihrer Struktur aufweisen können (eine besser
organisierte Gruppe der Landwirte verfügt über eine größere Stabilität ihrer ideologischen
Präferenzen). Entsprechend den Ergebnissen kann die Netzwerkdichte positiv auf die ideo-
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logische sowie auf politische Wahlkomponente wirken, was als eine kritische Anmerkung
bezüglich dieser Analyse angesehen werden kann und auf das Erfordernis einer weiteren
Untersuchung der möglichen Bedingungen für dieses soziale Phänomen hinweist.
Social organization of voting and government performance: Theory and
empirical application in Poland and Slovakia
Durch die Einbeziehung eines weiteren Netzwerkparameters, Netzwerkambivalenz, stellt
dieser Beitrag eine empirische Erweiterung der vorherigen Arbeit dar, wobei die Analy-
se für zwei EU-Länder, die Slowakei und Polen, komparativ durchgeführt wird. Neben
der Einbeziehung der Netzwerkambivalenz wird in diesem Beitrag auf zwei Arten der
logistischen Modelle, d.h. endogen determiniertes Latent-Class-Modell mit unbekannter
Klassenzugehörigkeit und Latent-Class-Modell mit exogen gegebener (bekannter) Klas-
senzugehörigkeit, eingegangen. Daher stellt dieser Vergleich eine Grundlage für das tiefere
Verständnis der Wahldeterminanten für die ideologische und politik-orientierte Kompo-
nente dar. Während die Modelle mit exogener Klassenzugehörigkeit lediglich eine Hetero-
genität in Präferenzen zwischen Landwirten und Nicht-Landwirten aufweisen, greifen die
endogen determinierten Modelle tiefer und ermitteln eine starke Heterogenität in der indi-
viduellen Netzwerkambivalenz sowie in Variablen der Makroebene (regionale ökonomische
Entwicklung).
Dieser Beitrag zeigt die Ähnlichkeiten und Unterschiede im Einfluss der formalen und
informellen Organisation der Wähler auf die ideologischen Wahlmotive in beiden Ländern
auf. Erstens ist aufgrund der beiden Arten von Modellen eine Aussage, dass die Landwirte
relativ mehr politik-orientiert wählen, nur für die Slowakei möglich. Eine formale Zuge-
hörigkeit zu der Gruppe der Landwirte ist in der Slowakei ein wichtiger Faktor, der das
politische Verhalten erklärt. Zweitens ist das politische Verhalten der polnischen Landwir-
te weniger von ihrer formalen Organisation, sondern viel mehr von den anderen Mikro-
und Makrofaktoren abhängig. Insbesondere ist in Polen der Einfluss der informellen Netz-
werkkommunikation auf die ideologischen Wahlmotive für Landwirte größer als für Nicht-
Landwirte. Drittens beeinflusst in beiden Gruppen und Ländern die Netzwerkambivalenz
die ideologischen Wahlmotive signifikant positiv.
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Capture in the Russian Parliamentary Elections 2003-2011: Panel Analysis of
Voting Motives using Latent Class Approach
Vor dem Hintergrund einer quantitativen Entwicklung und Anwendung eines handha-
bungsfähigen Instrumentariums für die Untersuchung des individuellen politischen Ver-
haltens wird in diesem Beitrag die Analyse der politischen Wahlen in Russland anhand
der Ermittlung der ideologischen (non-policy) Komponente und aufgrund der ’unbalanced’
Paneldaten über drei Wahlperioden durchgeführt. Neben der Anwendung der Heterogeni-
tät generierenden Latent-Class-Modelle und ihrer Interpretation sowie einer Ableitung des
Non-policy-Indikators trägt der Artikel zu einem besseren Verständnis der Determinanten
des ideologischen Wählens in Russland bei. Darüber hinaus wird die dynamische Verände-
rung der ideologischen Komponente aufgezeigt. Die Erfassung der dynamischen Verände-
rung sowie Bezugnahme auf die Pearson-Korrelation unter Einbeziehung der Mikro- und
Makroparameter bietet eine anschauliche Untersuchung der Entwicklung der ideologischen
Wahlen.
Ein Interesse weckt eine Erweiterung der Analyse durch die Ermittlung des individuellen
politischen Gewichts. Die Berechnung des Capture-Koeffizienten für die unterschiedlichen
sozioökonomischen Gruppen sowie die Untersuchung der Disparitäten in politischen Ge-
wichten für die ganze Bevölkerung anhand des Gini-Koeffizienten und der Lorenz-Kurve
lassen die Rückschlüsse ziehen, dass das Vorhandensein des Capture in den politischen
Wahlen eines Transformationslandes sich nicht unbedingt nachweisen lässt. Es haben sich
nur geringe Diskrepanz in politischen Gewichten der Wähler und das aufgrund dieser
Gewichten verhältnismäßig kleine gebildete Capture herausgestellt. Von besonderem In-
teresse ist das Ergebnis der herausgestellten Tendenz der über die Zeit steigenden politik-
orientierten Motive der jüngeren Bevölkerungsgruppe sowie der Wähler aus zentralen Re-
gionen.
Satisfaction and Media as Determinants of Voting Behavior in Russian
Elections 2003-2011
Dieser Artikel bietet eine tiefere Untersuchung der politischen Wahlen in Russland durch
die Einbettung der weiteren Parameter, vom Zufriedenheit mit Government Performance
sowie Medienkanäle, und liefert die Ergebnisse der über die Zeit herausgestellten Senkung
der Government Accountability im Lande. Die ermittelte Heterogenität in den Wahldeter-
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minanten in Abhängigkeit von sozioökonomischen Charakteristika sowie Zufriedenheitsni-
veau und den Medienkanälen der Entscheidungsträger unterstreicht den in diesem Beitrag
gewählten Ansatz der Latent-Class-Analyse. Die ermittelten signifikanten Einflüsse der
einbezogenen Variablen bestätigen die Ergebnisse des vorherigen Ansatzes.
Erstens bestätigt der Artikel einen über die Zeit signifikanten Einfluss des Medienkanals
TV auf die steigenden ideologischen und fallenden politik-orientierten Wahlmotive. Zwei-
tens hängt die große Zufriedenheit der Wähler mit ihrem starken Non-policy-Verhalten
zusammen und beeinflusst die politik-orientierten sowie retrospektiven Komponenten in
negativer Weise. Der über die Zeit stärker werdende Zusammenhang zwischen der Zufrie-
denheit der Wähler und ihren ideologischen Präferenzen bietet leider keine Anreize für
die Prognostizierung der positiven Tendenzen im politischen System Russlands beim Er-
halten der aktuellen soziopolitischen und ökonomischen Bedingungen im Lande. Auf der
anderen Seite wird das Interesse durch die dynamisch verändernden Tendenzen in Policy-
Voting für die jüngere Generation und zentralen Regionen sowie durch die Verstärkung
der Diskrepanzen in der retrospektiven Komponente zwischen Parteien geweckt, was die
Frage nach den möglichen Auswirkungen dieser Tendenzen infolge der möglichen zukünf-
tigen Verschlechterung der ökonomischen Bedingungen aufwirft. Aufgrund der steigenden
Unzufriedenheit und daher der zunehmenden Wichtigkeit der politik-orientierten und re-
trospektiven Wählermotive ist eine ansteigende Bedeutsamkeit der Wähler im politischen
Prozess in Zukunft durchaus möglich.
Im Rahmen dieser Arbeit ist das ’politik-orientierte’ Verhalten der russischen Wähler
eventuell als kritisch anzumerken, da es vermutlich insgesamt auf einem niedrigen Niveau
im Vergleich zu den anderen Ländern liegt, was den Bedarf eines komparativen Vergleichs
zu den demokratischen und nicht-demokratischen Ländern aufweist. Angesichts der Tat-
sache, dass Russland ein präsidentielles Regierungssystem hat und das Parlament über
deutlich schwächere legislative Funktionen und Rechte verfügt, ist die Analyse der präsi-
dentiellen politischen Wahlen notwendig. Da die politischen Parteien aufgrund mehrerer
mit Parteien assoziierten Persönlichkeiten die amorphen Non-policy-Eigenschaften aufwei-
sen und dadurch für die Wähler schwerer als eine konkrete Person ideologisch zu charak-
terisieren wären, ist es zu erwarten, dass die Diskrepanzen zwischen den Wählermotiven
in den Schätzungen aufgrund von Daten aus präsidentiellen Wahlen nur noch verschärft
werden können.
Der nächste kritische Punkt beinhaltet für die Analyse des Wählerverhaltens die An-
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wendung der im Survey vorhandenen Medienkanäle (TV, Radio, Zeitungen) anstatt eines
leider nicht vorhandenen Maßes des individuellen Informationsstandes. Die Einbettung der
weiteren ideologischen Komponenten (z.B. Parteienidentität und Charakteristika der Par-
teienleader) sowie die Erweiterung des untersuchten politischen Raums (z.B. über Issues
der Außenpolitik) wären für die Aufdeckung der tiefergehenden Determinanten des politik-
und nicht-politikorientierten Verhaltens in Zukunft sinnvoll.
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9. Kapitel
Summary
Understanding voting motives is important for explaining democratic processes and (low)
Government Performance in both industrialized and transition / developing countries.
Transition / developing countries are especially characterized by poor civic participati-
on and low political awareness, which can lead to great capture by local elites and low
Government Performance. Therefore, the measurement of policy and non-policy oriented
preferences at the micro and macro level, the derivation of capture and voting indicators,
and the identification of determinants of voting behavior can greatly improve our under-
standing of the consistency of democratic elections and Government Performance. Since
the political behavior of individuals and groups is multidimensional and multifaceted, this
work uses a direct estimation of heterogeneous preferences based on discrete choice models
and latent class analysis. The complex individual interactions in social environments and
dependence on the information milieu require embedding of social networks and informa-
tional resources to study the underlying processes in detail.
This dissertation consists of five papers related to policy, non-policy and retrospective
voting motives. The papers differ in their theoretical and empirical approaches as well as
in the parameters under study because of different empirical aims. The first paper focuses
on a theoretical model explaining ideological incentives and a post-logit derivation of a
coefficient as a measure of ideological voting. The first paper also compares policy mo-
tives between two special groups (farmers and non-farmers) and between low and high
performing districts in Slovakia. Paper two is extended via egocentric network parameters
and includes a derivation of political weights as well as an investigation of capture and
the sources of capture for socio-economic groups at the micro and macro. In the third
paper, we compare the ideological motivations of voters in two countries (Slovakia and
Poland) as well as an extension via cross pressure (network ambivalence). We then discuss
an investigation of exogenous and endogenous heterogeneity of voter preferences.
The two last papers study policy versus non-policy and retrospective motives of Russi-
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an voters and changes in the electorate over time. The fourth paper concentrates on the
influence of socio-economic characteristics upon an ideological indicator, calculated as a
relation of two kinds of individual voting motives. We also analyze a capture and discrepan-
cies of voting motives for different Russian parties. Paper five considers further important
voting parameters, individual satisfaction with government performance and information
sources (media). It also investigates the relationship and dynamic development between
policy oriented, ideological and retrospective voting motives.
Testing micropolitical foundation of agricultural protection: Latent Class
approach to Slovakia
This paper uses data for 391 Slovakian households and presents a theoretical and empirical
model for the analysis of policy versus non-policy motives between different districts, socio-
economic groups (farmers versus non-farmers), and individuals. Theoretically, we show
that a level of agricultural protection increases with the falling relative importance of
non-policy voting for the agrarian voters in comparison to the relative importance of non-
policy voting for the non-agrarian voters. The model explains the well-known ’development
paradox’. This theoretical model is a basis for the further empirical estimations. Using the
advantages of latent class analysis (Vermunt and Magidson, 2005) based on the endogenous
determination of heterogeneous preferences, we estimated the empirical models and derived
an ideological indicator by which we compared the different groups. The comparison of
farmer and non-farmer groups shows that farmers vote in a more policy-oriented fashion,
confirming our theory. Further, we computed the relative political weights and identified
a lobby canal with a low relative weight vis-a-vis all voters because of the strongly biased
voter beliefs toward agricultural protection.
Networks as determinants of voter behavior for the farm and non-farm
population: An estimation of spatial voting models using Latent Class Analysis
The main aim of the second article is to explain the policy-oriented incentives of diffe-
rent population groups by using social network parameters (Lake and Huckfeldt, 1998;
Granovetter, 2005), network size and network density, in addition to socio-economic cha-
racteristics. This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the impact of social
network structure on voter behavior at the micro level. Using Slovakian data, we find that
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social network structure is a significant determinant of ideological preferences and political
weights. The voters vote more policy-oriented with increasing network size and decreasing
network density. Since the networks effects are more pronounced in the non-farmer group
as compared to the farmers, probably because of the local intra-organizational networks
of the latter, our empirical application may be basis for future research studies about
the (in)stability of social network effects on the policy-oriented behavior of (un)organized
groups.
Social organization of voting and government performance: theory and
empirical application in Poland and Slovakia
The third article presents an extension of the first and second papers, using data from
569 Polish households. We accounted for individual network ambivalence (Nir, 2005), em-
bedded as a measure for network cross-pressure and analyzed the influences of voters’
formal and informal organization on their voting behavior. Using both kinds of models,
known class membership corresponding with a pure logit model and unknown class mem-
bership based on endogenous determination by a latent factor, we show the differences
between policy and non-policy voter incentives emerging from consideration of hidden fac-
tors. After the previous papers confirmed the strong influences of farmer affiliation and
network structure on voting behavior in Slovakia, here we confirm the impact of network
ambivalence on voting behavior in both Poland and Slovakia: ideological voting rises with
increasing ambivalence in both farmer and non-farmer groups. Moreover, we find a weaker
relationship between a formal organization of Polish voters within a farmer group and
their policy-oriented voting motives, compared to Slovak farmers because of the higher
organization degree of Slovak farmers.
Capture in the Russian Parliamentary Elections 2003-2011: Panel Analysis of
Voting Motives using Latent Class Approach
In the 1990s, Russia started a transformation of its political and economic systems, but the
process of democratic development in Russia failed during the 2000s. A non-democratic
system induces greater possibilities for special interests. Thus, a persistence of special in-
terests in the form of state capture in transition countries is confirmed (The World Bank,
2000). This article seeks to reveal a capture presence in the Russian parliamentary elections
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in the period 2003-2011. Moreover, based on unbalanced panel data using 4,804 individual
questionnaires from a European social survey over the three parliamentary legislative peri-
ods, this paper examines a dynamic development of policy and non-policy oriented voting
incentives. The paper shows a shift of policy oriented voting motives from older voters
and distant regions to younger voters and centric regions. Given the capture, although
policy-oriented voting is confirmed, the socio-economic groups by which government party
is strongly captured are not indicated.
Satisfaction and Media as Determinants of Voting Behavior in Russian
Elections 2003-2011
This paper highlights the role of satisfaction and the media to explain the political beha-
vior of Russian voters. The results support the idea that all considered voting components
are strongly dependent on the value of satisfaction with government performance, i.e. the
more the satisfaction of voters, the more the non-policy voting, and the less the policy
and retrospective voting. Thereby, the reinforcing coherence between these, over time,
is confirmed. While the changes in retrospective voting are seen mostly moving between
the Kremlin party and other parties, changes in policy and non-policy voting proceed
among the diverse socio-economic groups, corresponding with the results of the previous
article. With regard to information sources, watching TV influences policy-oriented voting
negatively. Moreover, the results allow us to form conclusions about government per-
formance, thereby confirming theoretical derivations: For example, low accountability of
Russian policy makers in recent times may be due the falling importance of satisfaction
for the retrospective voting component and permanently rising importance of satisfacti-
on for ideological motives. Although the importance of dissatisfaction to vote in a more
policy-oriented way rises especially for younger people from the central regions, the rele-
vance of policy motives remains low and even seems to fall. The reinforcing divergence
between satisfied and unsatisfied people seems, on the one hand, to be harmless because
of a well-balanced Lorenz-curve for political weights, but on the other hand, it can hide
an increasing potential for conflicts of interests in the future.
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